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CHAPTER I
BILATERALISM IN GENERAL
Statement of Problem 
This is a comparative study of the development of 
 ^ bilateralism within federal, state, and local labor-management 
relations during the period frcxn the issuance of Executive 
Order 10988 by President Kennedy on January 12, 1962, to the 
Florida fire fighters statute effective January, 1973.1 This 
research is of continuing interest to the author since my 
master's thesis was a case study of federal and local public 
employee unionization in San Antonio, Texas, during the summer 
of 1969.2 This study is, therefore, an expansion of the thesis 
topic. Yet it is not a case study, but a study of the legal 
provisions establishing bilateralism covering such topics as 
the organizational structure established to handle bilateralism, 
recognition, the process of negotiations, the resolution of 
negotiation impasses, the strike, unfair labor practices, and 
last but not least the influence of bilateralism upon the merit 
system.
Now that the boundaries of this study have been 
established, three very important concepts must be established 
to further define the area of study, i.e., sovereignty, uni­
lateralism, and bilateralism. Kurt L. Hanslow in his book 
The Emerging Law of Labor Relations in Public Employment 
describes sovereignty as "the King can do no w r o n g . T h i s  
common law concept can additionally be defined as the ultimate 
or absolute political authority in a particular unit of govern­
ment. All other authority is subordinate to this sovereign 
authority in that the official acts and actions taken in the 
name of the government take precedence over other acts or ac­
tions. Sovereignty is also viewed as not being delegatable 
for to do so would reduce the power of the sovereign. Upon 
this base of sovereignty is built the concept of unilateralism 
or decision-making on personnel policy as the sole discretion 
of the sovereign employer. The employee is viewed in somewhat 
paternalistic terms in that the sovereign employer will take 
care of its employees. Along with this idea is that if the 
employee does not like the conditions of public employment, he 
or she is free to seek employment outside of the public sector. 
But unilateralism is in varying degrees being replaced by bi­
lateralism or joint decision-making in the determination of 
the policies which will influence the worker. The sovereign
employer is waiving its unilateral decision-making position 
and taking a position of joint decision-making or bilater­
alism.4
Historically public employee union activity can be 
traced back to the naval ship yards in the Philadelphia area 
in the 1930's, to the postal unions in the early part of this 
century, and to the attempts to gain congressional approval 
during the 1950's of the Rhodes-Johnston bill (trying to es­
tablish a public employee's Wagner Act). But the recent ac­
tivity of public employee unionization, particularly since the 
issuance of Executive Order 10988, greatly overshadows any of 
these past activities. The emphasis of this research, and 
much contemporary research, is no longer centered on the idea 
"can" sovereignty be waived to allow bilateralism but "how far" 
will bilateralism in the public sector develop to resemble bi­
lateralism in the private sector. This is underscored by John 
Bloedorn's statement that "the question is not whether collec­
tive bargaining in the public sector should be authorized, 
but more specifically, what its structure, scope and procedures 
should be.
Bilateralism is creating numerous questions which must, 
in some way, be answered as the evolutionary process moves 
away from unilateralism. The following questions, around
which the chapters are based, are only illustrative of the 
many questions which will confront the public administrator 
in this developing era of bilateralism.
1. What structure is provided to handle this new 
relationship?
2. What is an appropriate bargaining unit?
3. How is an employee organization to be desig­
nated as the representative of the employees?
4. What provisions are there for union security?
5. What is the scope of bilateralism?
6. What are the rights of management?
7. How does the process of collective bargaining 
work?
8. What provisions are there for the resolution 
of impasses?
9. Is arbitration the ultimate answer?
10. What provisions are there for the strike?
11. Is there a way to allow strikes?
12. What areas are regulated to prevent unfair 
labor practices?
13. How does bilateralism influence the merit system?
To illustrate the development of bilateralism in public
personnel. Table 1-1 indicates the number of statutes passed 
and executive orders issued by the various jurisdictions which 
are used in this study.
Table 1-1.— The number of statutes passed 
and executive orders issued 
during period of study
Year Number
1962 1
1964 1
1965 2
1966 1
1967 6
1968 3
1969 18
1970 9
1971 15
1972 18
1973 1
To further illustrate the extent of union activity in 
the public sector. Table 1-2 indicates the tremendous growth 
in government employee unions vis-a-vis the private sector 
unions. This table not only reveals the increased number of 
government employees in unions, but the absolute change and 
percentage change figures reveal the tremendous growth in the 
public sector as compared to the private sector. The absolute 
change for all union membership for 1956-1960 was a loss of 
68,000, but this does not take into consideraion that for 
government employees there was a positive growth curve while 
in the private sector there was a negative growth curve. For 
the years 1960-1968 the^e was growth in both private and public
Table 1-2.— Union membership by sector, 1956-1968, in thousands
Year Total
Manufacturing Nonmanufacturing Government
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
1956 18,104 8839 48.8 8350 46.1 915 5.1
1958 17,968 8359 46.5 8574 47.7 1035 5.8
1960 18,036 8591 47.6 8375 46.4 1070 5.9
1962 17,564 8050 45.8 8289 47.2 1225 7.0
1964 17,920 8342 46.6 8125 45.3 1453 8.1
1966 19,126 8769 45.8 8640 45.2 1717 9.0
1968 20,210 9218 45.6 8837 43.7 2155 10.7
Absolute Change
56-60 -68 -248 -2 5 155
60—68 2174 627 462 1085
56-68 2106 379 487 1240
Percentage Change
56-60 -.4 -2.8 -.4 16.9
60—68 12.1 7.4 5,5 101.4
56-68 11.6 4.3 5.8 135.5
Source; H. P. Cohany and L. M. Dewey, "Union Membership Growth Among Government 
Employees," Monthly Labor Review, XCIII (July, 1970), p. 16.
sectors, but with the public sector accounting for just a 
little under 50 percent. The absolute change for the overall 
time period of 1956-1968 is also positive, but with the pub­
lic sector union membership growth accounting for 59 percent 
of the increase.
Even more telling about the growth of public employee 
unions are the percentage changes for the years 1956-1968.
For the time period 1956-1960 the overall percentage change 
was -.4 percent, but this must be read in the light of the 
negative change in both private manufacturing and nonmanufac­
turing sectors with a positive growth change of 16.9 percent 
in the public sector. For the years 1960-1968 a positive 
percentage change is registered for both public and private 
sectors, but again they differ greatly. The manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing percentages respectively are 7.4 and 5.5, but 
for the public sector the percentage change is 101.4. The 
overall time span of 1956-1968 also indicates a small percen­
tage increase for total union membership of 11.6 with the 
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing percentages at 4.3 and 5.8 
respectively. This is in light of the 135.5 percent growth in 
government union membership. These figures should help con­
vince anyone that public employee unionism is serious and that
8bilateralism is not going to decrease and fade away as many 
public administrators would like to believe.
Methodology, Theoretical Framework, 
and Hypothesis
Since this study is in the area of comparative adminis­
tration (public personnel administration/public employee 
unions), how does it fit into the area? First comparative 
administration must be defined. Comparative public adminis­
tration is the systematic study of the distinctive character­
istics of administrative ecology, activity, and organizational 
arrangements both international and intranational. Compara­
tive public administration, really coming into its own right 
only after World War II, has been slowly evolving away from 
"comparative" efforts to "developmental" efforts. This trend, 
largely based upon the impetus of a Ford Foundation grant, had 
an overall effect of directing scholarly efforts toward the 
developing countries.& The "development" trend is so pro­
nounced that Lynton K. Caldwell cautions against such a nar­
rowing of the interests of the area, in light of expressed 
fears of critics that the area is becoming a highly specialized 
esoteric effort with little practical value for understanding 
how administration really works.^ Caldwell's statement is
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corroborated by Joseph A. Uveges when he states that
"typically comparative administration has been thought of as 
the study of comparable administrations among varieties of 
nations and cultures."® "However," Uveges continues, "the 
contemporary scope of comparative public administration 
realistically includes the study and analysis of cultural var­
iations within nations on a comparative basis as well."®
Richard E. Holt and John E. Turner, in their book The 
Methodology of Comparative Research, contend that if political 
scientists are ever to generate a more general and valid 
body of theory, comparative cross-cultural research is abso­
lutely essential. "In principle," they continue, "there is 
no difference between comparative cross-cultural research and 
research conducted within a single s o c i e t y . T h e y  contend 
the only differences lie in such areas as the magnitude of 
language barriers in cross-cultural studies. Thus, this in­
tranational study of the development of bilateralism fits well 
within the context of comparative research as set forth by 
Holt and Turner.
This effort also fits within one of the three classes of 
comparative public administration literature established by 
Ferrel Heady. His second class, modified traditional, contains 
personnel management as one of the standard traditional sub- 
topics. Thus, an examination of the development of bilateralism
10
fits into the modified traditional class of literature
according to Heady. The other two classes are general system
model-building and middle range theory formulation.H
Since this examination is descriptive, justification
for such efforts are found in Clare Selltiz's, et al., work
Research Methods in Social Relations. They state that each
study has its own purpose, but that research usually fails
within the following four broad groupings.
To gain familiarity with a phenomenon or to 
achieve new insights into it, often in order to 
formulate a more precise research problem or to 
develop hypotheses.
To portray accurately the characteristics of a 
particular individual, situation, or group 
(with or without specific initial hypothesis 
about the nature of these characteristics).
To determine the frequency with which something 
occurs or with which it is associated with some­
thing else (usually but not always with a spe­
cific initial hypothesis).
To test a hypothesis of a causal relationship 
between variables.
This study fits into the second and third groups of research, 
efforts labeled descriptive by Selltiz.
To this point it has been established that this research 
does fall within the boundaries of comparative research (com­
parative public administration in particular); that it is a 
standard traditional topic in one of Heady's three classes of
11
comparative public administration literature; and that a 
descriptive study is one of four broad groupings of research 
efforts. In furtherance of the first mentioned point, Keith 
Henderson's treatment of activity in the "U.S. culture" study 
of public administration is enlightening. He believes that 
comparative public administration can assume intellectual 
leadership with the "U.S. culture" by studying the "real and 
proper structure and functioning of government executive or­
ganizations. " Such efforts, he contends, would assist the 
official in acquiring a better understanding of the problems 
confronting him, since the development of bilateralism is a 
very real problem area confronting the public official.13
Henderson, in an earlier article, states that the model 
building efforts of those engaged in cross-cultural studies 
(Fred Riggs in particular) have heuristic value for intrana­
tional study.14 This idea is also presented by Riggs when he 
writes that although his fused and diffracted models cannot 
be found in the real world, these "constructed" or "ideal" 
types can serve a "heuristic purpose by helping us to describe 
real world situations."15 Riggs adds that "we need a pretty 
complete descriptive and analytical understanding of what now 
exists before we can make useful judgments about what we ought 
to do, what changes should be made."l^ (Emphasis mine.)
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Since the Riggsian prismatic model is used as the 
theoretical framework for this study, how will it be applied? 
His model was constructed to describe the movement of tradi­
tional societies (he calls them transitional) fron being back­
ward to being developed. This movement is set in a three 
stage prismatic model. The three stages are fron a fused 
society through the prism of development into a diffracted 
society. Using a structural-functional framework for his 
prismatic model, the functions in a fused society are diffuse, 
while the functions in a diffracted society are specific. As 
a traditional society develops, the functions are differen­
tiated within a developing structural c o m p l e x . T h u s  by 
analogy, the units of government still using unilateralism 
based upon sovereignty are fused, while those units of govern­
ment having passed through the prism of bilaûeralism are dif­
ferentiated in their approaches to bilateralism. Riggs states 
that differentiation cannot happen at equal rates of speed,
the units of government implementing bilateralism are at
18different stages of differentiation. (In this research di­
versification and differentiation will be used synonymously.)
But the development of bilateralism has the great disad­
vantage of creating too much differentiation. The research 
design is centered around studying the similarities and
13
dissimilarities of bilateralism, but the "insulated chambers" 
of Justice Brandeis with the resulting experimentation in each 
have created such diversification of approaches that comparison 
in many instances is difficult.Therefore, to study this 
differentiation, the format must of necessity, at times, re­
semble a listing of the various approaches within the topic 
area of Chapters II through VI, i.e.. New York is doing it 
this way while California, Michigan, etc., are doing it that 
way. This may seem to some to be less than adequate, but to 
study and show the diversification in bilateralism, the format 
must conform to the data instead of the data conforming to a 
better format.
Therefore, in this study of bilateral diversification, 
it is hypothesized that the concept of unilateralism based on 
sovereignty has been rendered obsolete and is not being ade­
quately or sufficiently redefined to allow the bilateralism 
required by the increased strength of public employee unions 
and resulting differentiation. Furthermore, bilateralism 
(differentiation) in labor-management relations in government 
is now a fact of life, and it is only a matter of time before 
this development will resemble that labor-management relation­
ship found in the private sector.
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Nimrod Raphael!, in using model and theory synonymously 
(and it is so used here), contends that a model or theory is 
not "right" or "wrong," but must be judged by the model's ap­
plicability, usefulness, and communicability. First, the 
prismatic model does have applicability to the study of the 
development of bilateralism since there is much differentia­
tion within this area. The analogy fits. Second, the model 
is useful in helping both the layman and the professional 
grasp the diversity of bilateralism. Third, the model is com­
municable, being fairly easy to understand.^0
Lynton K. Caldwell presents three conceptual problems 
of comparative public administration, i.e., comparability, 
commensurability, and relevance. The main question of com­
parability is: What factors are significant? In my estima­
tion, since public bilateralism is still evolving and immature, 
one avenue of comparison is the legal foundation for such 
efforts. Caldwell contributes to this estimation by stating 
that comparative studies in public administration have made 
extensive use of legal data. Second, commensurability is 
really out of the question at present since the diversifica­
tion of public bilateralism renders quantification of the data 
impossible. Perhaps as bilateralism matures and some of the 
diversification begins to coalesce, quantification might be
15
possible. Third, relevance is of major importance at this
time in social research.21 Henderson contributes by stating:
In the final analysis, it would seem that Public 
Administration cannot survive unless it becomes 
relevant to current American problems, and can­
not become relevant until its major academic 
strengths are brought into contact with the prac­
titioner, especially the administrator.22
This study does deal with a very relevant current American 
problem, which is very relevant to the public administrator.
Thus, the use of Riggs' prismatic model as a theoretical 
foundation is applicable, useful, and communicable. There are 
factors in bilateralism that are comparable. The study is 
relevant, but commensurability is impossible at this time.
In conclusion, Riggsian thought also contains the distinction 
between monothetic and ideographic approaches. The former is
concerned with any approach seeking the formulation of general
propositions and laws, while the latter is concerned with 
unique instances (a particular government, case, or organiza­
tion) . The ultimate goal established by Riggs is a synthesis 
of the t w o . A l t h o u g h  Riggs' research and resulting model 
is nomothetic, this research is basically ideographic. As 
more research is conducted in this area, nomothetic models 
can be formulated, but this is very futuristic.
The heart of the data for this study are the statutes,
court orders, legal opinions, and executive orders issued by
16
the various units of government. These data were taken and 
separated into the various topics for examination and crea­
tion of similar and dissimilar classes. The main data sources 
are the Bureau of National, Affairs' publication Government 
Employees Relations Report contained in their Reference File 
and the Labor Law Report by the Commerce Clearing House,
These two publications have copies of all statutes, court 
orders, legal opinions, and executive orders used here.24
This work is unique in the developing literature of pub­
lic bilateralism. No one has attempted such an in-depth exam­
ination of all units of government and the numerous statutes, 
legal opinions, court orders, and executive orders. The only 
work which approaches the task of this research is Felix
25
Nigro ' s Manacrement-Emplovee Relations in the Public Service, 
but even it is limited in number of units of data considered. 
There are books written about specific topics of bilateralism 
and these will be considered in the respective chapters. Ad­
ditionally, there are several periodicals which contain articles 
covering specific topic areas. Among these are the Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review. Labor Law Journal. Personnel. 
Personnel Administration, and Public Personnel Management.
17
Public or Private Bilateralism;
Is There a Difference?
Only upon the resolution of this problem will the 
ultimate extent of development in bilateralism in the public 
sector toward that found in the private sector be resolved.
The terms "public sector" and "private sector" are used to dif­
ferentiate between industrial labor relations (the private sec­
tor), and the development of similar relations between govern­
ment and its employees (the public sector). If there is no 
difference then it is only a matter of time before the two 
areas merge in approaches. But if there is a difference then 
how will the two differ? In summary form, the argument that 
there is a difference between the two revolves around the fol­
lowing ideas: the lack of a profit motive in governmental
operations; the absence of competition in areas of service 
provided by government; the essential nature of governmental 
services; the responsibility of the public administrator to the 
public; and the lack of control over revenue or the tax 
schedules by the public administrator.^^ The counter argument 
follows the idea that although the above mentioned factors are 
important, it is still fundamental that government as an 
employer should and must deal with its employees in similar 
fashion as that mandated by government for private employers. 
For government to do otherwise would be t-o place its employees
18
in an inferior classification and overlook the needs of its 
employees for this type of job s e c u r i t y . 27
But it is this author's opinion that these lines of de­
bate miss the essential main point of the problem. To resolve 
this problem it is necessary to understand that what is called 
for in bilateralism is competition between parties over both 
economic and noneconomic matters and that each party has a 
weapon that can be used to gain its objective. The employee 
has the strike, while the employer has the lockout. A strike 
is where the employee refuses to work, while a lock-out is 
where the employer does not allow the employee to enter the 
work area. That both weapons have been used in the private 
sector is beyond debate, but does the strike and lock-out also 
exist in the public sector? At this time only five jurisdic­
tions are experimenting with allowing the strike,^8 but it is 
also apparent that some public employees have made liberal use 
of this economic weapon despite its general prohibition. The 
debate then comes down to this question: Does government have
the lock-out to counter the strike? If government does then 
the analogy with private bilateralism is complete, but if gov­
ernment lacks the lock-out then there cannot be an analogy and 
there is a difference between public and private bilateralism.
19
Among the data studied the lock-out is considered an 
unfair labor practice in Kansas (PE), Montana (N), New 
Hampshire (P), Oklahoma (P-F-ME), and Oregon ( N ) T h e r e f o r e  
for at least these five jurisdictions the public authorities 
have no economic weapon to counter the strike and there is a 
difference. Now is it possible to generalize from the particu­
lar to the general that government, because of its very nature 
and creation, i.e., providing services for its citizens and 
created by its citizens, cannot legally lock-out its employees 
and therefore not perform services for its citizens?
This gets down to the distinction between governmental 
and proprietary functions. Governmental functions are those 
carried out by local units of government acting as agents of 
their states which they must perform. Therefore, if the local 
units of government must perform these services, do they not 
then lack the economic weapon of the lock-out and then is not 
there a difference? On the other hand, proprietary functions 
are those services which local units of government perform but 
for which there is no state mandating. To the extent that 
there is no state mandating of the performance of these func­
tions the lock-out might be available, but the legal authority 
to perform these functions might also preclude the lock-out. 
Although governmental and proprietary functions are legal
20
characteristics of local government, the general idea may be 
applied to state and federal government, i.e., that there are 
services that must be performed even in the face of a strike.
Therefore, if the public administrator lacks the economic 
weapon of the lock-out it is quite impossible for both public 
and private approaches to bilateralism to be the same. It is 
only upon the resolution of the strike/lock-out problem that 
public and private can be alike, or stated differently, as 
long as there is fundamental differences in the weapons that 
are available to the parties involved then there will always 
be a difference between public and private bilateralism.
But the rejoinder to this idea is found in the Bureau 
of National Affairs' publication, Basic Patterns in Union 
Contracts, where a no-lock-out pledge appears in 81 percent of 
their 400 sample contracts in both manufacturing and non­
manufacturing contracts and agreements. These pledges are 
qualified in various ways, i.e., the lock-out is available if 
an arbitration award is violated, if there is refusal to arbi­
trate, or after the exhaustion of grievance procedures, e t c . 30 
Yet there is enough difference still to warrant the contention 
that the bilateralism of the public sector is different since 
a private pledge is not absolute, while it can be contended 
that the public administrator's prohibition against the lock­
out is absolute.
21
Why Is Government Entering Into Bilateralism 
Arthur Thompson and Irvin Weinstock are correct in their 
contention that the "managerial attitudes toward employee or­
ganization may prove to be the most important factor influ­
encing the factor of collective bargaining in the public 
service."31 Furthermore, it is the author's contention that 
the reasoning behind the dropping of unilateralism and the 
taking up of bilateralism by public management will set the 
tone for future development in this area. If public manage­
ment enters bilateralism on its own volition and understanding 
the positive aspects of it, then the probability of harmonious 
labor relations are better than in a situation where public 
management is forced into bilateralism. Furthermore, if pub­
lic management enters bilateralism on its own volition but 
with a paternalistic attitude this attitude can preclude the 
development of mutual respect and equality of the parties nec­
essary for mature bilateralism. All parties must enter bilat­
eralism with such an attitude that permits a mature, positive 
procedure.
More specifically: Why is government entering into bi­
lateralism? From the study of the data five basic reasons and 
one qualification can be established. These five are, in 
summary form: first, joint decision making is the modern way;
22
second, exchange of ideas and information improves 
communication; third, bilateralism creates harmonious and 
cooperative relations between employer and employee; fourth, 
it is a reasonable way of resolving disputes; and fifth, 
strife can result from the denial of bilateralism. The quali­
fication is that the listed reasons are subject to the health, 
education, safety, and welfare of the public.33
Joint decision making is the cornerstone of bilateralism. 
This allows a combining or compromising of ideas and desires 
from both management and labor in the setting of personal 
policies. Joint decision making permits the exchange of ideas 
and information by all parties with the resulting upgrading of 
communication. The aspect of communication is very important 
in bilateralism, for it is only with the clear transmission of 
ideas and information that the respective position of all par­
ties can be made known and combining or compromising allowed 
to operate. Joint decision making and the exchange of ideas 
and information based upon a good communication system should 
permit a more harmonious and cooperative relationship between 
the employer and the employees. For bilateralism to operate 
in a satisfactory manner there is a necessity to have mature 
relations between the parties, for to have the opposite situa­
tion will assuredly lead to strife, although in some cases 
strife will result no matter what is attempted.^4
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Bilateralism also permits a reasonable way to resolve 
disputes. The employment relationship does lead to disagree­
ment between the parties as to the particulars of what employ­
ment policies should be. But through bilateralism the parties 
can face each other, even in a conflict situation, and work 
out their differences to hopefully mutual satisfaction. For 
bilateralism to work satisfactorily there must be more than 
an equal volume of cooperation and conflict. Today, if bi­
lateralism is denied, then public management can almost be 
guaranteed employment strife and the disruption of public ser­
vices. The public employee unionization movement has seen the 
advantages gained by their counterparts in the private sector 
and will not rest until their employment relations closely 
resemble it.35 Besides, it is the author's contention that 
the idea has come of age and any effort on the part of public 
management to retard its evolutionary development is only sow­
ing the seeds of subsequent conflict.
These reasons are qualified to the extent that the par­
ties must understand that beyond doubt or question the public 
must be taken into consideration in their relationship. Al­
though the private sector relationship is at times alleged to 
have a third party (the public) taken into consideration, this 
seldom occurs. But public bilateralism cannot fail to take the
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public into consideration. The services (fire, police, 
education, hospital) provided by government directly influ­
ence the public and any bilateralism in public employment 
must be considered in this light. Thus both principal parties 
would be ill advised to incur the rath or ill-feelings of the 
public. Besides, if bilateralism is to be both mature and 
positive, the interests of the public must be taken into con­
sideration.^^
Legal Points in Bilateralism 
Two basic legal positions have developed around cases 
dealing with bilateralism. One position is based upon the idea 
that in the absence of specific legislative authorization pub­
lic agencies lack the power or authority to engage in bilateral 
activities. The second legal position is based upon the idea 
that public agencies have an implied power, from their position 
of employer, to engage in bilateral activities. But before 
these two positions are discussed, two additional legal points 
need to be presented.
In Atkins v. City of Charlotte, a three-judge U.S.
District Court declared the North Carolina statute of July 4, 
1969, void as to its prohibition of union membership stating 
that such prohibition was a violation of First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of association. Additionally, the court voided
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a section of the statute making such membership punishable by
law.37 In Beverly v. City of Dallas (1956) the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals voided a city ordinance prohibiting their
firemen from joining the international Association of Fire
Fighters (lAFF) by stating:
. . . that the ordinances of the City of Dallas 
here involved prohibiting employees of Dallas 
Fire Department from joining or remaining mem­
bers of a labor union are invalid, and that 
the action of the City of Dallas in prohibiting 
its employees from so joining is invalid and 
void.38
In Wichita Public School Employee's Union v. Smith (1964) the 
Kansas courts held that legislation authorizing bilateral ac­
tivities for private sector employees did not extent to gov­
ernmental employees.Therefore, from these examples two 
principles were established. One is that membership in public 
employee unions cannot be prohibited nor be made punishable.
The second is that general legislation extending bilateralism 
to private sector employees does not extent to public sector 
employees.
Now to return to the two main legal positions, the first 
presenting the idea that in the absence of specific legislation 
bilateralism cannot be engaged. In Levasseru v. Wheeldon 
(1962) the South Dakota Supreme Court decided that in the ab­
sence of a statute public employees have no right to engage in
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collective bargaining.40 The same idea was expressed in 
Delaware River and Bay Authority v. International Organization 
of Masters, Mates and Pilots (1965) when the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that the power to enter collective bargain­
ing contracts would be contrary to established state policy 
and that a change in that policy requires action by the legis­
lature. 41 The Attorney General of Indiana in his Opinion 
No. 21 dated July 8, 1969, stated;
The state Legislature impliedly acknowledged that 
until it grants the power to state agencies to 
enter exclusive collective bargaining agreements, 
the Indiana General Assembly retains that p o w e r . 42
The Arizona Court of Appeals ruled in Board of Education of
the Scottsdale High School District v. Scottsdale Education
Association in 1972, that:
A school board exceeded its powers by negotiating 
a collective bargaining agreement with a teachers' 
union covering salaries and providing impasse pro­
cedures, since, absent any statutory authority to 
do so, a public school board may not delegate its 
powers to manage and control the school system to 
the employees or their representatives.43
But this court did present the point that the parties could
meet and consult which would be more a form of communication
than b a r g a i n i n g . 44 Lastly, in City of Fort Smith v. Arkansas
State Council No. 38, AFSCME (1968) the Arkansas Supreme Court
ruled that "in the absence of a statute to the contrary a
municipality or other political subdivision is under no
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legally enforceable duty to bargain collectively with its 
employees about wages, hours, or working conditions."^5 The 
court concluded that such matters were legislative and the 
responsibility cannot be delegated or bargained away. In sum­
mary, the first legal position, which will be called the major­
ity position since more or most courts hold with its ideas, 
sets forth the point that bilateral relations can only be es­
tablished upon specific legislative authorization. Now what 
about the statutes that have been passed? How have the courts 
ruled on them?
In State of Wyoming v. City of Laramie (1968) the Wyoming 
Supreme Court upheld the legislation permitting fire fighters 
of any city, town, or county to engage in bilateral activities. 
The court continued by referring to cities as creatures of the 
state and that "certainly the state can direct cities to sub­
mit labor disputes with firemen to arbitration, and the consent 
or lack of consent of the city would be immaterial."46 The New 
York State Court of Appeals not only upheld the Taylor Act as 
being constitutional, but also the strike ban in City of New 
York V .  DeLury (1968) during the sanitation workers strike of 
that year.47 in State ex rel Missey v. City of Cabool the 
Missouri Supreme Court upheld the "meet, confer, and discuss" 
statute effective April 14, 1969. The court also stated that
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this procedure was nothing more than a method of communication 
because the discretion of the legislative body as concerned 
approval or disapproval of the final agreement was untouched.48 
In Lullo V .  International Association of Fire Ficrhters Local 
1966 (1970) the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the New Jersey 
Employer-Employee Relations Act effective April 1, 1969, in a 
case involving a challenge to the statutes' provisions on ex­
clusive representation and collective negotiations.49 in sum­
mary then, courts have held that bilateralism is constitutional 
or legal when it is established by the appropriate legislative 
body.
On the other hand, the second legal position contends 
that the employer has the implied power to engage in bilateral 
activities from its position of an employer. In Chicago Divi­
sion of Illinois Education Association v. Board of Education 
of City of Chicago (1966) the Illinois Appelate Court held 
that the "Chicago Board of Education does not require statu­
tory authority to enter into a collective bargaining agreement 
with a bargaining agency selected by its t e a c h e r s . T h i s  
ruling was supported in 1970 when the Iowa Supreme Court held 
in the case of State Board of Regents, State of Iowa, v. United 
Packing House Food and Allied Workers, Local No. 12 58 that:
the Iowa Board of Regents, which operates state
institutions of higher learning, has implied power
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to engage in "collective bargaining" with union, 
as constructed to mean that Board may voluntarily 
meet, confer, and consult with union in order to 
make its judgment as to wages and working condi­
tions; however. Board does not have implied power 
to agree to exclusive representation by union; 
but Board may enter.into written contract with 
union so long as its terms are within statutory 
authority of Board and contract contains no terms 
of employment that could not be included in 
standardized contract for individual employees.
Therefore, from these two cases, the second position 
holds that public employers can engage in bilateralism, with 
the exception of exclusive representation, with the employees 
within the normal employment situation.
In summary, courts have presented four points of inter­
pretation which influence bilateralism. First, that public 
employers cannot prevent their employees from joining unions, 
based on the First and Fourteenth Amendment's implied right 
of association. Second, any legislation passed by the state 
dealing with private bilateralism does not apply to public 
bilateralism except, of course, in those cases where the 
legislature sees fit to combine them. Third, public agencies 
do not have the right to engage in bilateral activities out­
side of legislative authorization (which is based upon the 
concept of sovereignty discussed earlier). Fourth, public 
agencies can engage in bilateral activities by implication of 
their position of employer; but this fourth point must be re­
membered as a very distinct minority position.
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The author is supportive of the first legal position, 
since it is much more desirable, perhaps even necessary, to 
preclude ultra vires suits against bilateral activities taken 
or engaged in based only on implication.^^ Bilateralism by 
implication (second legal position) is also less desirable 
since the Iowa court upheld meeting and conferring but not ex­
clusive representation which is a main support to union secur­
ity. It is hoped that both public employers and public employee 
unions will work together in gaining passage of legislation 
since bilateralism has come of age, and such legislation will 
allow the parties to enter bilateralism without doubts of its 
limits, a result if bilateralism occurs by implication. Again 
it must be remembered that for bilateralism to work with the 
least threat of disruption of public services, all parties con­
cerned must approach bilateralism from a mature, positive 
position. A mature, positive position is one based upon mutual 
respect, a desire to make the new relationship work, and each 
party accepting the other as equal. For to enter in any other 
stance will assuredly inject conflict into a relationship in­
herent with conflict, and unnecessary conflict will render the 
job of compromise all the more difficult.
State V .  Federal Mandating 
To continue the development of the line of thought in
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the preceding section (the need for legislation to establish 
bilateralism), the question arises as to which unit of govern­
ment should mandate bilateralism. Has bilateralism so de­
veloped nationally that the federal government should pass a 
national public employee Wagner Act, or should bilateralism 
be left to develop piecemeal in the respective states? Refer­
ence was made to this problem earlier, but now the question 
needs to be dealt with in detail and perhaps settled.
First, the problem is approached from the national per­
spective. When research was conducted for my master's thesis 
several union representatives made reference to proposed 
legislation awaiting a more favorable climate before Congress. 
Reference was made earlier to the Rhodes-Johnston bill before 
Contress during the 1950*s, but the late 1960's and 1970's 
have witnessed quite a concerted effort to have such legisla­
tion passed. The American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) had introduced before the 91st 
Congress by Representative Jacob H. Gilbert (D-NY) and before 
the 92nd Congress by Representative William Clay (D-Mo) their 
proposed "National Public Employee Relations Act."^^ The 
National Education Association (NBA) introduced their "Profes­
sional Negotiations Act for Public Education" by way of Senator 
Lee Metcalf (D-Mont.) on April 25, 1969.54 Although such
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legislation has not gained passage to date, as long as the 
effort is made it is only a matter of speculation when such 
legislation might gain passage. But perhaps more meaningful 
to the efforts in Congress is the Supreme Court case of 
Maryland v. Wirtz. This case is important since such fed­
eral legislation mandating state and local personnel policy 
will assuredly result in a test of its legality. The question 
is : Can the federal government mandate public bilateralism
for state and local government? would such legislation violate 
the federal principle and sovereign position of the state and 
local units of government in respect to their employees?
The case of Maryland v. Wirtz was occasioned by the 1965 
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938) which rede­
fined employer (as used in the Act) to cover such employment 
as hospitals, institutions, and schools of states and their 
subdivisions as to minimum wages and payment for overtime. 
Twenty-eight states joined in a suit contending that such fed­
eral legislation was an unconstitutional encroachment on the 
prerogatives of the states by the use of the commerce power. 
Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court with 
Justices Douglas and Stewart dissenting.^6
Justice Harlan supported the extension using the "enter­
prise concept" derived from the 1961 amendments to the original
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act. The enterprise concept is based upon the 1961 definition 
of protected employees as being those "employed in an enter­
prise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
commerce." To make the connection Justice Harlan then stated 
that there was substantial "effect" upon interstate commerce 
by such employees and that therefore coverage was constitutional. 
The effect v/as derived from the fact that such institutions are 
major users of goods handled in interstate commerce. He estab­
lished a rational basis for extension by stating that strikes 
and work stoppages in such employment would interrupt and bur­
den such interstate flow of goods. Justice Harlan contended 
that regardless of the governmental or proprietary character 
of the function, when Congress is acting constitutionally within 
a delegated power such legislation is superior to state claims 
to the contrary. He continued by stating that when states and 
local units of government engage in public activities connected 
to other activities validly regulated by Congress in the private 
sector that Congress may be forced to regulate such public ac­
tivities. He concluded by contending that the Supreme Court 
would not carve up the commerce power to exempt state and 
local functions performed as a benefit to their citizens as 
long as a rational basis for such regulation can be estab­
lished.5?
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Justice Douglas dissented (with Justice Stewart 
concurring) by contending that Justice Harlan failed to give 
proper weight to the fact that functions of sovereign entities 
were being dealt with and that he only relied upon a "rational 
basis" for extension and support. They contended that the im­
mense scope thus given the "enterprise" concept in relation 
to governmental functions was such that:
If constitutional principles of federalism raise 
no limits to the commerce power where regulation 
of state activities are concerned, could Congress 
commit the States to build super-highways criss­
crossing their territory in order to accommodate 
interstate vehicles, to provide inns and eating 
places for interstate travelers, to quadruple 
their police forces in order to prevent commerce 
crippling riots, etc.? Could the Congress vir­
tually draw up each State's budget to avoid 
"disruptive effect(s) . . .  on commercial inter­
course? "58
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
(ACIR) published in March, 1970, a year-long study on state 
and local labor-management relations, with Recommendation 
Sixteen dealing with federal mandating. This recommendation 
states :
The Commission recommends that Congress desist 
from any further mandating or requirements 
affecting the working conditions of employees 
of state and local governments or the authority 
of such jurisdictions to deal freely or to re­
frain from dealing with their respective per­
sonnel.59
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The ACIR recommendation is based upon the idea that federalism 
is dealt a crippling blow by such efforts. The report con­
tends that the federal government can best serve this mutual 
area of interest, since it is also participating in bilater­
alism, by encouraging the adoption of bilateralism by state 
and local units of government. The Intergovernmental Personnel 
Act (1969) is now being used by all units of government to up­
grade their personnel, so what better place than through this 
established procedure to advance bilateralism in all of gov­
ernment by training their personnel to handle such activities.®® 
Now for the state aspect of the mandating problem. The 
ACIR report contained five (of fifteen) recommendations for 
the states in establishing bilateralism. Recommendations One, 
Four, Five, Seven, and Fifteen urges the following action: 
that legislation be passed permitting employees to join or not 
to join organizations and permitting these organizations to 
then represent the employees; that a "bill of rights" be estab­
lished to help insure democracy and financial soundness in such 
organizations; that a single piece of legislation is preferred 
over a fragmented approach of passing legislation for separate 
classes of public employees; that both state and local em­
ployees be treated uniformly and that the basics of the merit 
system be protected; and lastly, that the mandating of the
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terms and conditions of bilateralism or the employment 
situation be kept to a minimum to allow proper discussion of 
mutual interests between the parties.
The American Federation of Teachers and the AFSCME have 
both developed model laws which states can adopt to establish 
bilateralism around collective bargaining. Additionally, the 
ACIR has developed both "meet and confer" and "collective 
negotiations" model bills for a d o p t i o n . a t  this time thirty- 
five jurisdictions are in the process of implementing seventy- 
two statutes establishing bilateralism. This variety of ap­
proaches underscores the diversification in public bilateralism.
The author contends that such experimentation now being 
conducted by these units of government in bilateralism would 
be lost by federal mandating. It is believed that the value 
of national legislation is much less than the value of develop­
ment by diversification even if this means confusion in the 
area for a while. How much better to have a period of confu­
sion with experimentation in final offer arbitration in 
Michigan (F-P) and Minnesota (PE-T) or the limited strike in 
Alaska (PE), Hawaii (PE-T), Montana (N), Pennsylvania (PE-T), 
and Vermont (ME-F), for example, than a lock-step approach 
from federal mandating. This burden of confusion falls on 
employer and employee organization alike since both are now
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"muddling through" bilateralism. It is through the confusion 
of diversification now that public bilateralism in the future 
will emerge eventually.
General Outline of Chapters
This study will be composed of eight chapters. In gen­
eral reference, the first chapter introduced the reader to the 
subject matter, while the last rhapter will draw the material 
together, reach conclusions, and examine the influence of bi­
lateralism on the merit system. The intervening chapters cover 
the administrative machinery for implementing bilateralism, 
recognition, collective bargaining, resolution of impasses, 
the strike, and unfair labor practices and procedures for hand­
ling complaints.
Chapter II is an examination of the administrative ma­
chinery used by the respective jurisdictions to implement 
bilateralism. Seventeen jurisdictions have created new ma­
chinery to handle implementation while fourteen made use of 
existing state labor machinery. Although the main area of 
study is the powers and duties assigned these administrative 
agencies, other points of study will be the composition, quali­
fications, method of appointment, and term of office of these 
agencies' officials. This material will introduce the reader 
to the diversification of administrative machinery in public 
bilateralism.
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Chapter III will study the recognition of employee 
organizations. One area examined here is the determination 
of the appropriate unit in which to recognize an employee or­
ganization. Provisions vary from the very simple to the very 
complex. The statute in Delaware (PE) contains a very short 
definition and a few criteria for determination, while the 
California (LA), Hawaii (PE-T), Kansas (PE), and Nevada (LE-T) 
statutes are detailed in definition and criteria.^3 A particu­
larly vexing problem is in placing the dividing line between 
supervisory and non-supervisory personnel. The latter are 
covered by the statutes while the former are generally not 
covered. The prohibition of a supervisors' union does have 
some exceptions, with the Nixon Executive Order (11491) allow­
ing them at the federal level while several states, among them 
Minnesota (PE-T) and Wisconsin (SE) and (ME-T), also allowing 
supervisory unions. Another point of analysis are the pro­
visions for representation elections. What are the criteria 
for such elections? The chapter is concluded with an examina­
tion of three aspects of union security, i.e., the union shop, 
the agency shop, and the check-off of dues and other assessments.
Chapter IV is an intense analysis of the heart of the 
public employee movement— collective negotiations. The descrip­
tive term, collective negotiations, is used synonymously with
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a multitude of other terms used to describe the heart of 
bilateralism in the various statutes. Some statutes simply 
call for negotiations or bargaining, others specifically pro­
vide for collective bargaining, meet and confer, professional 
negotiations, and meet and negotiate for example. One very 
important area of examination is the scope of negotiable 
items. Many statutes simply provide for negotiations over 
wages, salaries, and other terms and conditions of employment 
while other statutes are very specific. Another area of ana­
lysis will be the rights retained by management. What are 
these rights? Federal E.G. 11491 and many statutes at the 
state level are very specific as to the rights of management, 
while others are vague or silent. A developing point of con­
troversy is the amount of publicity allowable in public nego­
tiations. Decisions and opinions run both ways over providing 
either secrecy or public hearings (based on state laws preclud­
ing executive sessions). How is this problem to be handled? 
Lastly, the chapter analyzes the provisions for contract inter­
pretation.
Impasse resolution is the subject area of Chapter V.
From a preliminary analysis of the various sections setting 
forth impasse resolution procedures, the only statement that 
can be made is that they are extremely diverse. This
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diversity is captured in fourteen classes presented in 
Table 5-1. These classes were established in an effort to 
group like procedures. Final-offer arbitration is Class 13, 
while binding arbitration is Class 12. The phased application 
of mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration is found in Classes 
2, 3, and 4, while the non-phased application is found in 
Classes 5, through 9. The single application of mediation, 
fact-finding, and arbitration is found in Classes 1, 10, and 
11. Class 14 contains four jurisdictions that do not specify 
any procedures other than contacting the appropriate adminis­
trative agency or board for assistance.
Chapter VI is devoted to the strike. A study of the data 
indicates thirty states and the federal government prohibit the 
strike. Analysis of fifty-two provisions will be made ranging 
from concise prohibiting statements to elaborate procedures 
for handling the strike. Five states at this time provide for 
the strike (all with certain qualifications). Alaska (PE) 
attempts to divide its employees into three categories ; those 
that cannot strike, those that can strike for a limited time, 
and those that can strike for extended periods. Hawaii (PE-T) 
requires that several steps must be taken before a strike is 
allowed, i.e., all provisions for resolution of disputes and 
unfair practices must be exhausted, sixty days must have
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elapsed after a fact-finding board makes its report public, 
and the exclusive representative has given ten-day notice.
But the state can still proceed to enjoin a strike if the pub­
lic's health, safety, and welfare is endangered. Montana (N) 
allows nurses to strike providing that no two strikes occur 
within 150 miles of each other and that thirty day written 
notice is given. Pennsylvania (PE-T) allows its public employ­
ees to strike after dispute procedures have been exhausted, 
with the exception that public health, safety, and welfare can­
not be endangered. In Vermont (ME-F), municipal employees can 
strike, but again with the limitations that public health, 
safety, and welfare must be protected. There are twenty-one 
statutes which are silent on the strike.
Employer and employee unfair labor practices and the 
procedures for handling complaints is contained in Chapter VII. 
Unfair practice provisions are established to instruct all 
participants of activities which can be engaged in only under 
threat of exposure and sanction. Unfortunately, such specifi­
cations are needed to help maintain a certain degree of decorum 
in bilateralism. The analysis of specifications and procedures 
from twenty-two states, three cities, and the federal govern­
ment forms the base for this chapter.
The influence upon the merit system is examined within
the last chapter. One of the initial fears expressed when
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public employee unions became more active was that the merit 
system would be thrown out for some type of negotiated testing, 
grading, placement, promotion, demotion, etc. This initial 
fear has not turned out to be the case. The general consensus 
is that the heart of the merit system must be retained, but 
the major problem is defining the heart of the merit system 
and then defending it against any union encroachment.
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taken by a unit of government which are beyond the powers of 
that unit of government.
^^RF-BNA-GERR, 51:201.
^^RF-BNA-GERR, 51:223.
5^392 U.S. 188.
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See Chapter Three.
CHAPTER II
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES FOR IMPLEMENTING BILATERALISM
General Background 
Decentralization was one very important aspect of 
Executive Order 10988 issued by President Kennedy on January 
17, 1962. The Secretary of Labor was to aid in unit deter­
mination, the Civil Service Commission was to establish a 
training program, the two in combined efforts were to prepare 
the standards and code of employee conduct, while Section 13 
(b) called for the establishment of a President's Temporary 
Committee on the Implementation of the Federal Employee- 
Management Relations Program. But despite all of this admin­
istrative machinery. Federal E.O. 10988 was essentially an 
agency head function with each agency in essence going its 
own way within the broad context of the Order. This lack of 
administrative supervision was a weakness of Federal E.O.
10988 and prompted many to raise the question about the 
establishment of a "NLRB" for public employees. This weakness 
of Federal E.O. 10988 was corrected by E.O. 11941 through its
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establishment of the Federal Labor Relations Council (FLRC), 
the Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP), and providing a 
role for the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management 
Relations. This administrative arrangement and other similar 
administrative arrangements are the topic of this chapter.
Recommendations Eight and Twelve of the ACIR Report 
called for the establishment of appropriate machinery to co­
ordinate bilateralism and for the collection and exchange of 
data between and among both agencies and labor organizations. 
This machinery would aid in recognition, representation 
elections, impasse resolution, and other administrative 
matters for the proper and successful implementation of bi­
lateral ism. 1
Thirty-eight administrative arrangements from thirty- 
three jurisdictions are analyzed to discuss their roles in the 
implementation of bilateralism. Of these thirty-eight arrange­
ments, fourteen are newly created while nineteen made use of 
existing state labor machinery. Five jurisdictions, Kentucky 
(F), Maine (ME-T), Minnesota (PE-T), Oregon (N), and Federal 
E.O. 11491 use a combination of both existing machinery and 
new machinery. Table 2-1 indicates the administrative 
machinery both created and existing and the powers and duties 
of each. Again, before the reader gets further into the
Table 2-1.— Powers and duties of created and existing administrative arrangements 
for the implementation of bilateralism
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Table 2-1.— Continued
California (LE)
Department of Conciliation in 
the Department of 
Industrial Relations y Used in absence of local procedure
California (LA)
Employee Relations Board X a b c d e f g
Connecticut (ME)
State Board of Labor Relations y a b c f
State Board of Mediation and 
Arbitration y d
Delaware (PE)
Department of Labor and 
Industrial Relations y a b g
State Mediation Service y d
Hawaii (PE-T)
Public Employment Relations 
Board X a b c d e f g
U1
Table 2 - 1.— Continued
Kansas (PE)
Public Employee Relations 
Board X a b c d e f g
Kentucky (F)
State Labor Relations Board X a b c f g
Commissioner of Labor y d -
Maine (ME-T)
Public Employees Labor 
Relations Board X a b c f g
Board of Arbitration and 
Conciliation y d
Panel of Mediators y d
Maryland (Baltimore)
Office of Labor Commissioner X a b c f g
Massachusetts (SE)
Labor Relations Commission y b c f
in
NJ
Table 2-1.— Continued
Director of Personnel and 
Standardization y a d f g
Massachusetts (LE)
Labor Relations Commission y a b c f
State Board of Conciliation 
and Arbitration y d
Michigan (PE)
State Labor Mediation Board y a b c f
Minnesota (PE-T)
Public Employment Relations 
Board X d e g
Director of Mediation Services y a b f
Missouri (PE)
State Board of Mediation y a
Montana (N)
State Board of Health y a b f g
mw
Table 2-1.— Continued
Nebraska (PE)
Court of Industrial Relations
Nevada (LE-T)
Local Government Employee- 
Management Relations Board
New Hampshire (SE)
Commission
New Jersey (PE)
Division of Public Employment 
Relations
New Jersey Public Employment 
Relations Commission
New Mexico (SE)
State Personnel Board
New York (PE-T)
Public Employment Relations 
Board
in
4^
Table 2-1.— Continued
New York (New York City)
Office of Collective 
Bargaining X d e
Board of Collective 
Bargaining . X c d g
Board of Certification X a b f 9
Oklahoma (P-F-ME)
Public Employees Relations 
Board X a b c f 9
Oregon (PE)
Public Employee Relations 
Board X a b d
-
f
Oregon (N)
Commissioner of the Bureau 
of Labor y a b c 9
State Conciliation Service Y d
Public Employee Relations 
Board X d
in
in
Table 2 - 1 .— Continued
Pennsylvania (PE-T)
Pennsylvania Labor Relations 
Board y a b c d e f g
Pennsylvania Bureau of 
Mediation y d
Rhode Island (SE)
State Labor Relations Board 
for Conciliation and 
Fact-Finding y d
Rhode Island (ME)
State Labor Relations Board y a b d
South Dakota (PE)
Labor Commissioner y a b d
South Dakota (F-P)
Labor Commissioner y d
Vermont (SE)
State Employees Labor 
Relations Board X a b c d f g
ino>
Table 2 - 1.— Continued
Washington (LE)
Department of Labor and 
Industries y a b c f g
Wisconsin (SE)
Employment Relations 
Commission y a b c d f g
Wisconsin (ME-T)
Employment Relations 
Commission y a b c d f g
United States (11491)
Federal Labor Relations 
Council X g
Federal Service Impasses 
Panel X d f g
Assistant Secretary of Labor 
for Labor-Management 
Relations y a b c f
en
Table 2-1.— Continued
United States (11636)
Board of the Foreign Service X f g
Eraployee-Management Relations 
Commission X a b c f g
Disputes Panel X d f
U1
00
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material, mention must be made of the Riggsian differentiation 
or diversification presented in the Chapter I section on 
methodology and hypothesis. With Chapter II being the first 
of seven chapters analyzing various points in bilateralism 
the reader is initially exposed to the reality of this diver­
sification in bilateralism. The combination of new and created 
machinery and the various items examined well illustrate this 
major point of diversification which continually appears 
throughout this research.
The literature on administrative arrangements is prac­
tically nonexistent. Jean T. McKelvey has written perhaps 
the only article upon such arrangements in the January, 1967, 
issue of Industrial and Labor Relations Review.^  She begins 
by stating the basic problem, i.e., "the extent to which 
public employment labor relations are or should be governed 
by the same agencies which regulate and help to adjust labor 
disputes in the private field."3 She hypothesizes that the 
existing labor relations machinery will not be utilized as 
long as the differences between public and private bilater­
alism are emphasized. This hypothesis must be qualified in 
light of the research conducted here producing the fact that 
of the fifty-six separate boards performing some functions 
55 percent or thirty-six of them are existing state labor
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relations boards. Only 45 percent or twenty-five of the 
fifty-six would support her hypothesis which is almost no 
support at all.
A first corollary contends that if professional groups 
such as the National Education Association (NBA) or other 
similar groups of professionals not having affiliation with 
organized labor have a greater voice than private unions in 
public bilateralism, then new administrative machinery will 
be created rather than using existing machinery. The tendency 
to create new machinery is based on the professional groups' 
suspicion of labor unions in the private sector and of not 
wanting to be associated with craft or trade unions. Secondly, 
if the permissive legislation establishing bilateralism limits 
the scope of negotiable items, then a new breed of mediator 
is necessary to handle public bilateralism instead of similar 
individuals in private bilateralism accustomed to almost 
unlimited scope.^
She presents, in conclusion, four points which need to 
be taken into consideration before using either existing 
machinery or creating new administrative machinery. First, 
the experience and expertise of existing labor agencies could 
be easily transferred to public bilateralism, and, secondly, 
it should be more economical and efficient by not having a
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duplication of functions. Third, since many of the unions 
operating in the public sector have association with private 
labor unions, they should be familiar with existing machinery 
and be able to work within that structure unless the existing 
machinery is held in contempt because of past decisions and 
practices. Fourth, the new activity may regenerate a staid 
agency grown old and antrophied.
Contrariwise, first, there is sufficient difference 
between public and private bilateralism to warrant separate 
administering agencies and, secondly, public employees and 
professional groups still hold private unions with some sus­
picion and would rather not be that close in association. 
Third, the existing agency may be understaffed and unable to 
handle an increase in bilateral activities. Fourth, a new 
agency may be the place to allow innovative thinking instead 
of an old line trade or craft union organization which may 
not have had a new idea in years.^
New or existing, the jurisdictions studied break about 
even between the two alternatives. Although this study does 
not get into why each jurisdiction made its selection (a good 
topic for subsequent research) it will examine the structure, 
method of appointment, qualifications, term of office, powers, 
and duties of these boards.
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Analysis and Comparison 
The differentiation and diversification mentioned in 
the first chapter is very evident in this analysis of the 
administrative machinery established in implementing bilater­
alism. Although there are a few common points, the differences 
are more evident. This can readily be illustrated by the com­
position of the created boards. Data fron the statutes using 
existing administrative machinery are analyzed only in asso­
ciation with the powers and duties of the boards, since other 
data was absent in the statutes dealing with these boards.
Two jurisdictions. New Hampshire (SE) and Federal E.O. 
11491 and E.O. 11636, specify the membership of their boards.
In New Hampshire the three member Commission is composed of 
the Chairman of the State Personnel Commission, the Commissioner 
of Labor, and the Secretary of State. The three vote to de­
termine the chairman of the C o m m i s s i o n .  ^ The Federal Labor 
Relations Council (FLRC) is composed of the Chairman of the 
Civil Service Commission, the Secretary of Labor, and the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) with 
the first mentioned serving as chairman.? The Board of the 
Foreign Service is the foreign service's counterpart to the 
civil service's FLRC but with its membership not mentioned 
directly. Its membership is implied by the composition
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of the Employee-Management Relations Commission (EMRC) 
composed of representatives from the Board representing the 
Civil Service Commission, the Department of Labor and the 
0MB.® This is in contrast to Federal E.O. 11491 specifying 
membership on the FLRC and allowing the President to nominate 
members and designate the chairman of the Federal Services 
Impasse Panel (FSIP).
Several jurisdictions have their chief executive appoint 
the membership of their boards. The Court of Industrial Rela­
tions handles implementation for Nebraska (PE) with the 
governor appointing the five judges with the advice and consent 
of the legislature.® The Los Angeles Employee Relations Board 
is composed of five public members appointed by the mayor with 
city council approval, while Kentucky (F), Nevada (LE-T), New 
Hampshire (SE), New York (PE-T), Oklahoma (P-F-ME), and 
Vermont (SE) all have three member boards appointed by their 
governors with New York and Vermont requiring legislative
advise and consent.10
Of the remaining machinery, their distinction is multi­
membership but on a different ratio, i.e., the 1+1+1 of 
Hawaii (PE-T) and Maine (ME-T) means one labor member, one 
management member, and one public member. The Kansas (PE) 
Public Employee Relations Board is 1+1+3, the Minnesota (PE-T)
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Public Employee Relations Board is 2+2+1, while New Jersey 
(PE-T) and New York City are 2+2+3.^^ Generally the chairman 
is selected from among the public members or is the lone 
public member. Four jurisdictions, Kansas (PE), Nevada (LE-T), 
New York (PE-T), and Vermont (SE), specify that their boards 
are not to be composed of members from the same political 
party greater than two of three or three of five.^^
The terms for such boards can be seen in Table 2-2.
The Office of Labor Commissioner in the City of Baltimore has 
a term of office concurrent with the mayor, with the terms of 
office for those designated persons contingent upon any speci­
fied terms or continued approval of their appointing superiors.13
Table 2-2.— Terms of boards
3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 6 Years
New Jersey (PE) Kentucky (F) Los Angeles Hawaii (PE-T)
New York City Maine (ME-T) Oklahoma Kansas (PE)
Minnesota (PE) 
Nevada (LE-T)
(P-F-ME) Nebraska (PE) 
New York (PE) 
Vermont (SE)
There are few specified qualifications for membership. 
Los Angeles specifies a broad experience in labor relations 
and impartiality to protect the public interest. Kentucky (F) 
requires its members to be an elector in the state one year
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preceding appointment, while Vermont (SE) stipulates one year 
of residency with no connection with an employee organization 
or employment with the state for three years immediately pre­
ceding appointment. Nebraska (PE) requires experience in 
legal, financial, labor and industrial r e l a t i o n s .
The powers and duties of these boards and existing 
machinery can be grouped into the following seven general 
areas, i.e., determination of the appropriate unit, conducting 
representation elections which includes both certification and 
decertification, unfair practices procedures, impasse resolu­
tion procedures, maintaining a list of third parties and 
mediators, holding of required hearings, and promulgation of 
such rules and regulations necessary to carry out their duties. 
In situations with one board operating within one jurisdiction 
all these duties are handled by it, but in those jurisdictions 
with two or even three separate boards operating the duties 
become scattered with some performing review of others' 
activities. In Massachusetts (SE) and (ME-T), the Labor 
Relations Commission handles appropriate unit determination 
for local employees while the same function , for state employees 
is performed by the Director of Personnel and Standardization. 
The Labor Relations Commission performs representation 
elections and unfair procedures for both state and local
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employees. Impasse procedures for the state employees are 
handled by the Director of Personnel and Standardization, 
while the State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration handles 
impasse procedures for local employees.
The New York City arrangement is headed by the Director 
of the Office of Collective Bargaining, who is the Chairman 
of the Board of Collective Bargaining. The Board of Collective 
Bargaining is composed of two city members appointed by the 
Mayor to serve at his pleasure, two labor members designated 
by the Municipal Labor Committee, and three impartial members 
determined by vote of the other four members. The Board of 
Certification located within the Board of Collective Bargain­
ing is composed of the three impartial members of the Board 
of Collective Bargaining. The Board of Collective Bargaining 
has the power and duty to interpret the application of the 
New York City statute, make final determination on scope, 
handle unfair labor practice complaints, determine if a dis­
pute is a proper subject, for an arbitration procedure, and 
review rejected recommendations of an impasses panel as well 
as other things. The Board of Certification (see above) is 
charged with appropriate unit determination and conducting of 
representation elections. The Director of the Office of 
Collective Bargaining is to oversee the provision of the
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statute, administer provisions of the Board of Certification, 
facilitate collective bargaining, and engage in impasse 
procedures when necessary.
At the national level. Federal E.O. 11491 established 
the Federal Labor Relations Council (FLRC) composed of the 
three persons mentioned earlier and has the powers and duty 
to administer and interpret the Order, consider appeals from 
decisions of the Assistant Secretary of Labor, consider 
appeals on negotiability issues, consider exceptions to ar­
bitration awards, and handle other matters deemed appropriate 
to carry out the Order. The Federal Service Impasses Panel 
(FSIP) is composed of three persons appointed by the President 
to consider negotiation impasses. The Assistant Secretary of 
Labor for Labor-Management Relations shall decide questions 
on appropriate units, supervise representation elections, de­
cide questions as to national consultation rights, handle un­
fair labor practices complaints, and decide whether grievances 
shall be subject to negotiated procedures or subject to arbi­
tration under an agreement.Federal E.O. 11636 also 
prescribes a three unit organization for the foreign service, 
with the Board of the Foreign Service as a counterpart to the 
FLRC, the Employee-Management Relations Commission as a 
counterpart to the Assistant Secretary of Labor, and a
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Dispute Panel as a counterpart to the FSIP. .The big 
difference is in the composition of the Dispute Panel. The 
Chairman of the Board of the Foreign Service shall establish 
a panel composed of two members of the Foreign Service (neither 
of whom are considered management), a confidential employee or 
an organizational official, one public member, and one repre­
sentative each from the Department of Labor and the FSIP. The 
chairman of the Panel is designated by the Board Chairman.
The Panel then makes a finding of fact and recommendations 
which is reported to the Board for its consideration.^^
These four examples are only illustrative of the ma­
chinery established to implement bilateralism. It may sound 
confusing and in many cases it is. But how does it correlate 
with the administrative machinery established to handle in­
dustrial labor-management relations. For purposes of illus­
tration the administrative machinery of the federal government 
is used, i.e., the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). If 
these two organizations had been placed on Table 2-1 the NLRB 
would perform all powers and duties except impasse resolution 
and maintaining a list of third p a r t i e s . H o w  does this split 
responsibility compare with the public sector? Referring to 
the data in Table 2-1, eleven jurisdictions having thirteen
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statutes provide for a similar split in responsibilities, 
while fourteen jurisdictions having sixteen statutes provide 
for a combining of these functions and responsibilities. Both 
federal provisions are in the split responsibility category.
It is of interest that seven jurisdictions having a like 
number of statutes do not provide for the resolution of im­
passes, but do provide other means discussed in Chapter V.
In conclusion, the Riggsian prism of bilateralism has 
produced many and varied administrative arrangements for the 
implementation of bilateralism. All one need do is refer to 
Table 2-1 for confirmation of the above observation. What 
does this congeries of administrative arrangements mean to the 
future of bilateralism? The data are still incomplete since 
for many jurisdictions the advent of bilateralism is a fairly 
recent phenomena, e.g., the federal administrative arrangements 
have been operating only since 1971. But since the NLRB and 
the FMCS have been successful in implementing the federal gov­
ernment's part in private bilateralism, the author can foresee 
no great difficulties for similar public arrangements.
One major responsibility of the boards established to 
implement bilateralism is the determination of an appropriate 
bargaining unit and conducting elections or similar procedures 
for determining which employee organization will represent the
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unit or if the employees in the unit desire representation at 
all. Also, the aspect of unit security, i.e., union shop, 
agency shop, check-off, and exclusive representative, are 
analyzed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III
RECOGNITION
General Background 
Recognition is a multifaceted process. Based upon the 
employee's right to organize, the employees approach the em­
ployer to establish a formal bilateral relationship. This 
formal relationship is based upon the determination of the 
appropriate unit, the conducting of a representation election 
to determine the organization to represent the unit, and the 
granting of union security.
The determination of the appropriate unit is quite im­
portant, for through this process it is determined how the em­
ployees will be grouped or how the public organization will be 
divided for purposes of collective negotiations. This pro­
cedure will determine how many separate groups public manage­
ment will have to deal with, how many separate contracts will 
have to be implemented, and how many separate chances there are 
for something to go wrong. The problem is further complicated 
when supervisory, professional, managerial, confidential, and
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essential employees are brought into the picture. Caution 
and much consideration will need to be applied in the handling 
of these variables.
After the unit is delineated comes the process of deter­
mining the organization that will represent the employees 
therein. Although this would seem to be an easy process of 
election or other means of determination, strife will assuredly 
result unless all parties concerned respect the system used. 
Representation selection carries with it the idea that the em­
ployees can select the organization of their own choosing or 
select not to be represented by any organization. Along with 
unit determination and representative selection comes the im­
portant aspect of union security. Items within the scope of 
union security are exclusive representative status, union and 
agency shop, and check-off. If the organization selected is 
granted exclusive status, its position cannot be challenged for 
a specified period and is secure to deal with its counterpart 
without having to protect its existence. The union shop pro­
vides the organization greater membership security by requiring 
membership in the organization as a condition for keeping the 
position, while the agency shop provides the organization 
greater financial security by requiring the payment of a 
service fee to the organization for the administration of the
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contract and any benefits derived but with membership not 
required. Check-off allows dues or other specified deduc­
tions to be taken from the employee's paycheck upon proper 
authorization and paid directly to the organization.
The preceding topics are the substance of this chapter. 
Expressed in question form: What is an appropriate unit? How
is the unit determined? How is the representative selected? 
What provisions are there for union security?
Appropriate Unit 
"The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order 
to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the 
rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate .
. ." begins Section 159 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act.^ In much 
the same way the administrative machinery established or exist­
ing for the implementation of bilateralism is also deeply in­
volved in the determination of appropriate units for collective 
negotiations. About the only exceptions to this are in those 
statutes dealing with teachers or firemen that specify the 
units, leaving nothing for further determination. The Kansas 
(T) statute provides that "a unit including classroom teachers 
shall not be appropriate unless it includes all such teachers 
employed by the board of education, except administrative 
employees. A unit including administrative employees shall
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include all administrative employees employed by the board of 
e d u c a t i o n . T h e  Idaho (F) statute states the appropriate 
unit means "the paid members of any regularly constituted fire 
department in any city, county, fire district, or political 
subdivision within the state.
But specifically, what is an appropriate unit? The New 
Mexico (SE) provisions state that it is "the unit determined 
by an agency management together with the requesting employee 
organization and approved, rejected, or modified by the Board 
to be appropriately representative of a group of employees for 
the purposes of consultation or collective bargaining."^ This 
may seem straightforward enough, but behind this definition 
lies a tremendous challenge. For not only does this problem 
area include the preceding data, but the information contained 
in the sections on supervisory, professional, confidential and 
managerial, and essential employees.
One major fear concerning appropriate unit determination 
is over-fragmentation or, as Wellington and Winter call it, 
"balkanization." This means that as a consequence of unit 
determination the units have so fragmented the employees that 
collective negotiations and the general implementation of bi­
lateralism is exacerbated. Wellington and Winter contend that 
balkanization unnecessarily increases bargaining costs, and
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creating or maintaining a rational and comprehensive 
compensation plan is threatened. If balkanization can be 
avoided, then hopefully excessive competition between compet­
ing employee organizations can be avoided or reduced to toler­
able levels. They recommend that functional departments should 
not be broken into occupational units, but that departments 
having some autonomy with the organizational structure can be 
treated separately with justification.^ This will require a 
management that is prepared for bilateralism and that has done 
its homework to prevent over-fragmentation. Vermont (SE), 
Wisconsin (ME-T) and (SE), Kansas (PE), Alaska (PE), and 
Pennsylvania (PE-T) specifically state in their statutes that 
over-fragmentation is to be avoided in unit determination.^
By definition an appropriate unit is that group of em­
ployees or a section of the organization which engages in bi­
lateral activities. But how is the determination made? From 
an analysis of forty-nine statutes from thirty-three jurisdic­
tions, the following nine general criteria have been established 
with each jurisdiction using and emphasizing them in a variety 
of ways. The most mentioned factor is a community of interest. 
Although this is quite general, Wellington and Winter present 
three ways of describing or defining a community of interest. 
First, look for employees working within a unified compensation
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plan, or secondly, look for employees having a common set of 
procedures for such things as hiring, firing, and the handling 
of grievances. Lastly, determine if there are great occupation 
differences based upon such criteria as- function, education, 
trade, craft, or little movement into another occupation.^
Beyond these items the literature is quite skimpy with other 
criteria to aid understanding of the community of interest idea.
The second most mentioned criterion for unit determination 
which can be assessed in various ways is the desires of the em­
ployees and employer. Beyond these two main criteria, there is 
the history of collective bargaining or organization and the 
efficiency of the organization. New Mexico (SE) stipulates 
that the efficiency of the organization is the key criteria.®
The wages, hours, duties, skills, and other working conditions 
plus the geographic location of the job can also be used. The 
level of supervisory activity and the preparation, qualifica­
tion, and licensure for nurses are determinants. Maryland 
(BLT) stipulates that the position classification or group of 
classifications is prima facie support of an appropriate unit.® 
Most of these nine criteria can be seen in the California (LA) 
statute Section 4.822 (a), which is used as an illustration.
The Employment Relations Board is to use the following and 
other criteria in determining the appropriate unit:
79
1. The community of interest of employees.
2. The history of employee representation in 
the unit, among other employees of the city, 
and in similar employment.
3. The effect of the unit on the efficient 
operation of the City and sound employee 
relations.
4. The extent to which employees have common 
skills, working conditions, job duties, or 
similar education requirements.
5. The effect on the City's classification 
structure of dividing a single classifica­
tion among two or more units.
6. The right of professional employees to be 
represented separately from nonprofessional 
employees.
7. Management or confidential employees shall not 
be included in the same unit with other em­
ployees . 10
Beyond these nine general criteria and the California (LA) 
provision for illustrative purposes, the Hawaii (PE-T) and 
Wisconsin (SE) statutes are specific as to the units which 
can be established.
Section 6 (a) of the Hawaii (PE-T) statute establishes 
thirteen categories which constitute appropriate units.
These categories are:
1. Nonsupervisory employees in blue collar 
positions ;
2. Supervisory employees in blue collar positions;
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3. Nonsupervisory employees in white collar 
positions ;
4. Supervisory employees in white collar posi­
tions;
5. Teachers and other personnel of the depart­
ment of education under the same salary 
schedule ;
6. Educational officers and other personnel of 
the department of education under the same 
salary schedule;
7. Faculty of the University of Hawaii and the 
community college system;
8. Personnel of the University of Hawaii and 
the community college system, other than 
faculty;
9. Registered professional nurses;
10. Nonprofessional hospital and institutional 
workers ;
11. Firemen;
12. Policemen;
13. Professional and scientific employees, other 
than registered professional nurses.^
Categories nine through thirteen are designated optional ap­
propriate units because of the nature of the work and the es­
sentiality of these occupations. If employees in these 
categories desire, they can be included within categories one 
through four. By mutual agreement supervisory and nonsuper­
visory personnel can be combined in categories nine through 
thirteen, but if the supervisory employees are excluded, they
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will fit into a unit based on categories one through four.
The compensation plans and the appointment and classification 
of faculty existing on the effective date of the Hawaii (PE-T) 
statute (July, 1970) shall be "the basis for differentiating 
blue collar from white collar employees, professional from 
nonprofessional employees, supervisory from nonsupervisory em­
ployees, teachers from educational officers, and faculty from 
nonfaculty. The Hawaii Employment Relations Board has the
final determination on appropriate units.
The Wisconsin (SE) statute provides that it is the legis­
lative intent to avoid excessive fragmentation and, in accord­
ance with this desire, statewide units are established among 
the following occupational groups :
1. Clerical and related;
2. Blue collar and nonbuilding trades;
3. Building trades crafts;
4. Security and public safety;
5. Technical;
6. Professional
a. Fiscal and staff services;
b. Research, statistics and analysis;
c. Legal;
d. Patient treatment;
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e. Patient care;
f. Social services;
g. Education;
h. Engineering;
i. Science.13
The statute also provides that after July 1, 1974, the above 
units can be changed by petitioning the Employment Relations 
Commission, which must keep before it the legislative desire 
to avoid fragmentation but take into consideration the commu­
nity of interests.!^
In bringing this discussion to a conclusion before 
material is presented on supervisory, professional, confiden­
tial and managerial, and essential employees, four other gen­
eralizations are common among the data. Professional employees 
are to be separated from nonprofessional with inclusion only 
upon vote of the former. Craft employees are to be separated 
from noncraft employees, but again by vote they can be combined. 
Firemen, policemen, and guards are to be in separate units with 
special emphasis upon the policemen and guards, since security 
personnel could have a conflict of interest if combined with 
employees they must oversee. Generally, supervisory employees 
are to be in a separate unit, but as illustrated by the Hawaii 
(PE-T) statute, they can be combined.
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Supervisory Employees
A superyisory employee means "any individual having 
authority in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, 
suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, 
or discipline other employees, or the responsibility to assign 
work to and direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or ef­
fectively to recommend such action, if, in connection with the 
foregoing, the exercise of such authority is not of a merely 
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent 
j u d g m e n t . T h i s  is the definition of a supervisory employee 
as found in the Hawaii (PE-T) statute, Taft-Hartley Section 
152 (11), and eleven other statutes using the Hawaii (PE-T) 
statute definition as a model. Taft-Hartley Section 152 (3) 
excludes from the definition of covered employees supervisory 
employees, and this is echoed in Kansas (PE), Connecticut (ME), 
Rhode Island (ME), and Wisconsin (SE).^® Although the defini­
tion of supervisory employees is fairly common when used, only 
four statutes specify in any detail other criteria to be used 
in making such a determination.
The Connecticut (ME) statute provides that the State 
Board of Labor Relations is to determine if a supervisory 
position is covered by the statute in the event of a dispute 
between the municipal employer and an employee organization.
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In determining whether a supervisory position is excluded 
from coverage, the Board is to take the following criteria 
into consideration. The position must be characterized by 
principal functions of not less than two of these criteria. 
First, examine to see if the position requires the performance 
of such management control duties as "scheduling, assigning, 
overseeing, and reviewing the work of subordinate employees." 
Second, analyze the position to see if the duties performed 
are "distinct and dissimilar from those performed by the em­
ployees supervised." Third, determine if the position requires 
the exercise of judgment in adjusting grievances, the applica­
tion of other established personnel policies and procedures, 
and enforcing provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. 
Fourth, determine if the position calls for establishing or 
participating in the establishment of performance standards 
and the implementation of such standards. The one qualifying 
provision is that the criteria shall not necessarily apply to 
police or fire departments.^^ The Executive Director of the 
Public Employee Labor Relations Board is to use the same cri­
teria in implementing the Maine (ME-T) statute.
The Hawaii (PE-T) statute stipulates that in differen­
tiating supervisory from nonsupervisory personnel, job titles 
alone shall not be the basis for decision. Additionally, the
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Public Employment Relations Board, having responsibility for 
unit determination, will also consider "the nature of the 
work, and whether a major portion of the working time of a 
supervisory employee is spent as part of a crew or team with 
nonsupervisory employees.
The Michigan (PE) statute, in referring to firemen, 
states that "no person subordinate to a fire commission, fire 
commissioner, safety director, or other similar administrative 
agency or administrator, shall be deemed to be a supervisor.
Not only are there few provisions for determining the 
first level of supervision, but few statutes provide any mea­
sure of supervisory bilateralism. Kansas (PE) Section 5, which 
is very similar to Taft-Hartley Section 164 (a), provides:
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual em­
ployed as a supervisory employee from becoming 
or remaining a member of an employee organization, 
but no public employer subject to this act shall 
be compelled to deem individuals defined herein 
as supervisory employees as public employees for 
the purposes of this act.21
Although these provisions allow supervisory employees to belong 
to such employee organizations, in both cases they are exempted 
from coverage of the act. But the supervisory employee provi­
sions in the Minnesota (PE-T) statute stipulate they may join 
or participate in an employee organization or form their own 
organization, but are not authorized to be included in an
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appropriate bargaining unit. A public employer shall not, and 
shall not be required to by the Director of Mediation Services, 
extend exclusive recognition to such an organization, but may 
"consult and otherwise communicate with such an organization 
on appropriate matters.
Under the Pennsylvania (PE-T) statute, first level super­
visors cannot require their public employers to negotiate with 
them or their representatives, but their employers shall be 
required to meet and discuss with them "on matters deemed to 
be bargainable for other public employers covered by this act.
The Wisconsin (ME-T) statute carries the provision that 
until January 1, 1974, supervisors can remain members of labor 
organizations which contain nonsupervisors, but shall not par­
ticipate in determining collective bargaining policies or the 
resolution of employees' grievances. After January 1, 1974, 
the supervisors shall not remain members of these organiza­
tions.^^
The statute covering state employees in Wisconsin sets 
forth the provision that the Employment Relations Commission 
may consider a petition for a statewide unit of professional 
and nonprofessional supervisory employees. These organizations 
are not to be affiliated with other employee organizations, and 
their representatives are limited to bargaining over wages and 
fringe benefits.
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Federal E.O. 11491 provides for the renewal, continuation, 
or initial according of recognition to organizations of super­
visors which have historically represented them and for the 
extension of exclusive representative status. Section 7 (e) 
provides for the establishment of a system of intramanagement 
communications with supervisors which has as its purpose "the 
improvement of agency operations, the improvement of working 
conditions of supervisors, the exchange of information, the 
improvement of managerial effectiveness, and the establishment 
of policies that best serve the public interest in accomplish­
ing the mission of the agency.
Charles T. Schmidt contends that supervisory employees 
need to organize and be represented to protect themselves from 
the pressures both above and below resulting from bilateralism. 
Perhaps, he continues, through their own negotiations any fear 
of bilateralism will be lessened. This author heartedly con­
curs with these i d e a s . ^7
Professional Employees
A professional employee is defined by eleven different 
jurisdictions and Taft-Hartley Section 152 (12) as meaning:
A. Any employee engaged in work:
1. Predominantly intellectual and varied in 
character as opposed to routine, mental, 
manual, mechanical or physical work.
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2. Involving the consistent exercise of 
discretion and judgment in its perfor­
mance.
3. Of such a character that the output pro­
duced or the result accomplished cannot 
be standardized in relation to a given 
time period.
4. Requiring knowledge of an advanced type 
in a field of science or learning cus­
tomarily acquired by a prolonged course 
of specialized intellectual instruction 
and study in an institution of higher 
learning or a hospital, as distinguished 
from a general academic education or from 
an apprenticeship or from training in
the performance of routine mental, manual, 
or physical processes.
B. Any employee who:
1. Has completed the courses or specialized 
intellectual instruction and study 
described in Number Four of A.
2. Is performing related work under the 
supervision of a professional person to 
qualify himself to become a professional 
employee as defined in A . 28
Professional employees are generally covered by the 
statutes except in those cases where these employees fall in 
the supervisory category. Generally, as was shown in the ma­
terial on appropriate units, professional can be joined with 
nonprofessional employees only if they so declare by vote.
The only statute to provide separate treatment for pro­
fessional employees is the Minnesota (PE) statute. Section 13 
thereof states :
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The legislature recognizes that professional 
employees possess knowledge, expertise, and dedi­
cation which is helpful and necessary to the 
operation and quality of public services and 
which may assist public employers in developing 
their policies. It is, therefore, the policy of 
this state to encourage close cooperation between 
public employers and professional employees by 
providing for discussions and the mutual exchange 
of ideas regarding all matters not specified 
under Section 3, subdivision 18 of this act.29
Section 3, subdivision 18 provides that the term "terms and
conditions of employment" means the compensation and economic
aspects of employment, but not the educational policies of
school districts. The scope of this professional negotiation
is further limited by the management rights found in Section
6.3°
The professionals are to select a representative to meet 
and confer at least once every four months in facilities pro­
vided and at a time set by the employer. The Public Employment 
Relations Board, upon petition by the parties, is to submit a 
list of qualified consultants in the areas taken under consid­
eration by the parties. Either party can select its own con­
sultant, or both parties can select by mutual efforts one 
consultant which provides advisory opinions to the parties. 
These consultants are to be compensated equally by the parties 
at a rate not to exceed $100 per day plus necessary expenses 
agreed to by the parties.
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Confidential Employees
A confidential employee, using the Kansas (PE) statute
as a model, means:
. . . any employee whose unrestricted access to 
confidential personnel files or other informa­
tion concerning the administrative operations of 
a public agency, or whose functional responsi­
bilities or knowledge in connection with the 
issues involved in the meet and confer process, 
would make his membership in the same employee 
organization as other employees incompatible 
with his official duties. 2^
Confidential employees, and in this section managerial
employees are generally included, are to be determined by the
Personnel Department of Los Angeles with any dispute over such
33determination taken to the Employee Relations Board. The 
relationship between confidential and managerial employees is 
further highlighted in the New York (PE-T) statute by provid­
ing that confidential employees are those "who assist and act 
in a confidential capacity to managerial employees" described
in the statute.^4
The New York (NYC) statute provides that confidential 
and managerial personnel do not constitute a bargaining unit 
for negotiations.35 But the Minnesota (PE-T) statute allows 
their confidential employees the right to form their own or­
ganizations and be recognized. The Minnesota (PE-T) statute 
also has similar provisions for supervisory personnel.
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Although such recognition shall not be exclusive, their 
employer is required to "consult and otherwise communicate" 
on appropriate matters.
Essential Employees
The Minnesota (PE-T) statute also establishes a class of 
employees called essential. The essentiality of employees in 
the public sector is the main reason why the strike is gener­
ally prohibited, but more on this is included in Chapter VI. 
Section 3 (11) defines essential employee as "any person within 
the definition of subdivision 7 of this section whose employ­
ment duties involve work or services essential to the health 
or safety of the public and the withholding of such services
would create a clear and present danger to the health or safety
37of the public." Subdivision 7 is a general definition of 
employees covered by the statute. Although essential employees 
enjoy full privileges of the statute, the major difference is 
in the method of impasse resolution.
The Director of Mediation Services certifies the final 
bargaining position of the parties to the Public Employment 
Relations Board, thereupon, the Board establishes an aribtra- 
tion panel with participation of the parties. The arbitration 
panel is restricted to the final positions of the parties and 
its decision shall be binding. The decision of an arbitration
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panel, outside of essential employees, is binding only upon 
mutual agreement of the parties, but it is binding upon the 
parties involving essential employees regardless of d e s i r e s . ^ 8
Representation Election 
Representation elections are conducted to determine the 
employee organization that will represent the employees in an 
appropriate unit. Representation elections are held to certify, 
decertify, or change organizational representation. Generally 
speaking, the procedure is identical for all three types of 
elections. Additionally, it is very common for the recognition 
extended to the organization to be exclusive, i.e., the organi­
zation is protected as part of union security from having to 
defend its position for at least one year. The organization 
challenging the exclusive status must then follow the specified 
procedure to unseat. Federal E.O. 10988 did provide for ex­
clusive, formal, and informal recognition, but formal and in­
formal recognition was removed from the amended Federal E.O. 
11491.
From an analysis of data from thirty-two jurisdictions 
having forty-eight separate statutes, the following general 
outline of steps in gaining recognition has been developed.
In most procedures the board established to implement bilater­
alism is petitioned by either the employee organization or the
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employer that a question concerning representation exists. In 
most cases the petition must be signed by not less than 30 per­
cent of the employees in the unit, although Vermont (ME) is
low at 20 percent and Oregon (T) and (SP) are high at 40 per- 
39cent. New Hampshire (SE) requires a petition of 2 5 percent 
or 100 members whichever is less.^® Other organizations can 
also gain places on the ballot generally with a showing of 10 
percent, with Vermont (ME-F) requiring 15 percent and Kansas 
(T) requiring 30 percent.
Now for a momentary digression into an alternative route 
to gaining recognition. If the organization can validly claim 
majority support of the employees in a unit, Vermont (T), 
Delaware (T), Maine (ME-T), Massachusetts (SE), Montana (T), 
Nevada (LE-T), New York (NYC), and North Dakota (T) permit the 
employer to recognize the organization so claiming unless 
another organization challenges the claim, which then gener­
ally results in an investigation and election to determine 
representation. This procedure is also called a mutual consent 
election which is available in Kentucky (F), California (LA), 
Maryland (T), and Minnesota (PE-T). While the Vermont (ME-F) 
statute prohibits such procedures, the Vermont (T) statute 
does permit mutual consent elections but an objection by 10 
percent of the involved employees will cause an election. 2^
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Returning to the main line of thought, a board in 
receipt of a petition with generally at least 30 percent sup­
port of the employees in a unit will then call for an investi­
gation to determine if a question as to representation does in 
fact exist. If the investigation establishes the question of 
representation in the affirmative, an election is called for 
by secret ballot with the petitioning organization, other or­
ganizations having at least 10 percent support, and in many 
cases an option of "no representation" being placed on the bal­
lot. Massachusetts (ME-T), Michigan (PE), and Alaska (PE) 
allow in their statutes for a consent election.43 por such 
an election to take place the parties waive formal hearing to 
determine if a question of representation exists, agree on the 
details of the election, and conduct the election.
In most statutes a majority of votes cast will determine 
the victor in an election, with Vermont (SE) and Delaware (T) 
requiring an absolute majority of the employees in the u n i t . 44 
The 50 percent rule was in operation under Federal E.O. 10988. 
This rule required that either 60 percent of the eligibles in 
a unit vote of which a majority would select an organization 
to represent them or reject any representation, or with less 
than 60 percent participation, but an absolute majority voting, 
select an organization to represent them or reject any
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representation. The organization securing the required vote 
is then certified by the board as the representative of the 
employees, and collective negotiations can begin. In most 
instances, if one alternative on the ballot does not receive 
the required vote, a runoff election is conducted. In New 
Hampshire (P) and Wisconsin (SE) the runoff election is con­
ducted only upon request of the parties.^5 The top two vote- 
getting choices are placed in the runoff even if one of them 
is the "no representative" choice. The validity of the elec­
tion is generally good for at least twelve months. Some pro­
visions allow the recognition to run the duration of the 
negotiated agreement, but such duration cannot be longer than 
three years.^6 Several statutes provide for year-to-year or 
continual recognition until challenged. Only two jurisdictions, 
Vermont (T) and New Mexico (SE), stipulate that the costs of 
such activities shall be borne equally by the p a r t i e s . I n  
many statutes involving teachers, firemen, or policemen, the 
representation procedures are quite short with representation 
being based on majority support shown by election or designa­
tion.
To challenge the recognition or exclusive status of an 
organization, the challenge must be brought generally within 
thirty days of the expiration of the agreement or within ninety
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but not less than sixty days of the expiration of the 
agreement. The decertification or change procedure is basic­
ally the same as for certification.48
One of the duties of the boards is to establish the 
rules and regulations covering the designation of unit repre­
sentation, and the New Mexico (SE) provisions are quite spe­
cific on these requirements. These provisions are used here 
to illustrate the rules and regulations that could be estab­
lished:
a. The agency will post notice of the election 
not later than 20 days before the date of 
the election.
b. Questions of eligibility of employees to vote 
in an election will be resolved by the Board.
c. Ballots will allow eligible voters to choose 
between participating employee organizations 
or to choose, if they desire, not to be repre­
sented by any employee organization.
d. Positions on the ballot will be determined by 
chance.
e. If sample ballots are distributed, they will 
be of a conspicuously different color than 
official ballots and clearly marked as samples.
f. The official ballots in all cases are to be 
furnished by the agency. Before, during, or 
after an election no one will be permitted to 
handle any ballot except an election official 
and the individual who votes the ballot.
g. The agency and each participating employee or­
ganization will be allowed an equal number of 
observers at each polling place.
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h. Polling places will be at or near the work 
place of the eligible voting member of the 
bargaining unit, as determined by the offi­
cials conducting the election.
i. Polling places will be open during working 
hours determined by the officials conducting 
the election. Employees will be given ade­
quate time, during working hours, to vote.
j. Ballot boxes will be opened and votes counted
in the presence of only the following:
1. Judges, clerks, or recorders designated 
by the officials conducting the election.
2. One observer from each participating 
employee organization and the agency.
k. The agency and the employee organization shall 
agree upon, in the preelection agreement, the 
acts and conduct that will be reasons for set­
ting the results of the election aside. Where 
agreement is not possible, the Board shall 
establish the election ground rules. Complaints 
shall be made to the Board by either the agency 
or the employee organization within five cal­
endar days following the election, and the 
Board's decision on the matter shall be final. 
Such decision shall be announced within 30 
calendar days.
1. An election is valid only if at least 60% of 
the eligible employees vote.
m. An employee organization which receives a
majority of the votes cast will be certified 
as the winner of the election.
n. Officials conducting the election will notify 
the agency director and the State Personnel 
Director of the results of the election by 
telephone not later than one work day after 
polling places are closed to voting. A 
written report of the results will be mailed 
not later than three days after the date of
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the election. Recognition shall not be granted 
or denied until the five-day complaint period 
expires.
In the event more than one employee organiza­
tion participates and no choice receives a 
majority vote in a valid election, a run-off 
election, to decide between the two choices 
receiving the highest vote, will be held not 
earlier than 10 days nor later than 30 days 
after the indecisive election.
No representation election shall be held in 
any unit within which, in the preceding twelve­
month period, a valid representation election 
has been held. This requirement does not pre­
clude a consultation relationship during this
period.49
Union Security
Union and Agency Shop
The union and agency shop is one aspect of bilateralism 
which has given some concerned parties great difficulty.50 
This is based upon the idea that public employment based upon 
the merit principle should not and could not adhere to the 
union or agency shop concept. The union shop agreement stipu­
lates that continued employment is contingent upon joining the 
union and remaining a member thereof, while the agency shop 
requires an employee to pay a certain sum to the union, regard­
less of membership, for any benefits derived or for the admin­
istration of any contract. The contention is that such 
provisions in public employment are antithetical to the merit
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principle of job continuation based only upon merit and 
competence. Furthermore, job democracy is violated if an em­
ployee is required to pay a sum to an organization to which 
he or she does not belong.
There are only two illustrations of union shop provisions 
among the statutes. These are the Kentucky (F) and Alaska (PE) 
statutes. The Kentucky (F) statute states "that nothing in 
this Act, or in any other statute of this state, shall preclude 
a public employer from making an agreement with a labor organi­
zation to require as a condition of employment membership 
therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning 
of such employment or on the effective date of such agreement, 
whichever is the l a t e r . T h e  Alaska (PE) statute also allows 
the union shop by providing that the public employer can agree 
with an organization to require, as a condition of employment, 
membership in the organization on or after the thirtieth day 
following the beginning of employment or on the effective date 
of the agreement.
Six jurisdictions make provisions for the agency shop or 
for the payment of a service fee to the exclusive representa­
tive of the unit. These six jurisdictions, which are presented 
below, are Alaska (PE), Hawaii (PE-T), Massachusetts (SE),
Rhode Island (SE), New York (NYC), and Wisconsin (SE).^^
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Alaska (PE) is unique in providing for both the union and 
agency shops. The public employer in Alaska can by agreement 
with the exclusive representative, require as a condition of 
employment a service fee to reimburse the bargaining agent for 
the expense of representing the unit. Hawaii (PE-T), although 
not mentioning the agency shop, also provides that the employees 
in a unit be required to pay a service fee approved by the 
Public Employment Relations Board to defray the costs of nego­
tiation and contract administration.
On June 26., 1969, Massachusetts passed separate legisla­
tion allowing the agency shop initially in the city of Boston 
and Suffolk County. On June 24, 1970, additional legislation 
was passed which allowed any other city, county, town, or dis­
trict to institute the agency shop by local option. The amount 
of the agency service fee is determined by negotiation. The 
Rhode Island (SE) statute also provides for the payment of a 
service charge for nonmembers in an amount equal to the regular 
monthly dues of members. The New York (NYC) statute also allows 
an agreement where the required payment of nonmembers of a sum 
is equal to the uniform regular monthly dues required of members.
The Wisconsin (SE) statute is unique in providing for a 
"fair-share agreement," which is a type of agency shop. Once 
the appropriate unit and exclusive representative have been
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determined, a petition signed by not less than 30 percent of 
the employees in the unit can be sent to the Employment Rela­
tions Commission requesting a referendum vote. The Commission 
conducts the referendum vote with approval by two-thirds of 
the eligible voters in the unit required. If the vote is in 
the affirmative, the fair-share agreement takes effect sixty 
days later with the amount equal to the uniformly required 
dues of the organization.
The only maintenance of membership provision is found in 
the Pennsylvania (PE-T) statute. This provision requires em­
ployee organization membership for the duration of the contract
for members who have joined or will join in the future. The
provision also states that membership can be terminated during 
a fifteen day period prior to the termination of the a g r e e m e n t . 54 
It is somewhat strange that with all the fear of both the 
union and agency shop only six provisions specifically disallow­
ing required membership can be found among the data. These are: 
Connecticut (ME), Delaware (T), Maryland (BLT), Vermont (T), 
and Federal E.O. 11491 and E.O. 11636.^^ These provisions 
can be illustrated by the Connecticut (ME) statute which states:
When an employee organization has been designated 
in accordance with the provisions of this act as
the exclusive representative of employees in an '
appropriate unit, it shall have the right to act 
for and to negotiate agreements covering all 
employees in the unit and shall be responsible
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for representing the interests of all such 
employees without discrimination and without 
regard to employee organization membership.
This strange silence on prohibiting the union and agency shop 
is perhaps ameliorated by the provision found in thirty sta­
tutes representing nineteen jurisdictions which state that pub­
lic employees shall have the right to form or join in such 
organizations or shall have the right to refuse to join or 
participate in such organizations or activities. Even this 
is somewhat diluted by Hawaii (PE-T), Massachusetts (SE), New 
York (NYC), and Wisconsin (SE), which have either an agency 
shop or a service fee requirement and are also among those 
jurisdictions providing the above. The two jurisdictions pro­
viding for the union shop only specify that employees may or 
shall have the right to form and join such organizations and 
participate in such activities.
The cases dealing with either the union or agency shop 
seem to be quite scarce and divided between support and rejec­
tion. In Citv of Warren v. International Association of Fire 
Fighters, Local No. 1383 (1958), a Michigan Circuit Court 
(Macomb County) held that Article 16 of the contract was 
superior to a provision of the Civil Service Act. The two 
provisions state:
Any employee who is not a union member and who 
does not make application for membership shall
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as a condition of employment pay to the union an 
amount equal to the union's regular and usual 
initiation fee and a monthly service charge as 
a contribution toward the administration of this 
agreement in an amount equal to the regular 
monthly dues. Employees who fail to comply with 
this requirement within thirty days shall be dis­
charged by the employer.
It shall be unlawful for a public employer or an 
officer or agent of a public employer to dis­
criminate in regard to hire, terms or other con­
ditions of employment in order to encourage or 
discourage membership in a labor organization. 7^
The court contended that the civil service legislation was 
general legislation, while the Public Employment Relations Act 
was special legislation and therefore must be preferred. In 
this situation a majority of employees had decided to partici­
pate with only twenty-five employees not joining and refusing
to p a y . 58
The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld an agency shop pro­
vision in a 1970 case involving the Southgate Education Asso­
ciation and the Southgate Community School District. The court 
held the nonmembers' fee was to be equivalent to "a nonmember's 
proportionate share of the cost of negotiating and administer­
ing the contract involved," Continuing, the court stated:
"It would be inequitable not to require nonunion members to 
pay their proportionate share of the cost of obtaining and 
administering . . . benefits."58
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A county court invalidated Toledo, Ohio's 1971 labor 
agreement which contained a union shop agreement requiring 
compulsory union membership, mandatory check-off, and payment 
for an employee engaged in full-time union work. These pro­
visions were held to be in violation of state civil service 
laws, the state constitution, and the rule-making powers of 
the local civil service commission.^0
With such few cases, it is difficult to establish any 
meaningful guidelines of future court interpretation. But that 
the problem will assuredly appear many times is all but guar­
anteed. The Bureau of National Affairs' publication, Basic 
Patterns in Union Contracts, contributes the data that of 
their 400 sample contracts, the provision for a union shop was 
found in 62 percent, the modified union shop in 11 percent, the 
agency shop in 9 percent, and the maintenance-of-membership in 
7 p e r c e n t . A publication of the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
in the Department of Labor entitled the Characteristics of 
Agreements Covering 1000 Workers or More, indicates that out 
of 1,300 agreements 1,085 contain the union or modified union 
shop provision, while only sixty-five provide for the agency 
shop and thirty-eight for maintenance-of-membership.^^
From these data, therefore, the union and agency shop 
provisions are very prevalent in the private sector, while
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their development in public bilateralism is of unknown 
quantities now. It is the author's opinion that the agency 
shop and maintenance-of-membership provisions are not so 
strange or antithetical to the merit principle that their de­
velopment would be damaging. But the union shop is another 
question. Conditions such as proved or established competency 
can be stipulated before employment is secured, but requiring 
union membership or the gaining of union membership to continue 
employment is believed to be outside of merit principles. Merit 
principles may in some way have to bend in bilateralism, but it 
is the author's opinion that the union shop contributes nothing 
to job competency and is simply a method of securing members 
where the union's appeal or work situation appeal cannot gain 
members. If the union is so good, then the employees out of 
intelligence should join, but if a public employee declares 
against union membership, job continuance should not be made 
contingent upon union membership.
Check-Off
Another aspect of union security is the check-off of 
union dues and other fees. Of the thirty-six jurisdictions 
and seventy-four separate statutes and executive orders, only 
sixteen jurisdictions and nineteen separate statutes or 
executive orders specifically provide for it. Recommendation
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Thirteen of the ACIR report states that such arrangements
should be based upon written authorizations of employees in
appropriate units represented by organizations having majority 
63status.
The aspect of dues check-off is considered much less 
challenging than either the union or agency shop or designating 
a representative as the exclusive representative of the em­
ployees in an appropriate unit. The Bureau of National Affairs' 
data indicate that of their 400 contract samples 85 percent 
contain check-off provisions, with manufacturing enterprises 
accounting for 95 percent and nonmanufacturing enterprises 
for 65 percent (based on the lack of such arrangements in the 
construction i n d u s t r i e s ) D a t a  from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics indicates that of their 1300 contract samples 1,050 
contain check-off provisions, with the construction industry 
having 115 out of 250 agreements making no reference to the 
check-off provisions.®^
It is the author's opinion that dues check-off is very 
fundamental to union security and in no way challenges the 
merit principle. In a vast majority of statutes this can be 
initiated or terminated only upon the presentation of written 
authorization by the employee.
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The Delaware (PE), Hawaii (PE-T), and Pennsylvania (PE-T)
check-off provisions are used for illustrative purposes. These
respectively are:
Upon the written authorization of any public 
employee within a bargaining unit, the public 
employer shall deduct from the payroll of the 
public employee the monthly amount of dues as 
certified by the secretary of the exclusive bar­
gaining representative and shall deliver the same 
to the treasurer or the exclusive bargaining rep­
resentative .
In addition to any deduction made to the exclu­
sive representative under subsection (a) (agency 
shop), the employer shall, upon written authori­
zation by an employee, deduct from the payroll 
of the employee the amount of membership dues, 
initiation fees, group insurance premiums, and 
other association benefits and shall remit the 
amount to the employee organization designated
by the employee.
Membership dues deductions and maintenance of 
membership are proper subjects of bargaining 
with the provision that as to the latter, the 
payment of dues and assessments while members, 
may be the only requisite employment condition.^8
Summary
This chapter should well illustrate the diversification 
within bilateralism. Although some commonality does surface, 
there is still the aspect of each jurisdiction doing its own 
thing. The following major points are examined in this chapter: 
appropriate unit, representation election, and union security.
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By definition an appropriate unit is that group of 
employees or section of an organization engaging in bilateral 
activities. The most common criterion for determining an ap­
propriate unit is the community of interests. Other factors 
to be considered are the desires of the employees, the history 
of collective bargaining, and the efficiency of the organiza­
tion. But the problem of determination is complicated when 
supervisory, professional, essential, and confidential employees 
are considered. Bilateralism is still fairly young and all the 
attendant problems are still to be resolved.
A representation election is the process of determining 
the employee organization that is to represent the employees 
in an appropriate unit. The process of selecting a represen­
tative is called certification, while the reverse process is 
called decertification. If allowed, the employees can opt for 
"no representative" in either process. Generally, 30 percent 
of the employees must sign a petition to initiate either pro­
cess with competing groups generally needing only 10 percent 
for participation. The selection process is by secret ballot, 
but consent elections (no voting) are permitted wherein the 
organization claims majority support and is certified if no 
opposition is registered. Usually only a majority of those 
voting is required for victory, but in same instances an 
absolute majority is needed.
109
Union security refers to that aspect of bilateralism in 
which the employee organization is assured in various ways of 
its continuity. Exclusive representation, union shop, agency 
shop, and check-off are elements of union security. Exclusive 
representative status, gained through certification, assures 
the organization that its status cannot be challenged for a 
specified period. The period is usually one year. Only 
Kentucky (F) and Alaska (PE) allow the union shop which re­
quires the joining of the organization to retain employment, 
while six jurisdictions provide for the agency shop which re­
quires the payment of a service fee for negotiating and admin­
istrating the agreement but does not require membership. While 
the agency shop is not that foreign to the merit principle, it 
is my opinion that the union shop does damage the merit prin­
ciple. The check-off of dues and other organization assessments 
is the last aspect of union security examined. In my opinion, 
check-off is a very benign aspect of bilateralism and should 
not be rejected by management. Rejection will only engender 
hard feelings. Since bilateralism is loaded with other areas 
that can produce conflict, it would be very inadvisable to 
create the situation here.
The purpose of all this activity is aimed toward the 
topic of the next chapter— collective negotiations. Chapter IV
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examines the heart of bilateralism by analyzing the scope of 
negotiations, management's rights, publicity, official time, 
and contract interpretation. These are the key aspects of 
collective negotiations.
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CHAPTER IV
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
Background Material 
This chapter does not tell how to collectively negotiate; 
that is an art which must be learned through experience and 
not read from a book. Perhaps the best book on how to prepare 
for collective negotiations in public bilateralism is Warner 
and Hennessy's Public Management at the Bargaining Table.^  
(Although this book was written in 1957, it still contains valu­
able insights.)
This chapter does examine the scope of negotiations, the 
rights of management, official time, contract interpretation, 
and publicity in connection with both negotiations and the 
resulting agreement. These topics will follow an analysis of 
the statutory provisions on collective negotiations dealing 
with monetary terms, the term of the agreements, negotiation 
teams, and when negotiations are to begin. But before this 
material is presented, collective negotiations needs to be
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discussed in general to better establish what it is and what 
it is not.
Vernon Jensen states that "collective bargaining is not 
an instrument for resolving all problems in the industrial 
universe, let alone society as a w h o l e A l t h o u g h  his state­
ment concerns private bilateralism specifically, the same idea 
is applicable to public bilateralism. He continues by stating 
that although collective bargaining is concerned with the imme­
diate and particular, the parties also operate within certain 
restraints which the parties ignore at their peril.^ One such 
restraing found in the Declaration of Policy section of the 
Wisconsin (SE) statute states:
It recognizes that there are three major interests 
involved: that of the public, that of the state
employee and that of the state as an employer.
These three interests are to a considerable ex­
tent interrelated. It is the policy of this state 
to protect and promote each of these interests 
with due regard to the situation and to the rights 
of the others . . . .  neither party has any right 
to engage in acts or practices which jeopardize 
the public safety and interest and interferes 
with the effective conduct of public business.^
Therefore, one definite restraing of public bilateralism which
cannot be ignored by either party is the public's safety,
interest, and business.
Harold W. Davey contributes the idea that "there is no
true substitute for good-faith negotiation to finality as the
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best way to resolve labor relations disputes." He continues 
by saying that "bilateralism no matter how tough it is will 
come to be regarded as preferable to trilateralism in any 
shape or form."^ Thus, a second restraint is the possible 
injection of outside parties into the negotiation procedures 
to make the final decisions occasioned by the inability of the 
parties to do so. If public management and public officials 
are worried about bilateralism, the spectre of third party 
intrusion should cause even greater concern. So, echoing the 
initial statement of Davey, "there is no true substitute for 
good-faith negotiation to finality as the best way. . . ."&
Leland B. Cross states that "the collective bargaining 
agreement which sets forth the basis for that relationship 
must be somewhat unique in each i n s t a n c e . E a c h  agreement 
is unique, each provision is unique, each relationship is 
unique. A third restraint, then, is the uniqueness of each 
agreement, provisions, and relationship. Although there is 
a need for consistency, inflexibility of either agreements, 
provisions, or relationships would be undesirable.
A fourth restraint is based around the statement of Pat 
Greathouse: "We have learned . . . that it is much better to
solve issues that arise during the life of the agreement as 
they arise and not wait for the expiration of the agreement."®
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Collective negotiations is not a one-time affair; there is a 
contract or memorandum of understanding and the everyday 
employer-employee relationship to implement. William Simkin, 
in his book Mediation and the Dynamics of Collective Bargaining, 
contributes the idea of "noncrisis" mediation which deals with 
the settling of controversial issues as they arise and not 
letting them collect until the next negotiation season.^ 
Bilateralism is an on-going relationship requiring constant 
attention by all concerned. It should not allow conflict or 
other points of friction to accumulate which could result in 
strife at the negotiation table, possibly culminating in a 
strike. The public, good-faith negotiations, uniqueness, and 
noncrisis settlement of conflict during the life of the agree­
ment are four restraints on collective negotiations.
Another approach to the restraints upon collective 
negotiations in bilateralism is the examination of three court 
cases dealing with the wording of the statutes. Allowing 
bilateralism, in Los Angeles Transit Authority v. Brotherhood 
of Railroad Trainmen (1960), the California Supreme Court ruled 
that without legislative authorization public employees in 
general do not have the right to strike, but that the use of 
certain language in legislation establishing bilateralism 
carries with it certain interpretations from private
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bilateralism. Quoting from the case, the court stated;
Language identical with the italicized words 
(engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection) . . . courts have uniformly 
interpreted these words as including the right 
to strike peacefully to enforce union demands 
with respect to wages, hours, and working con­
ditions. . . . Terms such as "concerted activi­
ties" are commonly used by courts as well as 
legislative bodies to refer to strikes.10 
(Italics mine.)
It is not surprising to find similar wording in Taft-
Hartley Section 157. This section states:
Employees shall have the right . . .  to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargain­
ing or other mutual aid or protection. . . /H 
(Italics mine.)
This is acceptable since the right to strike is insured by
Taft-Hartley, but it is quite strange to find similar wording
in ten state statutes.1^  The statutes from Kentucky (P) and
Pennsylvania (PE-T) provide respectively:
In any county in the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
which has a population of 300,000 or more and, 
which has adopted the merit system, the county 
employees in the classified service as policy 
may organize, form, join or participate in 
organizations in order to engage in lawful con­
certed activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid and protection, 
and to bargain collectively through representa­
tives of their own free choice.(Italics mine.)
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It shall be lawful for public employees to 
organize, form, join or assist in employee or­
ganizations or to engage in lawful concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bar­
gaining or other mutual aid and protection or 
to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own free choice. . . .14 (italics mine.)
The Kentucky (P) statute also prohibits the strike, while 
Pennsylvania (PE-T), Alaska (PE), and Hawaii (PE-T) are three 
of the five states having a limited right to strike. There­
fore, the legislatures need to exercise caution in the wording 
used to establish the right of collective negotiations and to 
engage in activities in pursuit of such activities. A juris­
diction may be implying something it has no intention to, 
namely the right to strike along with the right to collectively 
negotiate.
Now attention needs to be directed to the use of the 
term "collective negotiations" which is used in this research 
instead of the term "collective bargaining." This is done in 
light of the material presented in Chapter I on the difference 
between public and private bilateralism, plus the case of 
Lullo V .  International Association of Fire Fighters. This 
1970 New Jersey case is very important in recalling that in 
the past the California Supreme Court had ruled that the term 
"collective bargaining" implied the right to strike. This is 
why the New Jersey (PE-T) statute uses the term "collective
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negotiations." The New Jersey Supreme Court stated;
The New Jersey Legislature was aware of the pos­
sible implications of an authorization of 
"collective bargaining". . . . suggested that 
public employees be . . . the choice of the 
term was conscious and deliberate . . . they 
clearly intended to avoid the problem experienced 
by the California Legislature when "collective 
bargaining" was . . . construed by the Supreme 
Court to confer the right to strike.
It is crystal clear that in using the term 
"collective negotiations" the Legislature intended 
to recognize inherent limitations on the bargain­
ing power of public employer and public employee.
In our judgment, therefore, the authorization for 
"collective negotiations" in the 1968 Act was de­
signed to make known that there are salient dif­
ferences between public and private employment 
relations which necessarily affect the character­
istics of collective bargaining in the public
sector. Finally, it signified an effort to make 
public employers and employees realize that the 
process of collective bargaining as understood 
in the private employment sector cannot be 
transplanted into the public sector.
The California Legislature, in response to its Supreme Court 
decision, replaced its collective bargaining statutes with 
meet and confer provisions which do not carry the implications
of the former terminology. In light of this material, it is
somewhat strange to find seventeen statutes calling for col­
lective bargaining.
The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in State ex rel Missey 
V .  City of Cabool (1969) that the Missouri Legislature was
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deliberative in motive in using the term "meet, confer, and
discuss" in its statute. The Court stated;
The act does not constitute a delegation or 
bargaining away to the union of the legislative 
power of the public body, and therefore does no 
violence . . . because the prior discretion in 
the legislative body to adopt, modify or reject 
outright the results of the discussions is un­
touched. The public employer is not required 
to agree but is required only to "meet, confer, 
and discuss," a duty already enjoined upon such 
employer prior to the enactment of this legis­
lation. The act provides only a procedure for 
communication between the organization selected 
by public employees and their employer without 
requiring adoption of any agreement reached.
In summary, these three cases indicate that the legis­
lation establishing bilateralism must be carefully worded or 
the legislature could implying something, mainly the strike, 
which it has no intention of doing. This is why the statutes 
establishing bilateralism use as synonymous terms to collective 
negotiations: meet and discuss,meet and confer,meet and
negotiate,confer, consult, and discuss,professional 
negotiations,21 and some still use collective bargaining.22
General Provisions 
As a general rule collective negotiations are to begin 
within ten days after receipt of a written request from the 
employee organization. Alaska (T) provides for a twenty day 
period, while Georgia (F) provides for a thirty day period.
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Exceptions to the rule would be that the Oklahoma (T) 
negotiations are to begin within sixty days after the employee 
organization has been determined, while Kansas (PE) provides 
that negotiations are not to occur within a thirty day period 
both prior to and after the budget submission date.24 Nego­
tiations are to begin not later than 120 days prior to the 
annual school district meeting according to the Vermont (T) 
statute.25 The Nebraska (T) provisions call on the teacher's 
organization to specify the item or items it desires to meet 
and confer over with the school district. The district then 
has thirty days to decide whether to honor or reject the re­
quest. Negotiations are to begin within twenty-one days if 
the request is honored.26
Several statutes have provisions concerning the composi­
tion of the negotiation team. The negotiation teams for 
Alaska (T) are not to be larger than five members for either 
side.27 The provisions in California (T) set forth that when 
more than one organization represents teachers in a district, 
a council of such organizations is to be formed with each 
organization having proportional representation. The teacher- 
council team is to have at least five but not more than nine 
members.28 The California (LA) ordinance provides that the 
chief administrative officer or his designate is the official
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representative of the city.29 The chief executive officer, 
whether appointed or elected or his designate, is to represent 
the city in negotiations by the Connecticut (ME) statute.^0 
The Idaho (T) statute stipulates that the employee representa­
tive shall be a professional employee of the d i s t r i c t . T h e  
•teams in Maryland (T) shall not be less than two members each, 
while the Maryland (BLT) statute calls upon the mayor to name 
both members to and chairman of the city team, which shall in­
clude the labor commissioner. The employee team shall have 
two or more m e m b e r s . ^ 2
The Massachusetts (ME-T) statute calls for the chief 
executive officer or his designate to represent the city, and 
the school committee or its designate to meet with the teachers. 
The employer is not to designate an attorney unless authorized 
by the city council or town m e e t i n g . I n  Minnesota (PE-T), 
the state is to be represented by the Commissioner of Adminis­
tration, the Director of Civil Service, and the Attorney General, 
The agency of the state which is being represented shall pro­
vide personnel and resources to enable the team to negotiate 
effectively.34 The Nevada (LE-T) provision reads:
Where any officer of a local government employer, 
other than a member of the governing body, is 
elected by the people and directs the work of 
any local government employee, such officer is 
the proper person to negotiate, directly or 
through a representative or representatives of
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his own choosing, in the first instance 
concerning any employee whose work is directed 
by him, but may refer to the governing body or 
its chosen representative or representatives 
any matter beyond the scope of his a u t h o r i t y . 35
The State of Nevada is to be represented by the Director of
the Department of Health, Welfare and Rehabilitation or his
representative when negotiating with nurses employed by the
s t a t e . 36 (The Nevada statute is unique in covering nurses
employed by the state, since the legislation is entitled
Local Government Emplovee-Manaqement Relations Act.)
Although the monetary aspect of negotiations is also
discussed in some detail in the section on Scope, the most
repeated provision is for the employee representative to
serve by written notice the desire to negotiate over monetary
terms at least 120 days before the last day to appropriate
money. Idaho (F) and New Hampshire (P) call for 90 day prior
n o t i c e . 37 Notification of desire to negotiate monetary terms
must be made on or before December 1 according to Nevada
( L E - T ) . 38 Minnesota (PE-T) requires notification not later
than 90 days prior to the last day for budget submission or
September 1, whichever is earlier.39
The terms of the contracts or memoranda of understanding
are varied. The most repeated phrases are "not more than"
or "not to exceed," with the quantity being either one, two.
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three or five years. (Not more than three years is used the 
most.) Nebraska (PE) stipulates the contract is to coincide 
with the biennial budget, while Florida (F) provides that the 
contract is to coincide with the fiscal year but not to exceed 
two years.40 Wisconsin (SE) establishes the fiscal year or 
biennium as the term for its contracts.
Scope of Negotiations 
The heart of collective negotiations, or perhaps even of 
bilateralism, is the scope of negotiable items, i.e., the items 
or policies which the parties can negotiate over and place in 
an agreement or contract form. The entire bilateral relation­
ship evolves around scope. The recognition process is aimed 
toward the time that labor and management face each other across 
the bargaining table to negotiate items within the acceptable 
limits. Scope, therefore, cannot be over emphasized, for if 
bilateralism is to be more than a mere formality, the area that 
can be negotiated must be such that the employees can have an 
impact upon their environment and feel that unilateralism has 
vanished and that bilateralism has emerged. But this thought 
is qualified by the next section analyzing managements' rights. 
The scope of bilateralism is thus somewhat circumscribed.
The most straightforward definition of allowable limits 
of scope is "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
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employment." This definition is found in Taft-Hartley Section 
158 (d), and in forty-two statutes from twenty-six jurisdic­
tions under examination.42 The main difficulty with this 
definition of scope is that in many jurisdictions wages and 
hours are established by legislation and, therefore, are not 
subject to negotiations. Note that Federal E.O. 11491 requires 
meeting and conferring in good faith in respect "to personnel 
policies and practices and matters affecting working condi­
tions."43 Wages and hours are not mentioned because Section 
12 provides that any agreement is subject to the following 
requirements :
[I]n the administration of all matters covered 
by the agreement, officials and employees are 
governed by existing or future laws and the 
regulations of appropriate authorities, includ­
ing policies set forth in the Federal Personnel 
Manual; by published agency policies and regula­
tions in existence at the time the agreement was 
approved; and by subsequently published agency 
policies and regulations required by law or by 
the regulations of appropriate authorities, or 
authorized by terms of a controlling agreement 
at a higher agency level.44
Thus, to a great extent, but with exceptions to be examined 
later, wages and hours are outside the limits of scope.
What then are terms and conditions of employment? This 
seems to be a major opening for bilateral negotiations. Re­
search of the data revealed only five definitions of the term
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in Alaska (PE), Delaware (T), Kansas (PE), Minnesota (PE-T),
and New Mexico (SE). These are, respectively:
. . . means the hours of employment, the 
compensation and fringe benefits, and the 
employer's personnel policies affecting the 
working conditions of employees; but does not 
mean the general policies describing the func­
tion and purposes of a public e m p l o y e r . 45
. . . are defined as physical conditions of 
facilities in the school district building 
such as, but not limited to heat, lighting, 
sanitation, and food p r o c e s s i n g . 46
. . . means salaries, wages, hours of work, 
vacation allowances, sick and injury leave, 
number of holidays, retirement benefits, in­
surance benefits, wearing apparel, premium 
pay for overtime, shift differential pay, 
jury duty and grievance procedures, but 
nothing in this act shall authorize the adjust­
ment or change of such matters which have been 
fixed by statute or by the constitution of this 
state.47
. . . means the hours of employment, the compen­
sation therefor including fringe benefits, and 
the employer's personnel policies affecting the 
working conditions of employees. In the case 
of professional employees the terms mean the 
hours of employment, the compensation therefor, 
and economic aspects relating to employment, 
but does not mean educational policies of a 
school district. The terms in both cases are 
subject to the provisions of section 6 of this 
act regarding the rights of public employers 
and the scope of negotiations.48
. . . refers to subjects of interest to employees 
which are not specifically covered by statute, 
executive order. Board rules or management rights, 
and are within the discretionary power of the 
negotiating official.49
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These five provisions go a long way in defining this 
difficult term. An unsettling thought, contributed by 
Wellington and Winters, is that without further legislative 
guidance, agencies and courts are "unsuited" to their assigned 
task of interpretation. They continue by stating that this 
innocuous phrase will require the resolution of issues "po­
litically, socially, and ideologically among the more explosive 
in our society; ones that adjudicatory tribunals are institu­
tionally ill suited to resolve."^0 To further the reader's 
understanding of "other terms and conditions of employment," 
Appendix D contains the contents of Article VIII from the 
1957 contract between the New York City Department of Social 
Services and the Social Service Employees U n i o n . 51
Now the examination of scope turns from "wages, hours, 
and other terms and conditions of employment" to the specific 
provisions in several jurisdictions. Federal E.O. 10988, 
which established three levels of recognition (informal, for­
mal, and exclusive), defined scope in each instance a little 
differently. Employee organizations having informal recogni­
tion shall "to the extent consistent with the efficient and 
orderly conduct of the public business, be permitted to pre­
sent to appropriate officials its views on matters of concern 
to its members." (Emphasis mine.) The agency was under no
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requirement to consult about the formulation of personnel or 
other policies. Units having formal recognition shall consult 
over "the formulation and implementation of personnel policies 
and practices, and matters affecting working conditions that 
are of concern to its members." (Emphasis mine.) A unit hav­
ing exclusive recognition shall be given the opportunity to 
discuss "grievances, personnel policies and practices, or other 
matters affecting general working conditions of employees in 
the unit." (Emphasis mine.) The main difference was probably 
the method of conducting negotiations, i.e., informal simply 
meeting while exclusive units could meet and confer. But each 
level of recognition did spell out in greater detail the scope 
of negotiable items. 2^
The scope under Federal E.O. 11491 is different since 
there is only one type of recognition (exclusive). Sections 
11 and 12 have specified in more detail the scope of negotiable 
items. Section 11(a) of Federal E.O. 11491 stipulates that 
"personnel policies and practices and matters affecting work­
ing conditions" shall be the scope of negotiable items. This 
is then restricted by management's rights and other areas 
exempted in Sections 11(b) and 12(a).^3 (This material is 
analyzed in more detail in the next section on Management's 
Rights.) If there is a disagreement as to scope. Federal 
E.O. 11491 provides the following procedure for settlement:
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1. An issue arising at the local level is
referred to the head of the agency for
determination.
2. The agency head's determination is final in 
respect to interpreting agency regulations.
3. The employee organization can appeal to the 
FLRC the decision made in No. 2.54
The scope of Federal E.O. 11636 dealing with the foreign
service covers consulting in good faith "regularly and prior 
to the adoption of proposed or revised personnel policies and 
procedures, including grievance procedures, which affect work­
ing conditions of employees."^5
The New York (NYC) statute is detailed in Section 1173-4.3 
as to the scope of collective bargaining. Final determination 
of conflict over scope resides in the Board of Collective Bar­
gaining. The requirement to bargain in good faith covers:
. . . wages (including but not limited to wage 
rates, rates, pensions, health and welfare bene­
fits, uniform allowances and shift premiums), 
hours (including but not limited to overtime 
and time and leave benefits) and working 
conditions. . . .56
This scope is then qualified by the following exceptions.
First, the employees whose wages are determined by Section 
220 of the labor law shall not be subject to bargaining. Sec­
ond, matters subject to the career and salary plan which re­
quire uniform application shall only be negotiated with an 
employee organization or council of such organizations that
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represent over 50 percent of such employees. But this 
stipulation shall not prevent the negotiation of unique pro­
visions where circumstances demand it. Third, department mat­
ters which require uniform application shall be negotiated only 
with an employee organization or council of such organizations 
which represent more than 50 percent of such employees. Fourth, 
all subjects, such as pension, overtime, and leave rules, af­
fecting uniformed police, fire, sanitation and correction 
services shall be negotiated with the representative of such 
employees. Fifth, matters involving pensions for uniformed 
forces other than those referred to above shall be conducted 
with an employee organization or council of organizations 
which represents more than 50 percent of such employees.
The exceptions to the general rule mentioned earlier that 
wages are outside the limits of public bilateralism are now 
analyzed using Connecticut (ME), Hawaii (PE-T), and Alaska (PE). 
The Connecticut (ME) statute is unique in providing that where 
monetary terms are involved "the budget-appropriating authority 
of any municipal employer shall appropriate whatever funds are 
required to comply with a collective bargaining agree­
ment. . . . "  The agreement is to be submitted to the legisla­
tive body of the municipality within fourteen days after 
negotiations are completed. If the municipal legislative body
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rejects the agreement, it is returned for further negotiations; 
if the legislative body accepts, then the monetary terms shall 
be complied with by appropriation. If the legislative body 
does not act within thirty days after the fourteen day period 
mentioned above, the agreement stands approved and the funds 
must be appropriated.
The Hawaii (PE-T) statute provides that the subjects 
excluded from negotiations include "the salary ranges and the 
number of incremental and longevity steps," but the amount of 
wages to be paid in each range and the length of service for 
the incremental and longevity steps shall be negotiable. The 
appropriate legislative body can reject the agreement, causing 
its return for further negotiations, or accept it but subject 
to appropriation.59 in much the same language, the Alaska (PE) 
statute stipulates that any monetary terms of an agreement are 
subject to funding through appropriations.^0
Thus, from these three illustrations the scope of nego­
tiations can include monetary terms and can be handled in a 
variety of methods. The Connecticut (ME) provisions require 
the appropriation of funds, while Alaska (PE) and Hawaii (PE-T) 
simply provide for funding through the appropriate legislative 
body, but without requirement to do so.
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Three jurisdictions allow discussion over items outside 
of the established limits of scope. These are Nevada (LE-T), 
New Mexico (SE), and Oregon (T). The Nevada (LE-T) statute 
provides that discussion over topics outside of scope are not 
precluded nor are they required. But when they do occur, the 
meeting is informal and exempt from all requirements of notice 
or time schedule.61 An employee organization and agency head 
can discuss items outside of the scope and develop a memoran­
dum of agreement according to Section X of New Mexico's (SE) 
provisions. The agreement is sent to the appropriate higher 
authorities as recommendations from the parties over the sub­
jects c o v e r e d . T h e  school boards in Oregon (T) can provide 
procedures for determining the teachers' or administrators' 
views over items not subject to negotiations specified else­
where in the statute.63
In summary, most jurisdictions define scope as meaning 
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 
Other jurisdictions delineate their scope differently, but 
either way the big problem with scope in public bilateralism 
is that so many negotiable items are subject to law or regula­
tion and thus are outside of scope, with the three exceptions 
of Alaska (PE), Hawaii (PE-T), and Connecticut (ME) noted 
above. To the extent that the scope of bilateralism is
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limited by statute and managements’ rights, the character of 
joint decision-making (bilateralism) is qualified. For public 
scope to resemble private scope would require the repeal of 
many statutes and the determination of public policy outside
of legislative halls which in contemporary times is under
%
attack.
Management's Rights 
This topic is a potential problem area because it returns 
to the very basis of public bilateralism, i.e., the waiving of 
the sovereign position of the public employer to allow bilater­
alism. In waiving unilateralism, the public sector then allows 
their employees to participate in the decision-making process 
by establishing the scope of negotiations discussed in the pre­
ceding section. But in many statutes the scope of negotiations 
is restricted by rights retained by management. These items 
remain within the area of sovereign prerogative which public 
management will not, cannot, or perhaps should not give up. 
Various spokesmen for the employee organizations contend that 
the scope of negotiations should be opened as wide as the 
private sector,^4 but the SNA's publication Basic Patterns in 
Union Contracts reports that 58 percent of their 400 sample 
contracts contain a general statement on management rights, 
while the Bureau of Labor Statistic's publication
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Characteristics of Agreements reports 60 percent of their 
1300 sample contracts contain management rights provisions.^5 
So the concept of management rights is not as foreign to the 
general labor movement as one might be led to believe.
One source of management rights not found to the same 
extent in the private sector is the large number of laws gov­
erning wage scales and hours of work. This is supported by 
using New Hampshire (SE) as an example where Section 98-C:4 II 
provides that the agreement "shall at all times be subject to 
existing or future laws and all valid regulations adopted 
pursuant thereto."^6 in similar terms Federal E.O. 11491 pro­
vides in Section 12 (a) that each agreement is subject to the 
following requirements;
[I]n the administration of all matters covered 
by the agreement, officials and employees are 
governed by existing or future laws and the regu­
lations of appropriate authorities, including 
policies set forth in the Federal Personnel 
Manual; by published agency policies and regula­
tions in existence at the time the agreement was 
approved; and by subsequently published agency 
policies and regulations required by law or by 
the regulations of appropriate authorities, or 
authorized by the terms of a controlling agree­
ment at a higher agency l e v e l .
Thus, it is again asserted by the author that there is 
a difference between public and private bilateralism, not only 
based upon the lack or absence of the strike and lock-out, as 
presented in Chapter I, but also on the grounds that the scope
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of negotiations is restricted or bound by regulating law much 
more so than in the private sector. For example, there is a 
minimum wage which covers private employers, but in the federal 
civil service the employees in Schedule B (the commonly known 
GS ratings) have eighteen separate grades with ten pay steps 
in each grade (some exceptions in the higher grades) with the 
pay for each step set by statute. The public employer simply 
lacks the ability to negotiate in countless situations.
Now for an analysis of the management rights provisions 
contained in fourteen statutes from twelve jurisdictions. It 
seems somewhat strange that more provisions were not found 
since public management was so up-tight about bilateralism. 
Perhaps the restricted scope occasioned by the numerous con­
trolling laws might account for some silence, but the deafen­
ing silence in this area causes the author to wonder about 
all the fuss over management rights. Is public management 
all that worried about its rights? But, as Husain Mustafa, 
writing in the Public Personnel Review, stated, "Only a short 
step separates the desire to cooperate from compromising one's 
prerogatives.
Section 7 (2) of Federal E.O. 10988 contains what I call 
the basic list of management rights, also found in Federal 
E.O. 11491 and E.O. 11636, Kansas (PE), New Hampshire (SE),
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and Nevada (LE-T). These rights are;
1. To direct employees of the agency.
2. To hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain 
employees in positions within the agency, and 
to suspend, demote, discharge, or take other 
disciplinary action against employees.
3. To relieve employees from duties because of 
lack of work or for other legitimate reasons.
4. To maintain the efficiency of the Government 
operations entrusted to them.
5. To determine the methods, means, and personnel 
by which such operations are to be conducted.
6. To take whatever actions may be necessary to 
carry out the mission of the agency in situa­
tions of emergency.70
Additionally, Federal E.O. 11491 and E.O. 11636 expanded
upon the provisions of Federal E.O. 10988 found in Section
6 (b) dealing with the mission of the agency, its budget, and
its organization, etc. The provisions of Federal E.O. 11491
(which are identical in Federal E.O. 11636) are:
In prescribing regulations relating to personnel 
policies and practices and working conditions, 
an agency shall have due regard for the obliga­
tion imposed by paragraph (a) of this section.
However, the obligation to meet and confer does 
not include matters with respect to the mission 
of an agency; its budget; its organization; the 
number of employees; and the numbers, types, and 
grades of positions or employees assigned to an 
organizational unit, work project or tour of duty; 
the technology of performing its work; or its 
internal security practices. This does not pre­
clude the parties from negotiating agreements
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providing appropriate arrangements for employees 
adversely affected by the impact of realignment 
of work forces or technological change.
Therefore, at least in federal bilateralism the scope of 
negotiations is restricted by provisions of Sections 11(b) and 
12(a)(b) using Federal E.O. 11491 as the example. There is 
one qualification found in the above quote, that dealing with 
negotiations over the impact of realignment of work forces or 
technological change. Similar provisions are found in the 
management rights provisions of California (LA) and New York 
(NYC). The New Mexico (SE) provisions and the Maryland (BLT) 
statute provide that the negotiated agreement contain within 
it a section on management rights, while other provisions 
stipulate that the bilateral relationship is subject to manage­
ment rights without requiring inclusion in the agreement.^3
In conclusion, the report of the ACIR contains the recom­
mendation that management rights be included in any statute 
establishing bilateralism.^^ The specific wording of the 
specified management rights is very similar to Section 12 (b) 
of Federal E.O. 11491. This discussion on management rights 
tends to break down into two schools of thought. The first 
school holds that these rights should not be spelled out, based 
upon the fear that other rights not so stipulated might be 
taken as being within the scope of negotiation. The second
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school holds that the rights need to be stipulated, for 
failure to do so might lead the opposition to consider that 
they are within the scope of negotiation.75 This author holds 
with the second school, believing that the provisions contained 
in Federal E.O. 11491 and discussed in the preceding material 
are a minimum for management's rights provisions. Why? Pub­
lic agencies in all units of government are delegated authority 
to carry out responsibilities in a defined area. This delega­
tion of authority is determined in legislative assemblies where 
all political forces concerned should have access. Such items 
as the mission of the agency, its budget, the technology of 
performing its work, and basic principles of the merit system, 
among a list of many, should not be determined in negotiation 
sessions conducted in an executive session. Although there is 
much room for improvement in gaining access and procedures in 
legislative assemblies, since negotiation sessions are open 
only to the two concerned parties, what access would other 
interested parties have? It is the author's opinion that if 
you think the legislative process is discriminatory, wait 
until public policy is determined in the atmosphere of the 
smoke-filled negotiation room.
Publicity
The publicity problem simply stated is; Can the
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negotiation sessions be conducted in executive session if such 
activity is prohibited by law? In all the literature on bi­
lateralism little attention, in my opinion, is directed toward 
this very important aspect of bilateralism. Many jurisdictions 
prohibit executive sessions of their governing bodies, and 
since the negotiation team is an extension of these bodies, 
any open proceeding restrictions would seem to apply. Besides, 
it is a fundamental tenet of democracy that public business be 
conducted in the open to prevent or at least retard secret 
dealings. In gathering data on this subject, it was discovered 
that little has been written and few statutes deal with pub­
licity.
Three examples were found involving the states of 
Connecticut, Florida, and New York. The Connecticut State 
Board of Labor Relations held that a 1971 Stamford,
Connecticut, ordinance requiring the town manager to report 
the initial and subsequent management proposals was a viola­
tion of prohibited labor practices. The city contended that 
such an ordinance was in line with the state's "right-to-know" 
law. The Board decided that the ground rules of negotiations, 
which included the terms and publicity surrounding the nego­
tiation process, were mandatory subjects of negotiations under 
the state's Municipal Employee Relations Act, effective
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June 16, 1967. Although the Board did rule that the process 
of negotiations was negotiable, it stopped short of determin­
ing that negotiations must be confidential.^®
Former Governor Rockefeller requested the State's 
Public Employment Relations Board to study the problem of the 
public's right to know about agreements reached involving 
large sums of public funds, but at the same time protecting 
against interference in the negotiation process. The Board 
reported no disclosure laws were needed in the state's Taylor 
Act, based on the fact that such agreements were made public 
after negotiations had ended. The Board concluded that dis­
closure would deny the needed flexibility necessary to the 
"diversity of negotiating situations among the 1,100 public 
employers and 2,500 negotiating units."7?
The Florida Supreme Court held that despite the state's 
"sunshine law" requiring public employers to conduct official 
business in public, meaningful collective bargaining would be 
destroyed if full publicity was given during negotiations.
Not only could negotiation sessions be conducted in executive 
session, but the initial planning of management's position 
could also be conducted in executive s e s s i o n . ^8
There are only fourteen statutes which deal in any way 
with publicity, either prior, during, or after the negotiation
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process. Of these fourteen, ten call for the negotiated 
agreement to be passed by the legislative body in the form of 
a resolution or ordinance.^9 This process would then insure 
at least some public light upon this public business of nego­
tiation. Of the other provisions, Connecticut (ME) and 
Kentucky (F) simply provide that "no publication thereof shall 
be required to make the agreement effective." But both juris­
dictions do require the passage of an ordinance or resolution 
for the agreement to become effective, thus to some extent 
shedding light upon the proceedings.
The Alaska (T) statute provides that the negotiations 
may be held in executive session upon mutual consent of the 
parties, but that the final agreement shall "be made at a pub­
lic meeting of the school b o a r d . "^1 The Director of Mediation 
Services has the discretion under the Minnesota (PE-T) statutes 
to determine if negotiations, mediation sessions, and hearings 
shall be public or private. Section 9 (2) states:
All negotiations, mediation sessions, and hear­
ings between public employers and public 
employees or their respective representatives 
shall be public meetings except when otherwise 
provided by the director.82
Professional negotiations between teachers and school 
boards under the Montana (T) statute may be open to the pub­
lic, but meetings of the school board prior to negotiations 
shall be closed to the public.83 The Wisconsin (SE)
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provisions call for the final agreement to be submitted to 
the Joint Committee on Employment Relations after ratification 
by the employee organization, at which time the Committee shall 
"hold a public hearing before determining its approval or dis­
approval . "84
In drawing this discussion on publicity to a conclusion, in 
Heisel and Hallihan's Questions and Answers on Public Employee 
Negotiation, their responses to two questions on publicity, 
took the line of thought that confidentiality should pervade 
the initial stage and negotiation process to preclude public 
posturing by either side. They contend that positions publi­
cized as being hard and fast would preclude good faith negotia­
tions. How could the parties back away from their public 
positions without losing face? They conclude by proposing a 
public hearing over the final agreement, thus giving all inter­
ested parties, including public spirited groups, the democratic 
right of knowing what their government is doing.
The author is of the opinion that confidentiality is 
needed in the initial planning stages of the negotiation pro­
cess and during the actual negotiations. This is supported by 
a general principle of administrative law that hearings and 
proceedings in which public notice is not given so as to allow 
pleadings by interested parties does not render the proceedings
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reversible providing the safeguard of a hearing before a 
reviewing body is conducted prior to implementation of any 
decision made. In like terms, if the initial stages and 
actual negotiations are executive session in nature and fact, 
the safeguard of requiring the agreement to be implemented by 
ordinance or resolution thus provides the necessary safeguard 
and requirement of conducting public business in the open.
Official Time
Official time means the duty hours of the employer and 
employee which can be used for conducting bilateral relations. 
Only five statutes from three jurisdictions mention that the 
solicitation of members and the conducting of organization 
business is to be on non-duty time. These three jurisdictions 
are Maryland (BLT), New Mexico (SE), and Federal E.O. 10988, 
E.O. 11491, and E.O. 11636. The administrative machinery 
handling bilateral implementation in the other jurisdictions 
may be able to promulgate similar rules, but this author 
believes the use of official time is important enough to war­
rant wider coverage among the statutes.
Outside of the solicitation of members and the conducting 
of organization business, official time for the conducting of 
negotiations has developed from the provision of Section 9 of 
Federal E.O. 10988 and Section 20 of Federal E.O. 11491. These
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sections provide respectively;
Officially requested or approved consultations and 
meetings between management officials and repre­
sentatives of recognized employee organizations 
shall, whenever practicable, be conducted on of­
ficial time, but any agency may require that 
negotiations with an employee organization which 
has been accorded exclusive recognition be con­
ducted during the non-duty hours of the employee 
organization representatives involved in such 
negotiations.8?
Employees who represent a recognized labor organ­
ization shall not be on official time when nego­
tiating an Agreement with agency management, 
except to the extent that the negotiating parties 
agree to other arrangements which may provide that 
the agency will either authorize official time for 
up to 40 hours or authorize up to one-half the 
time spent in negotiations during regular working 
hours, for a reasonable number of employees, which 
number normally shall not exceed the number of
management representatives.88
Federal E.O. 11636 allows the Secretary of State to establish 
by regulation reasonable limitations on the use of official 
time for consultation and c o n f e r r a l . 88
Beyond these federal regulations, California (ME) states 
public agencies shall, for recognized employee organizations, 
allow a reasonable number of public employees time off for 
meeting and conferring on matters within the scope of repre­
sentation without loss of compensation or other benefits.^0 
The California (LA) statute provides that the city shall grant 
reasonable time off for those employees necessary for meeting 
and conferring with the number based upon a ration of one per
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each 100 employees in the recognized unit, but such number 
shall not be less than two nor more than seven.
Exclusively recognized employee organizations shall be 
permitted to bargain collectively during working hours without 
loss of salary or wages, with the number of such employees 
being at least five based on a ratio of one employee per 500 
employees in an organization over 2,500 members, and units of 
less than 2,500 members getting the minimum number of five. 
This is the provision found in the Hawaii (PE-T) statute.
Maryland (BLT) requires that negotiations with represen­
tatives of employee organizations shall, whenever practicable, 
be conducted on official time, but if the employee negotiators 
are employees of the city government, negotiations are to be 
conducted during non-duty h o u r s . New Mexico (SE) provisions 
are very similar to Federal E.O. 11491 in providing that nego­
tiations shall be conducted during non-duty hours except to 
the extent agreed to by the parties to allow for the use of 
official time up to forty hours or one-half the time spent in 
negotiations during the regular working hours. The number of 
employees is not to exceed f i v e . ^ 4
The statutes in Michigan (PE) and Wisconsin (SE)and(ME-T) 
provide that the payment of wages for employees engaged in 
negotiations is not an unfair employer p r a c t i c e . ^5
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In conclusion, this author is of the opinion that 
reasonable use of official time for negotiations, without any 
loss of service provided by those employees negotiating, is 
not a heavy burden for public management to bear. To require 
non-duty hours negotiations works a hardship on both employer 
and employee. Bilateralism is a normal item of business in a 
jurisdiction allowing such activity, and therefore, negotia­
tions should be conducted during duty hours.
Contract Interpretation 
Contract interpretation refers to the activity around 
the determination of the application or interpretation of some 
provision of a negotiated agreement. The data for this analy­
sis comes from twenty-two statutes covering twenty jurisdic­
tions. In condensed form, contract interpretation is 
considered a grievance in seventeen of the twenty-two 
statutes.9G Twelve statutes provide for arbitration with ten 
of these calling for binding arbitration. Five statutes 
stipulate the equal sharing of the cost involved in the es­
tablished procedure.98
North Dakota (T) and Oregon (PE) define such a conflict 
an impasse. The former stipulates negotiations over the 
conflict, which if not resolved would proceed to impasse 
resolution procedures, while the later procedure requires the
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immediate implementation of impasse procedures.This 
application of impasse procedures in contract interpretation 
is strange since generally impasse resolution, or the pro­
cedures for handling impasses, are restricted by definition 
to negotiation impasses. These are the only two exceptions 
to this general rule located in this author's research in bi­
lateralism.
The provisions for contract interpretation found in 
California (LA), Minnesota (PE-T), and Federal E.O. 10988 and 
E.O. 11491 are used for an in-depth illustration of the pro­
cess. The California (LA) statute defines a contract inter­
pretation as a grievance, with the grievance procedure found 
in Section 4.855. The parties involved in the meet-and-confer 
process shall develop a grievance procedure to be placed in 
the memorandum of understanding. Any grievance (contract 
interpretation or application conflict) not settled by the 
negotiated process shall go to final and binding arbitration. 
Such procedures shall conform to the following standards.1^0
Initially the employee having a contract interpretation 
grievance shall discuss the conflict with the employee's im­
mediate supervisor on an informal basis. Secondly, provision 
is made for the filing of a written grievance and for proces­
sing through at least four levels of review but not less than
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two levels of review. At each stage of review a written 
notice of the results is sent to the employee and his repre­
sentative if any. Thirdly, if the grievance is not settled 
in the above procedure, either party may submit the grievance 
to arbitration by written notice to the other party of such 
desire. The Employee Relations Board is to submit a list of 
seven arbitrators frcxn which the parties are to alternately 
strike (mark-out) one name until a single name remains. The 
arbitrator is to hear the case, his decision being final and 
binding. If this arbitrator is unable to hear the case, the 
parties will repeat the striking process mentioned above to 
determine another arbitrator. The total expense of arbitration 
shall be shared equally by the parties. The employee may be 
represented by a representative of his own choice throughout 
the entire process.101
The Minnesota (PE-T) statute also defines contract in­
terpretation as a grievance. All agreements shall provide a 
grievance procedure which shall include compulsory binding 
arbitration. If the parties to the agreement are unable to 
establish such a procedure, they shall be subject to the 
grievance procedure established by the Director of Mediation 
Services. Although the Director of Mediation Services is to 
promulgate grievance procedures for handling contract
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interpretation, the process shall not provide for the services 
of the Bureau of Mediation Services. If the parties are un­
able to agree upon an arbitrator, the Public Employment 
Relations Board is to provide a list of five with the parties 
striking (mark-out) names until one remains. The arbitrator's 
decision is binding upon the parties with all costs being 
equally shared by the p a r t i e s . 1^2
Federal E.O. 10988 provides in Section 8 that exclusive 
representatives can negotiate procedures for handling griev­
ances in accordance with Civil Service standards and which 
does not in any way diminish or impair any rights of employees 
which would otherwise be available in the absence of the nego­
tiated procedures. The procedure may include the arbitration 
of grievances, which shall be advisory in nature, and restricted 
to the interpretation or application of the agreement. The 
process must be initiated by an e m p l o y e e . ^03
The procedures in Section 13 of Federal E.O. 11491 are 
very similar to those found in Section 8 of Federal E.O. 10988. 
An agreement entered into under Federal E.O. 11491 shall con­
tain provisions for the handling of grievances over the 
interpretation or application of the agreement, and these 
provisions establish the only procedures available to the 
employees of the unit covered by the agreement. An employee
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can proceed in initiating this grievance procedure without 
the intervention of the exclusive representative, but any de­
cision shall not be inconsistent with the controlling agree­
ment. The negotiated procedure may include arbitration, but 
arbitration can only be invoked by either the agency or the 
exclusive representative. An appeal can be taken to the 
Council (FLRC) under Council rules concerning exceptions to 
an arbitrator's decision. Questions as to the subject matter 
of a grievance can be taken to the Assistant Secretary for 
Labor-Management Relations for his d e c i s i o n . 104
Summing up this material, contract interpretation or 
application is generally classified as a grievance with barely 
a majority providing for arbitration of the conflict. Although 
these common points do emerge, once again the Riggsian diversi­
fication produces a melange of approaches. It is also note­
worthy that twenty of the thirty-six different jurisdictions 
forming the body of data for this analysis of bilateralism 
contain such provisions, but these twenty jurisdictions account 
for only twenty-two of the seventy-four statutes.
Summary
Since this chapter is fairly lengthy, perhaps it would 
be best to outline the major sections. These were: Background
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Material, General Provisions, Scope, Management's Rights, 
Official Time, Contract Interpretation, and Publicity.
The Background Material examines both the restraints of 
collective negotiations and court cases dealing with the word­
ing of bilateral statutes. The four restraints presented on 
collective negotiations are: respect for the public's inter­
est, good-faith negotiations, uniqueness of each situation, 
and noncrisis settlement of conflicts. The cases held that 
in using statutory phraseology from private bilateralism, pub­
lic bilateral statutes carry with them the meaning and inter­
pretation from private bilateralism. For example, the 
California allowance of "concerted activities" to further the 
goals of collective bargaining was interpreted as permitting 
the strike. California subsequently repealed the collective 
bargaining provisions and substituted meet and confer.
The General Provisions section examined when collective 
negotiations are to begin, which is generally ten days after 
the employee organization files a written request with the unit 
of government. The composition of the negotiating teams was 
analyzed with many variations discovered. If the employee 
organization desires to negotiate over monetary items, there 
is generally a deadline for notification. The most used stipu­
lation is that notification must be made at least 120 days
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prior to the last day appropriations can be made. The terms 
of either a contract or memorandum of understanding vary 
greatly, but however stated a maximum limit of usually three 
years.
The next two sections. Scope and Management's Rights, 
are very closely related but are handled separately to reduce 
the confusion to manageable limits. The most commonly used 
terminology for Scope, which refers to the area of items which 
negotiation covers, is "wages, hours, and other terms and con­
ditions of employment." This term plus other provisions on 
Scope are examined. Management's Rights are important to study 
since they would preclude negotiation to some extent. The 
rights set forth in Federal E.O. 10988 are generally used as 
a guide.
Official Time refers to the provisions which allow 
negotiations to be conducted during duty hours. Generally, 
negotiations can be conducted during working hours, but other 
union business must be non-duty time activities. The provi­
sions for official time from Federal E.O. 10988 and E.O. 11491, 
Maryland (BLT), New Mexico (SE), Hawaii (PE-T), California 
(ME) (LA), Wisconsin (SE) (ME-T), and Michigan (PE) are analyzed.
Contract Interpretation refers to the activity around the 
interpretation and application of the contract or agreement.
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In most provisions contract interpretation is called a 
grievance, with binding arbitration being used in barely a 
majority of these instances to settle the conflict. Less 
than one-third of the statutes provide for contract interpre­
tation.
Publicity is examined because of the "open meeting" re­
quirement of many jurisdictions. Can negotiation sessions, 
which is the conducting of public business, be conducted in 
executive session (in private)? Generally it is held that 
negotiations can be held in executive sessions, providing the 
agreement be presented to the legislative body in public ses­
sion to allow public scrutiny before implementation.
■In conclusion, Riggsian diversification is well illus­
trated by the many and varied approaches to collective negotia­
tions. This diversification is even more apparent in the next 
chapter on Impasse Resolution. Impasse resolution refers to 
the procedure established to handle deadlocks in negotiations. 
Mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration, used either in some 
combination or by themselves, are used in impasse resolution.
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CHAPTER V
IMPASSE RESOLUTION
Background Material 
"Conflict can be devastating; it can also be creative," 
states William E. Simkin, former head of the Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service.^ A negotiation impasse is just 
that— conflict— for the term refers to a deadlock in negotia­
tions which can result in a strike if not averted by the timely 
and proper method of resolving the conflict. This chapter 
examines the many avenues established to resolve negotiation 
deadlocks in bilateralism.
The methods used and examined in impasse resolution are 
mediation, fact-finding with and without recommendations, 
advisory, binding, and final-offer arbitration. Mix these 
variables with the thirty-three jurisdictions having fifty- 
nine statutes and the result is Riggsian diversification. To 
aid in understanding this diversification, fourteen classes 
have been established, each illustrating a different approach 
in the use of mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration.
Table 5-1 is a summary presentation of the classes and the 
diversification in the use of mediation, fact-finding, and 
arbitration in impasse resolution.
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Table 5-1.— Diversification in the use of mediation, 
fact-finding, and arbitration in impasse 
procedures
Class
Number
Using Mediation
Fact-
Finding Arbitration
1 5 M A
2 11 M----- ----) FF
3 5 M----- ---- >FF A
4 4 M----- ------
5 3 Mr FF
6 2 M, FF, A
7 1 M, A
8 1 M, A
9 2 M (FF, A)
10 11 FF
11 4 A
12 5 BA
13 2 FOA
14 3 Do not specify either M, FF, or A
A word of explanation is needed to understand Table 5-1. 
Classes 1, 10, 11, 12, and 13 are established upon the single 
use of the three major approaches to impasse resolution or a 
hybrid variety of a major approach. The main approaches 
are mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration— while a hybrid 
approach is final-offer arbitration. Classes 2, 3, and 4 
indicate by the use of arrows that the method used moves 
from mediation to fact-finding, or mediation to fact-finding 
to arbitration, or mediation to arbitration. Classes 5, 6, 
and 7 involve the use of the three major approaches but not
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in sequence like form as Classes 2, 3, and 4. Generally, 
in classes 5, 6, and 7 the approach used depends upon the 
request of the parties or the type of employees involved.
Uie comma indicates the lack of sequence. Class 8 is estab­
lished around the Alaska (PE) statute which provides media­
tion for employees in category 3, but arbitration for 
employees in categories 1 and 2. The diagonal is used to 
indicate this arrangement. Class 9 is established to handle 
the process of Federal E.O. 11491 and New Mexico (SE) where 
the primary approach is mediation, but where the Federal 
Services Impasse Panel and the New Mexico State Personnel 
Board may allow the use of either fact-finding or arbitration. 
Class 14 contains three jurisdictions which indicate the 
impasse should be taken to the appropriate administrative 
board for handling but do not specify any approach.
There are several common points among Classes 1 through 
11. Whenever a board is established to handle an approach, 
it is generally tripartite, i.e., one management member, one 
employee organization member, and one public member who is 
usually the chairman. Alaska (T) provides for two me_nagement 
and employee organization members with the fifth member serv­
ing as chairman, while Kansas (PE) specifies three public 
2
members. If there is any need for outside help in selecting 
the public member of these panels, both the American Arbitra­
tion Association and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service are used in several instances. When costs are
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mentioned, the general rule is that they are to be shared 
equally, or with each party paying its own costs and divid­
ing the other costs equally being second most common.
Hawaii (PE-T) and Kansas (PE) provide that their respective 
boards will finance mediation and fact-finding, but the
3
parties share equally all other costs. Pennsylvania XPE-T) 
stipulates that the state pays the entire cost of arbitra­
tion.^ The most frequently used terminology for when the 
impasse procedures become available is within and including 
thirty days of negotiations or after a reasonable period of 
time. Montana (T) and New Hampshire (P) provide for impasse 
resolution after 50 and 40 days respectively, while New York 
(PE-T) stipulates at least 120 days before the end of the 
fiscal year.^ Oregon (T) specifies 60 days prior to budget 
submission, while Pennsylvania (PE-T) specifies after 21 days 
of negotiations but no more than 150 days before budget sub­
mission time.^ Classes 12 and 13 are analyzed in detail in 
subsequent sections and are therefore not included here.
Classes One Through Eleven and Fouteen
Class 1: Alaska (T) , California (ME), Georgia (F) ,
Maryland (T), and North Dakota (PE)
The most common point among the five jurisdictions in 
Class 1, which is somewhat perplexing to the author, is that
in all but California (ME) the process sounds very much like
fact-finding with recommendations. In reading William 
Simkin's book on mediation, escalation or the addition of
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other mediators is possible but, as he indicates, this must
7 'be done with caution. But four of the jurisdictions pro­
vide for tripartite boards with Alaska (T) providing for two
8representatives from both labor and management.
Using the Georgia (F) statute as a representative model, 
the mediation process becomes available when the parties are 
unable to reach agreement within thirty days of their first 
meeting. Within five days of the thirty day period each 
side is to select one representative, and the two are to 
select the third member (chairman) within another five day 
period. If the parties are unable to select the third member, 
the American Arbitration Association is to select the person. 
The board is to call a hearing within ten days of the appoint­
ment of the third member, with the parties given seven days 
notice. The hearing shall be concluded within twenty days 
and the board "shall make written findings and a written 
opinion upon the issues presented." A majority decision of 
the mediators is advisory only. The cost of the third member
9
is shared equally, with each side bearing its own costs.
When class 10 is examined later, I believe that the 
reader will then better understand the opening statement 
about these mediation procedures sounding like fact-finding. 
Mediation is usually a solo performance with very infrequent 
use of recommendations and findings. The function of the 
mediator is to act as a conduit of communication in 
reconciling differences. Uie Georgia (F) procedure even
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contains a list of factors to be used by the mediation 
panel. (These are further discussed in the Section, Factors 
in Arbitration.) This latter point would also add greater 
weight to the idea that the straight application of mediation 
in public bilateralism, excepting California (ME), does not 
resemble that practiced in private bilateralism.
Class 2: Idaho (T), Kansas (PE), Maryland (BLT),
North Dakota (T), Oregon (T) , Oregon (SP) ,
Oregon (N), Vermont (T) , Vermont (ME-F),
Wisconsin (SE) , Wisconsin (ME-T)
The dominant characteristic of Class 2 is the two- 
phased approach to impasse resolutions. The first phase is 
mediation, and if this fails or is not used, the second phase 
of fact-finding is used. Kansas (PE) provides that the im­
passe goes to fact-finding if the conflict persists seven 
days after appointment of the mediator, while Oregon (T)
(SP) (N) stipulate within ten days of appointment.^^ In 
Vermont (ME-F) phase two becomes active after not less than 
fifteen days of mediation, while Wisconsin (SE) and (ME-T) 
statutes simply state after a reasonable period of time.^^
The Kansas (PE) statute allows the parties to establish 
an impasse procedure through negotiation or, in the event of 
failure or absence of such provisions, to approach the 
Public Employees Relations Board for assistance. The parties 
may request or the Board may on its own motion assist in 
settling the impasse by appointing a mediator or mediators 
representative of the public from a list maintained by the
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Board. If the mediation effort fails to resolve the 
impasse within seven days after appointment, the Board shall 
appoint a fact-finding board to be composed of not more than 
three public members. Not later than twenty-one days from 
the date of appointment, the fact-finders shall issue their 
findings and recommendations. The Board"may make the report 
public seven days after submission to the parties, but if 
the impasse continues fourteen days after submission to the 
parties, the report shall be made public.
If the impasse persists after fact-finding efforts, the 
Kansas (PE) provisions allow a third phase to become opera­
tive. If the dispute continues after a forty day period 
but not later than fourteen days prior to budget submission 
time, both parties shall submit their positions to the con­
trolling governing body. This body shall take such action
as will protect the public interest and the interests of the
12public employees.
Ihe (ME) part of Vermont (ME-F), since (F) is analyzed 
as binding arbitration, provides that after a reasonable 
period, but not less than sixty days, the parties may peti­
tion the Commission of Labor and Industry to appoint a 
mediator who is not actively connected with labor or industry. 
If mediation efforts fail, but after not less than fifteen 
days, either party may petition the other and require all 
unresolved issues to go to a fact-finding board. This 
tripartite board shall conduct a hearing upon proper notice
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and shall issue its report of findings of fact and 
recommendations within thirty days after concluding the hear­
ing. A majority decision is sufficient, and the report will 
be published in a newspaper having circulation in the munici­
pality. An appeal on questions of law can be taken to the 
supreme court.
Class 3: Hawaii (PE-T) , Maine (ME-T) , Nevada (LE-T) ,
New Jersey (PE-T) , New York (PE-T)
The distinguishing feature of Class 3 impasse resolu­
tion is the full use of mediation, fact-finding, and arbitra­
tion in a phased application. The parties to the dispute, 
usually with the assistance of their administrative board, 
will first use mediation but if unsuccessful then use fact­
finding, and if still unresolved the impasse goes to arbitra­
tion. For illustration the Hawaii (PE-T), Maine (ME-T), and 
the Nevada (LE-T) statutes are used.
The Hawaii (PE-T) provisions allow the parties to 
negotiate their own impasse procedures, ending in a final 
and binding decision. In the absence of such provisions or 
on the motion of the Public Employment Relations Board, the 
Board shall render assistance to the parties. The Board 
shall appoint a mediator or mediators to assist in resolving 
the dispute, selecting the individuals from a list maintained 
by the Board within three days of receiving notification of 
an impasse. If the dispute continues for fifteen days after 
the date of the impasse, the Board shall appoint a
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fact-finding board of not more than three public members.
I
The fact-finding board is to report within ten days of its 
establishment, with the parties having five days to study 
the findings and recommendations and reach a settlement. If 
the parties are unable to reach a settlement and have not re­
ferred the dispute to final and binding arbitration, the 
Board shall publish the findings and recommendations for 
public information.
The arbitration procedure is activated if the impasse 
continues past thirty days, with a hearing before a tripartite 
Board. The Board shall appoint any member to the panel where 
the parties fail to do so, even to the extent of appointing 
an arbitrator for one or both of the principal parties. If 
the impasse remains unresolved for fifty days, the arbitration 
board shall send its decision to both parties for implementa­
tion, but any part of the decision dealing with money is sub­
ject to appropriation. If the parties have not submitted 
their impasse to arbitration, either party shall be free to 
take whatever action deemed necessary to settle the dispute 
short of disruption or interruption of services within sixty 
days after the fact-finding report was made public. On all 
cost items the employer and employee organization are to 
submit their positions to the appropriate legislative body 
for settlement. This procedure is similar to New York (PE-T) 
of this class and Kansas (PE) of Class 2.^^
The Maine (ME-T) three phase procedure begins with 
mediation if the parties agree to use this approach. But if
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the parties are unable to reach a settlement with or without 
a mediator, they can use a mutually acceptable fact-finding 
procedure. If the parties do not select an outside fact­
finding procedure, they may approach the Executive Director 
of the Maine Board of Arbitration and Conciliation to estab­
lish a three member board from a list maintained by the 
Board. If the dispute still remains unresolved thirty days 
after receipt of the board's findings and recommendations, 
either party can make the report public, but not earlier than 
the thirty day period unless upon agreement of both parties.
The parties shall have an additional fifteen day period 
in which to settle their differences before arbitration is 
started. At the end of this forty-five day period, they may 
jointly agree to proceed to arbitration, but at the end of 
a ten day period after the forty-five day period either party 
may request arbitration. The arbitration board is tripartite, 
and if the parties cannot agree to the third member, the 
services of the American Arbitration Association will be used 
to determine the third member. The board can proceed even if 
one party does not select its representative, which is the 
only instance of such provision found. Any decision of the 
board on salaries, pensions and insurance is advisory with 
the parties having ten days in which to accept. If the de­
cision is not accepted, the board or either party may make 
the decision public. On all other issues in dispute, the 
decision is binding by majority decisions but subject to
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review by the Superior Court. This binding decision may 
also be made public.
The Nevada (LE-T) procedure is initiated by requesting 
the Local Government Employee-Management Relations Board to 
appoint a mediator if the parties negotiate up until the 
date for completion of the tentative budget without agree­
ment. The mediator has forty-five days in which to effect 
a settlement, but if he is unable, he is discharged from his 
responsibilities. Either party may submit the impasse to a 
tripartite fact-finding board with its report being issued 
within forty-five days of its selection. The report shall 
be made public if the parties have not resolved the dispute 
within five days of receipt of the report. Prior to the sub­
mission of the issues, the parties may stipulate that any or 
all items contained in the board's report are binding.
The arbitration procedure is before a single arbitrator 
whose decision is advisory unless the parties, by mutual 
consent, agree that all or any part of the decision is bind­
ing. If the arbitration procedure fails to effect an agree­
ment and the continuing dispute threatens or endangers public 
safety, the Board shall conduct upon notice a public hearing 
for a review of the arbitrator's decision. The Board can 
modify the arbitrator's decision or make any part binding.
Class 4: Connecticut (T), Rhode Island (SE),
Rhode Island (ME), and Rhode Island (T)
Class 4 impasse procedures are based upon the phasing 
from mediation into arbitration bypassing fact-finding as
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examined in Class 3. Since there are only four statutes in 
this class and Rhode Island (ME) and (T) are identical, all 
four procedures are examined.
The Connecticut (T) procedures begin with the parties 
submitting the dispute to the Secretary of the State Board 
of Education or with the Secretary initiating action when it 
is determined the conflict is jeopardizing the education of 
the children. The parties will meet with the Secretary, his 
agent, or a mediator and provide any information as directed 
by the Secretary. If such mediation efforts fail, the 
Secretary may order the parties to meet with him four days 
later with a settlement or their choice of arbitrators. The 
representatives will select a third member, but if all this
effort fails, the Secretary shall designate an arbitrator.
17An advisory decision will be issued within fifteen days.
If the parties are unable to reach an agreement within 
thirty days after negotiations begin, the Rhode Island (SE) 
statute directs the parties to submit within three days any 
and all unresolved issues to the State Labor Relations Board 
for conciliation and fact-finding. Within ten days of ap­
pointment the conciliator shall issue his report (findings 
and recommendations) with the parties having five days in 
which to consider the report. Any unresolved issues shall 
be referred to arbitration. An arbitrator, who shall be a 
Rhode Island resident, shall conduct a hearing within ten 
days upon proper notice and issue his decision within ten
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days after a maximum hearing limit of twenty days. The
decision shall be binding for all issues except those involv-
18ing wages, in which case the decision is advisory.
The procedure for Rhode Island (ME) and (T) again is
initiated after thirty days of negotiations with either party
requesting mediation by the Director of Labor or any other
source. If mediation fails or is not requested after the
thirty-day period, any and all unresolved issues shall be
submitted to arbitration. The arbitration panel is tripartite
with the American Arbitration Association aiding in selecting
the third member, if necessary. A hearing shall be conducted
within ten days, upon seven days notice. It will be concluded
within twenty days with the report issued within ten days
after conclusion. The decision of the arbitrators shall be
made public and shall be binding on all matters not involving
expenditures of money. Appeal can only be based on fraud or
19a decision violating law.
Class 5: California (LA), Delaware (T),
and New Hampshire (SE)
The common point for Class 5 is the choice of using 
either mediation or fact-finding. The California (LA) pro­
cedure is handled by its Employee Relations Board, while the 
New Hampshire (SE) statute allows the chief executive officer
to negotiate impasse procedure steps for mediation or fact- 
20finding. The Delaware (T) mediation step can be either
21tripartite or a single individual. The particulars of each
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statute are not discussed since they are basically the same 
as mediationor fact-finding in Classes 1 through 4.
Class 6 : New York (NYC) and Pennsylvania (PE-T)
The basic feature of these two statues is that either 
mediation, fact-finding, or advisory arbitration can be used. 
The Pennsylvania (PE-T) statute specifies that impasse in­
volving guards at prisons and mental hospitals or employees
involved in the functioning of the courts shall go to ad-
22visory arbitration. The main distinguishing feature of 
the New York (NYC) process is the review of a fact-finding 
report by the Board of Collective Bargaining. If either 
party fails to appeal the fact-finding report within a stipu­
lated thirty day period, the recommendations become final and 
binding. If the Board reviews the report, it can confirm or 
modify the recommendations. But if the Board fails to re­
view within thirty days of appeal or within forty days after 
notification of rejection (with review upon its own initia-
23tive), the recommendations are accepted and become binding.
Class 7: Delaware (PE)
This single jurisdiction class can easily be handled by
quoting from the sole provision:
Upon the failure of the public employer and the 
exclusive bargaining representative to conclude 
a collective bargaining agreement, any matter 
in dispute except matters of wages and salaries 
may be submitted by either party to the State 
Mediation Service or by agreement of the parties 
to arbitration under Chapter 1 of this title.24
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Bius, Class 7 is different in using either mediation or 
arbitration as compared to Class 5 using either mediation 
or fact-finding or Class 6 using either mediation, fact­
finding, or arbitration.
Class 8: Alaska (PE)
The distinguishing feature of the Alaska (PE) impasse 
procedure is based around the three categories of employees 
examined in Chapter Ill's section on Appropriate Units and 
Chapter Vi’s section on Limited Right to Strike. Remember 
that Alaska established three categories of employees deter­
mined by their essentiality. For those employees in the 
most essential category, if mediation fails then the dispute 
goes to arbitration. In the least essential category, 
apparently mediation can be used before the employees vote 
to go on strike. The employees in the middle category can 
engage in a strike after failure of mediation, but upon is­
suance of an injunction to protect the health, welfare, or 
safety of the public, the dispute shall be submitted to 
arbitration. The parties to any agreement can negotiate and
agree upon the use of arbitration according to the state's
25Uniform Arbitration Act.
Class 9: New Mexico (SE) and Federal (11491)
The distinction in Class 9 is that both jurisdictions 
provide mediation as a prime method of resolving impasses, 
but upon authorization by their respective agencies, i.e..
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the Federal Service Impasse Panel and the State Personnel
26Board, either fact-finding or arbitration can be used.
Class 10; Connecticut (ME), Idaho (F), Kentucky (F), 
Massachusetts (SE) and (ME-T), Montana (T),
Nebraska (T) , New Hampshire (P),
Oklahoma (T) , Oregon (PE) , 
and Vermont (SE)
The common characteristics of these eleven statutes is 
the single use of fact-finding as an impasse procedure. Since 
the procedures in fact-finding have been described in past 
classes, only one illustration will be given here. The 
Idaho (F) statute provides that if within the first thirty 
days of negotiations no agreement has been reached, any and 
all unresolved issues shall be submitted to a fact-finding 
commission. The two sides each select a member to a tripar­
tite board with the third member selected by the two repre­
sentatives or by the State Labor Commissioner when the two 
representatives are unable to do so. This selection process 
will be completed within fifteen days. No member of the 
commission shall be an elected official or employee of the 
city, county, fire district, or political subdivision af­
fected. The commission shall conduct a hearing upon proper 
notice with all interested parties entitled to be heard. If 
a member shall cease to participate, the remaining members 
shall continue with a majority determining the facts and 
recommendations.
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Class 11; Florida (F), Florida (T),
Oklahoma (P-F-ME), and Wyoming (F)
These four statutes have advisory arbitration in common. 
Since all four procedures are all but identical, the pro­
cedures will be described in general terms with minor reflec­
tion on exceptions. If the parties are unable to effect a 
settlement within thirty days of beginning negotiations, any 
and all unresolved issues shall be submitted to advisory 
arbitration. The two sides are to select their member of a 
tripartite board within five days, and within ten days after 
the five day period select the third member. The two Florida 
statutes provide for the use of the American Arbitration 
Association, the Oklahoma (P-F-ME) statute provides for the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, while the Wyoming 
(F) statute provides for the district judge of the judicial
district to aid in selection of the third member if the two
2 8other members are unable to select the third member. The 
hearing is conducted within ten days after the appointment 
of the third member with seven days notice. The hearing is 
to be concluded within twenty days of the appointment of the 
third member, and the report issued within ten days of con­
clusion of the hearing. Florida (T) allows twenty days after
29conclusion for its reporting period. The procedures for 
Wyoming (F) are set forth in the Uniform Arbitration Act of 
the state.
Classes 12 and 13 are discussed in detail in the next 
sections.
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Class 14: Nebraska (PE), South Dakota (PE-T),
and Washington (T)
The last class is composed of the provisions that do 
not specify either mediation, fact-finding, or arbitration.
The Nebraska (PE) statute requires the parties to take the 
impasse to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement, 
while South Dakota (PE-T) provides for requesting the Com­
missioner of Labor to intervene. Washington (T) provides 
that the parties take their dispute to a committee composed 
of educators and school directors appointed by the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction for recommendations
31which are advisory.
In summary, this section has examined the impasse pro­
cedures of Classes 1 through 11 and 14. These various classes 
were established based upon the variation in the use of either 
mediation, fact-finding, or arbitration. Classes 12 and 13 
are analyzed in greater detail in the following sections.
Binding Arbitration
Class 12: Pennsylvania (P-F), Rhode Island (P) and (F),
South Dakota (P-F), and Vermont (ME-F)
Conventional binding arbitration, whether voluntar^^ or 
compulsory, was thought for a long time to be the ultimate 
in bilateral impasse resolution. The hope expressed was that 
since the strike is generally prohibited (see Chapter VI), 
this means of resolving negotiation disputes should be used. 
The employer and employees would trade-off the strike and 
binding arbitration. But to this point in the development
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of bilateralism, only four jurisdictions having five statutes 
provide exclusively for binding arbitration. Other jurisdic­
tions have provisions that either allow arbitration to be
negotiated or that permit other impasse procedures to become
.. .. 32binding.
Although binding arbitration was thought the panacea for 
bilateral impasse resolution, upon deeper reflection the 
"chilling" effect it can have upon collective negotiations 
seems to far outweigh any advantage. The chilling effect re­
fers to the possibility that the parties will not negotiate 
in good faith, but force the negotiations into a deadlock and 
thus into arbitration. The strategy involved here is the hope 
that the arbitrator will compromise between the divergent 
points, thus granting advantages which one party could not 
normally get in the regular negotiation process.
This opposition to binding arbitration is reflected in 
Herbert R. Northrup's work on compulsory arbitration and the 
Railway Labor Act as arbitration is administered through the 
National Mediation Board. Northrup is very critical of any 
government intrusion— especially compulsory arbitration— and 
sets forth a four point evaluation of it. First, compulsory 
arbitration "does not insure industrial peace, but rather can 
breed strikes especially short ones." Second, it "does not 
necessarily further the economic or social policies of- govern­
ment, but in fact may work against such policies." Third, it 
"enhances union power and growth, especially through political
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action." Fourth, compulsory arbitration "discourages
33collective bargaining."
The fourth point is more meaningful to this research, 
although the other three are also important. Compulsory bind­
ing arbitration can and does discourage negotiations as con­
tended above, but although it gets the parties a decision, it 
does not settle issues. Pat Greathouse believes that issues 
can only be settled through negotiations leading to agreement 
instead of through parties spending time in disagreement trying 
to bolster some preconceived position.
But this line of thought, i.e., that binding arbitration 
has a chilling effect upon collective negotiations, can be 
qualified to some extent by Joseph Loewenberg's study of com­
pulsory arbitration in Pennsylvania (P-F). He believes that 
the availability of compulsory arbitration did not adversely 
influence bilateralism since fully two-thirds (132 of 19 8) of 
the negotiation settings were terminated without impasse. He 
contends that instead of compulsory arbitration acting like a 
court of last resort, it was used as a tactical weapon, i.e., 
the threat of going to arbitration might force concessions 
not otherwise made, plus the administrators could blame the
arbitrators for higher salaries and any resulting increase in
 ^ 35needed revenues.
But now to the specifics of the various statutes provid­
ing binding arbitration. Rhode Island (P) and (F) have the 
same procedures starting with the inability of the parties to
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reach, agreement within thirty days from and including the 
date of their first meeting. In this case any and all unre­
solved issues shall be submitted to arbitration. Within five 
days of the thirty day period, the parties shall each select 
a representative, and these representatives shall within ten 
days after the five day period select a third member to be 
chairman. If the parties are unable to select the third mem­
ber, the Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court shall 
select a resident of the state to fill the post. A hearing 
is to be held within ten days of the appointment of the third 
member with seven days notice of the hearing. The hearing is 
to be concluded within twenty days of commencement, and the
majority report filed within ten days of the closing of the
, • 36hearing.
The South Dakota (F-P) statute provides that the deci­
sion of a Board of Arbitration is binding unless it is appealed 
within thirty days. Any decision concerning money will be pro­
vided in the next fiscal year. Whenever a dispute arises, 
either party may file a petition with the State Labor Commis­
sioner and the other party for a fair hearing before an arbi­
tration board. Within ten days of filing the request, each 
party is to select its representative, and within five days 
following their selection the two shall select a third member 
as chairman. The Commissioner shall select the third member 
if the parties are unable to do so. The hearing is to be held 
within ten days with seven days notice of it. The hearing
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shall be open to the public, with completion within twenty
days unless the Commissioner grants an extension. The report
is to be filed within five days of completion and published
in at least one newspaper in the city or town in which the
dispute arose with the cost being equally borne. The costs
37of the entire process are also to be borne equally.
The firefighters covered by the Vermont (ME-F) statute 
can also take an impasse to arbitration before a tripartite 
board with ten days notice of the hearing. The hearing is to 
be conducted within thirty days of the naming of the third 
member, and the report issued within forty-five days of the 
naming of the third member. Court review of the decision can
be based on fraud, arbitrator misconduct, or an error of law.
3 8Qhe cost of the arbitration is shared equally.
The Pennsylvania (P-F) statute defines an impasse as the 
inability to conclude negotiations within thirty days of ini­
tiating them. Negotiations are to begin at least six months 
before the start of the fiscal year, and any request for arbi­
tration is to be made at least 110 days before the start of 
the fiscal year. Either party may initiate the action with a 
second cause for initiation being the lack of approval of an 
agreement by a local unit of government within one month of 
submission and by the state legislature within six months of 
submission. Each party within five days appoints its repre­
sentative, and within ten days both will select the third 
member. If the parties are unable to select the third member.
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the American Arbitration Association will submit a list of 
three Pennsylvania residents, with the employer striking one 
name first and then the employee representative, thus produc­
ing one name. A hearing is to be conducted within ten days, 
and a report is to be issued within thirty days of the appoint­
ment of the third member. The majority decision is binding 
upon all parties, accompanied by the unusual provisions that 
no appeal to court is allowed. The firemen and policemen are
to bear their own costs with the state or political subdivision
39paying for all other costs.
In summary, of the thirty-six jurisdictions having 
seventy-four statutes, only seven of the thirty-six (represent­
ing eight statutes) provide for binding arbitration either man­
datory or by negotiation. Thus, at this point in the develop­
ment of bilateralism, binding arbitration has not gained a 
large group of practitioners. Probably the main reason is 
that most negotiations seldom become impasses, but those that 
do receive a great deal of attention. Therefore, impasse pro­
cedures such as binding arbitration will only be used in the 
minority of cases-, but these exceptions must still be provided 
for. Also, it is interesting to note that all five statutes 
mandating binding arbitration deal with policemen and firemen. 
The other statutes deal with public employees outside this 
classification. Thus, at this time only firemen, policemen 
and their public employers are engaged in. binding arbitration.
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Final-Offer Arbitration 
Class 13 : Michigan (F-P) and Minnesota (PE-T)
Final-offer arbitration is another technique, of fairly 
recent origin, for dealing with a negotiation impasse. Final- 
offer arbitration is an impasse resolution technique in which 
the arbitrators are limited in selecting in entirety one of 
the final positions for their decision. Its use in public bi­
lateralism can be dated from President Nixon's proposal for 
dealing with the railroad dispute in the late 1960's. Senator 
Griffin (R-Michigan) introduced on February 2, 1970, a bill 
(S. 3526) designed to deal effectively with emergency disputes 
in the transportation industry while protecting the public 
interest. The procedure established by the Railway Labor Act 
had failed to handle the conflict since, as stated in Section 
2 (a) (1), it tends "to encourage resort to governmental in­
tervention in such disputes rather than utilization of the 
collective bargaining processes to solve labor-management 
disputes.
Section 219 of S. 3526 sets forth the procedure to be 
followed in final-offer arbitration. The President may direct 
each party to submit a final offer to the Secretary of Labor 
within three days with each party also able to submit one al­
ternative plan. The Secretary of Labor is to transmit the 
proposals to the other parties simultaneously. If one party 
refuses to submit a final offer, its last offer of previous 
bargaining shall be deemed its final offer. Ihe proposals are
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to constitute a complete collective bargaining agreement.
After receipt of the proposals, the parties are to continue 
to bargain for five more days with the Secretary of Labor 
helping by offering mediation services.
If there is no settlement within the five day period, 
the parties are to select a three member panel, and if unable 
to perform this function, the President is to appoint the panel. 
No member of the panel is to have a conflict of interest with 
the matter of its concern, and it is to disband if settlement 
is reached before starting its work. The hearing is to be 
informal, with completion within thirty days of the date the 
President directed the parties to submit their final offers.
The federal government is not to participate, and the 
panel is not to attempt to mediate. The panel is not to have 
any third party communication, while the parties are not to 
change the terms and conditions of employment after the sub­
mission of their final offers. The panel is not to change any 
offer, but must select the most reasonable. Factors which the 
panel are to follow are the past history of collective bargain­
ing contracts, a comparison of wages, hours, and conditions of 
comparable positions, a similar comparison with industries in 
general, the security and tenure of employment, and the public 
interest. The final offer selected by the panel shall be 
deemed the contract between the parties unless found arbitrary 
and capricious by a district court granting an injunction under 
Section 20 8 of the Act.^^
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Now with the general idea of final-offer arbitration in 
mind, the specifics of the provisions in Michigan (F-P) and 
Minnesota (PE-T) are examined. The Michigan Policemen's and 
Firemen's Arbitration Act, which became effective May 4, 1972, 
provides that whenever agreement is not reached within thirty 
days of the submission of the dispute to mediation and fact­
finding, the parties may initiate binding arbitration by 
written request to the State Labor Mediation Board. Within 
ten days the parties are to select their representatives, and 
within another five days the two representatives are to select 
a third member as chairman. If the parties are unable to se­
lect the third member, the Chairman of the State Labor Media­
tion Board shall do so in not more than seven days. Upon 
appointment of the third member as chairman, the hearing shall 
begin within fifteen days, upon proper notice to the parties. 
The hearing shall be concluded within thirty days of its com­
mencement, with a majority decision constituting the action of 
the arbitration panel. At any time before making their deci­
sion, the panel may remand the dispute to the parties for fur­
ther bargaining.
At or before the conclusion of the hearing, the panel 
shall identify the economic issues in dispute, and the parties 
are to submit their last offer of settlement. The panel shall 
adopt the final offer of the party which more nearly complies 
with the factors presented in Section 9. These factors are:
a. The lawful authority of the employer;
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b. Stipulations of the parties;
c. The interests and welfare of the public and
the financial ability of the unit of govern­
ment to meet those costs ;
d. Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions
of employment of the employees involved in the
arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours 
and conditions of employment of other employees 
performing similar services and with other 
employees generally,
(i) in public employment in comparable 
communities ;
(ii) in private employment in comparable 
communities ;
e. The average consumer prices for goods and ser­
vices, commonly known as the cost of living;
f. The overall compensation presently received 
by the employees, including direct wage com­
pensation, vacations, holidays and other ex­
cused time, insurance and pensions, medical 
and hospitalization benefits, and continuity 
and stability of employment, and all other 
benefits received;
g. Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances 
during the pendency of the arbitration pro­
ceedings ;
h. Such other factors, not confined to the fore­
going, which are normally or traditionally 
taken into consideration in the determination 
of wages, hours and conditions of employment 
through voluntary collective bargaining, 
mediation, fact-finding, arbitration or other­
wise between the parties, in the public ser­
vice or in private employment.
The decision of the arbitration panel is enforceable in 
the circuit court for the county in which the dispute arose, 
providing that it is supported by competent, material, and 
substantial evidence. Any monetary award is applicable in the
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next fiscal year, except a retroactive award may be made in 
the case where the fiscal year started after initiation of 
arbitration. The parties at any time, by stipulation, may 
amend or modify the arbitration award.^ ^
The Minnesota (PE-T) final offer procedure begins by 
either party filing a petition with the Director of Mediation 
Services stating briefly the nature of their disagreement.
The Director shall fix a time and place to confer with the 
parties at which time mediation or other aids can be extended. 
If mediation does not resolve the dispute, the Director shall 
certify to the Public Employment Relations Board that either 
party has petitioned for arbitration and that further media­
tion efforts are fruitless. Upon certification, the parties 
shall submit their respective final positions on the issues 
in dispute. If the procedure through the Director is not used. 
Section 9 (5) provides that the parties are to submit their 
respective final positions at least seventy-five days before 
the last date for submission of the budget and tax levy to 
the Public Employment Relations Board. The parties may stipu­
late those items that they have agreed upon.
The Chaiirman of the Board is to establish an arbitration 
panel by supplying a list of seven names from which the parties 
alternately strike (mark-out) names until only three remain.
If the parties desire, they may select a single arbitrator.
The panel shall issue its decision by majority vote (if the 
panel is three member), and the cost of the panel is shared
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equally by the parties. The employer shall have ten days in 
which to decide to accept or reject. Silence means acceptance, 
while rejection renders the decision of no force or effect.
If the dispute involves non-essential employees, the parties 
may request that the decision be binding, but if the dispute 
involves essential employees, the Board shall consider only 
the final offers and the decision shall be binding. The par­
ties are free to settle any time prior to or after the render­
ing of the decision regardless of the terms and conditions
43of the decision.
Eugene, Oregon, in 19 71 passed a final-offer ordinance 
with Gary Long and Peter Feuille analyzing the first six ex­
periences. But before their conclusions are presented, it is 
important to study the Eugene procedures. If agreement is not 
reached within twenty-five days of beginning negotiations, the 
parties are to submit a final offer and may also submit one 
alternative. (This is similar to S. 3526.) The final posi­
tions are filed with the city recorder and preserved for the 
arbitration board. The parties are to continue negotiation 
for five more days (also like S. 3526), but if unable to reach 
agreement, a tripartite board is to be selected within ten days. 
The board is to convene within ten days and report its decision 
within another ten days. The board then operates within a time 
period of thirty days and since negotiations are to begin 
around January 15, the final offer procedure should terminate 
around March 15. The panel is to select the most reasonable
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final offer using as criteria the bargaining history of the 
parties, the relevant market comparisons in both public and 
private sectors, and the city's ability to pay. The city pays 
all the panel's expense, which is quite different since in al­
most all impasse provisions mentioning costs they are shared 
equally. Long and Feuille therefore conclude that from their 
examination final offer arbitration is an incentive to bargain­
ing primarily because of the sudden death nature of the alter­
native. Either party may "lose the entire ball game" if the
arbitrator selects the opposition's position as most reason- 
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able. But before their other concluding observations are 
discussed, the final offer experience of Indianapolis examined 
by Fred Witney must be presented.
Fred Witney, one member of a two member arbitration panel 
established when the AFSCME and Indianapolis could not reach 
agreement, analyzes his experience. Although Indiana lacks 
either specific or general bilateral legislation, the Indiana 
Senate passed such legislation on February 2, 19 72, but it 
failed to gain House passage. Since the bill contained a final 
offer arbitration provision, the parties decided to use the 
procedure. The procedure calls for the selection of the most 
reasonable offer, no alteration of any offer, and the award is 
not to place the city in deficit financing. Witney concludes 
that final offer arbitration, although a way to resolve bi­
lateral impasse problems, may not function to "meet the needs 
of the parties or conform to the tests of equity and
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desirability." Furthermore, he chides the opponents of final
offer in not seeing the loss of flexibility and the increasing
likelihood of inferior decisions.
Joseph R. Grodin's article in the May, 1972, issue of
Industrial Relations supports Witney (with Long and Feuille in 
46opposition). Grodin contends that final offer requires a 
level of sophistication which bilateralism presently lacks. 
Long and Feuille counter by stating that "experience does not 
necessarily support the contention that sophisticated and ex­
perienced practitioners are needed to make the final-offer 
mechanism function properly. Furthermore, we believe the 
Eugene experience suggests that actual immersion in the final-
offer process facilitates sophistication in the most rapid
47manner possible." Grodin's second criticism centers around 
the lack of face-saving qualities, i.e., the ability in con­
ventional arbitration to insert certain positions which are
known to be totally beyond reason for political or ideological 
48reasons. Long and Feuille counter that such happenings have 
no place in collective negotiations or impasse procedures by 
stating :
Unacceptable demands really have no place, but 
could provide some psychological reinforcement 
by loading one proposal with goodies and then 
forget about them, but then you lose one 
alternative.
They, of course, are referring to that aspect of both S. 3526 
and the Eugene ordinance allowing submission of two final 
positions. One side could simply waste one position for
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psychological purposes, but then, as Long and Feuille contend, 
the party is down to one usable final position.
Fred Witney additionally does not like final offer to 
follow a strict time table. But Lone and Feuille counter by 
showing that the fairly strict time table of the Eugene ordi­
nance did not hinder the process. The parties simply know that 
the procedure will terminate by March 15 and act accordingly. 
Witney also takes exception to the arbitrators being tied to 
some time frame, but Long and Feuille's countering argument 
above seems to allay such opposition. Witney further questions 
the aspect of final offer in not allowing the arbitrators the 
ability to pick and choose among the alternatives presented. 
(Remember, Witney was on the Indianapolis arbitration panel.) 
Again, Long and Feuille contend that this is the very nature 
of final-offer arbitration. The very heart of final-offer is 
removing the ability to pick and choose, which carries with it 
the often presented idea that conventional arbitration has a 
chilling effect on bargaining, i.e., the parties or party 
simply negate the negotiation phase hoping to get a better 
deal in arbitration. But final-offer removes the chilling 
effect by requiring each side to present its best final offer, 
for to do otherwise is suicide. The parties or party cannot 
hope the arbitrator compromises in their behalf, for in final- 
offer the panel can only select the most reasonable offer.
In conclusion, perhaps it would be best to recapitulate 
the preceding material. This examination of final-offer
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arbitration began with an analysis of Senate Bill 3526 
introduced in 1970. This was President Nixon's proposal to 
handle the then current disputes in the railroad industry and 
future disputes. Then the examination turned to the specifics 
of the Michigan (F-P) and Minnesota (PE-T) provisions. From 
there articles by Grodin, Witney, and Long and Feuille were 
presented and discussed which covered final-offer experiences 
in Eugene, Oregon, and Indianapolis, Indiana.
Where does this material leave us? Final-offer arbitra­
tion is such a new aspect of the diversification of bilateral­
ism that available data is still inconclusive. Experimentation 
is taking place and at first glance the results seem favorable. 
If the strike is to be prohibited in the public sector, then 
the negotiations process must function next to perfection, and 
when it does not, then impasse procedures take over. Final- 
offer arbitration, wherein the parties must put their best foot 
forward, seems to answer the question as to the nature of an 
acceptable impasse procedure. The parties must negotiate in 
good faith because getting something out of conventional arbi­
tration is gone. Final-offer requires that the parties nego­
tiate responsibly for it is in their best interests to do so.
I heartedly support such efforts.
The factors to be used by the arbitrators in making 
their decisions are the next item for examination.
Factors in Arbitration
This section of impasse resolution examines the factors
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to be taken into consideration by the arbitrators in making 
their decision, and strangely enough by the mediation board 
provided in Georgia (F). The data are taken from seven juris­
dictions having eight statutes. In only three cases, Nevada 
(LE-T), Rhode Island (SE), and Oklahoma (F-P-ME), do the fac­
tors apply to other than firemen and policemen. (This last 
statement of course applies only to the municipal employees 
covered by the Oklahoma statute,) Thus one generalization is 
that binding arbitration, final-offer arbitration, and the 
factors used in guiding the decision apply with few exceptions 
to only firemen and policemen.
One basic feature of the factors is a listing of several 
items specifically to be used for comparison. These items are: 
hazards of employment, physical qualifications, mental qualifi­
cations, educational qualifications, job training and skills, 
retirement plans, sick leave, and job security. All but the 
last three mentioned are unanimous in the four statutes having 
such a listing with the last three coming from the Florida (F) 
s t a t u t e . T h e  interest and welfare of the public and the 
financial ability of the unit of government are to be con­
sidered. Nevada (LE-T) requires the consideration of the impact 
on and the consistency of the treatment of other employees in 
the unit of government.Michigan (P-F) specifies the overall 
compensation, taking into consideration wages, vacations, 
holidays, insurance, pensions, medical and hospitalization, 
and the continuity and stability of employment. Additionally
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the Michigan (P-F) statute lists the cost of living index,
the lawful authority of the employer, and any stipulations of 
52the parties.
The last major area of consideration is the comparison 
of wages, hours, and conditions of employment with other simi­
lar occupations in public employment, private employment, and 
same or similar skills under the same or similar working con­
ditions; Oklahoma (P-F-ME) even specifies the building and
53trades industry in the local operating area. Thus, if some 
contend that impasse resolution by arbitration is an illegal 
delegation of authority, at least in these instances the legis­
lators have seen fit to provide guidelines by which the arbi­
trators are to operate. At least in these cases the arbitrators 
are precluded from using any other items in making their de­
cision.
Summary
This chapter examined the diverse methods used in impasse 
resolution. The prismatic effect of bilateralism was captured 
within the fourteen classes presented in Table 5-1. These 
classes were then used to examine the approaches of the classes 
in using mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration. Of the 
fifty-nine items listed, thirty-four begin with the use of 
mediation, eleven use fact-finding exclusively, eleven use 
arbitration exclusively, and three did not specify any parti­
cular method. Thus, it can generally be stated that bilateral
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impasse resolution begins with mediation and then either 
phases into fact-finding or arbitration (Classes 2, 3, and 4), 
or fact-finding and arbitration can be used in addition to 
mediation (Classes 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9).
It is of interest also that only five statutes use bind­
ing arbitration. This is somewhat surprising since this ap­
proach to impasse resolution was considered to be the ultimate 
in light of the general prohibition of the strike. This idea 
followed the line of reasoning that since the economic sanction 
of striking was not available (albeit the strike has been used), 
then binding arbitration was an equitable substitute. But from 
the meager showing, few jurisdictions have accepted and fol­
lowed the idea. In the five usages the employees involved were 
all firemen and policemen.
Another variety of arbitration— final-offer— seems to be 
catching the eye of many people. Final-offer arbitration is 
the method whereby the parties submit their final positions and 
the arbitrator is limited in selecting only one position in its 
entirety, using reasonableness as the main criterion for selec­
tion. Only two jurisdictions' statutes, Michigan (F-P) and 
Minnesota (PE-T), were available for examination, but the use 
of final-offer in Eugene, Oregon, and Indianapolis, Indiana, 
was also examined by way of articles written about them.
Another device or technique needs to be mentioned— the 
joint committee. This, in my opinion, could go a long way in 
aiding both negotiations and impasse resolution. The joint
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committee is composed of representatives from both sides that 
study issues and problems generated by the bilateral relation­
ship. These committees, as Thomas M. Love describes them, are 
the qualitative side of a decision, while negotiations are the 
quantitative side. The parties are under no deadline, there 
is more freedom of discussion and study, and hopefully negotia­
tions may go a little easier with this background support.
Thus, if negotiations are aided, then perhaps the impasse pro­
cedures will be used less often. This is another fertile area 
of future research since little has been written about the
joint committee and its impact upon negotiations specifically
55or bilateral relations generally.
The entire purpose of the material examined in this 
chapter is designed to eliminate or at least lessen the like­
lihood of the subject of the next chapter— the strike.
200
Footnotes
^Simkin, Mediation, P. 356.
^Alaska (T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 14.20.570, 51:1115, 
and Kansas (PE), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 12 (c), 51:2515.
^Hawaii (PE-T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 11 (b) (4), 51:2015,
and Kansas (PE), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 12(e), 51:2515.
^Pennsylvania (PE-T), CCH-LLR, Section 807, p. 57,992.
^Montana (T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 9, 51:3514, New ' 
Hampshire (P), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 105-B:8.I, 51:3814, and 
New York (PE-T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 209.1, 51:4115.
^Oregon (T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 342.470 (1), 51:4613, 
and Pennsylvania (PE-T), CCH-LLR, Section 801, p. 57,990.
^Simkin, Mediation, pp. 127-132.
^Alaska (T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 14.20.570 (a), 51:1115, 
Georgia (F), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 8, 51:1911, North Dakota (PE), 
RF-BNA-GERR, Section 34-11-02, 51:4311, and Maryland (T), 
RF-BNA-GERR, Section 160 (3) (i), 51:2912.
^Georgia (F), RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 7-11, 51:1911-1912.
/ Kansas (PE), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 12 (c), 51:2515,
Oregon (T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 342.470 (2), 51:4613, Oregon 
(SP), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 8 (2), 51:4615, and Oregon (N), 
RF-BNA-GERR, Section 61 (2), 51:4616.
l^Vermont (ME-F), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 1707 (b), 51:5417, 
Wisconsin (SE), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 111.88 (1), 51:5814, and 
Wisconsin (ME-T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 111.70 (4) (c) 3,
51:5818.
^^Kansas (PE), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 12, 51:2514-2515.
^^Vermont (ME-F), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 1707, 51:5417.
l^Hawaii (PE-T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 11, 51:2015. Also 
see New York (PE-T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 209.3 (e), 51:4115, 
and Kansas (PE), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 12 (d), 51:2515.
l^Maine (ME-T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 965.E, 51:2812-2813.
l^Nevada (LE-T), RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 14 and 15, 
51:3712-3713.
201
^^Connecticut (T), CCH-LLR, Section 10-153 f, pp. 53,190- 
53,191.
^^Rhode Island (SE), RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 36-11-8 and 
36-11-9, 51:4811-4812.
^^Rhode Island (ME), RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 28-9.4-10 
through 28-9.4-13, 51:4813-4 814, and Rhode Island (T), 
RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 28-9.3-9 through 28-9.3-14, 51:4815.
on
^California (LA), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 4.840, 51:1421, 
and New Hampshire (SE), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 98-C:4.I, 51:3812.
^^Delaware (T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 4010, 51:1713.
^^Pennsylvania (PE-T), CCH-LLR, Section 805, p. 57,991.
^^New York (NYC), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 1173-7.O.b (4), 
51:4156.
^^Delaware (PE), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 1310, 51:1711.
^^Alaska (PE), RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 23.40.190-200 and 
23.40.215, 51:1113.
^^New Mexico (SE), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 11, 51:4016, and 
Federal (11491), RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 16 and 17, 21:4-5.
2?Idaho (F), RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 5-7 and 9-10, 51:2111.
2 A
Florida (T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 9, 51:1815, Florida 
(F), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 10, 51:1814, Oklahoma (P-F-ME), 
RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 548.7-9, 51:4513-4514, and Wyoming (F), 
RF-BNA-GERR, Section 27-270, 51:5911.
^^Florida (T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 10, 51:1815.
^^Wyoming (F), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 27-271, 51:5911.
^^Nebraska (PE), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 48-816, 51:3613,
South Dakota (PE-T),RF-BNA-GERR, Section 3-18-8.1, 51:5012, and 
Washington (T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 28.72.060, 51:5614.
^^Màine (ME-T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 965.E.4, 51:2812,
North Dakota (T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 12, 51:4313, Rhode Island 
(SE), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 36-11-9, 51:4811-4812, and Rhode 
Island (ME), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 28-9.4-13, 51:4813-4814.
33Herbert R. Northrup, Compulsory Arbirtation and Govern­
ment Intervention In Labor Disputes (Washington, D.C.: Labor
Policy Association, 1966), p. 207,
202
Pat Greathouse, "Changing Trends and Concepts in Collec­
tive Bargaining," Labor Law Journal, XVII (December, 1966), 
p. 724.
Joseph Loewenberg, "Compulsory Arbitration for Police 
and Fire Fighters in Pennsylvania in 196 8," Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, XXIII (April, 1970), pp. 367-379.
^^Rhode Island (F), RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 28-9.1-7 through 
28-9.1-11, 51:4816-4817, and Rhode Island (P), RF-BNA-GERR, 
Sections 28-9.2-7 through 28-9.2-11, 51:4817-4818.
37South Dakota (F-P), RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 2-12, 51: 
5013-5014.
3 8
Vermont (ME-F), RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 1708-1709, 51: 
5417-5418.
39Pennsylvania (F-P), CCH-LLR, Sections 3-8, pp. 58,023-
58,025.
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, A Bill to Provide More Effective 
Means for Protecting the Public Interest in National Emergency 
Disputes Involving the Transportation Industry and for Other 
Purposes, S.3526, 91st Congress, 2d Session, 1970, pp. 1-2.
^^Ibid., pp. 10-13.
^^Michigan (P-F), RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 3-10, 51:3114-
3115.
43Minnesota (PE-T), RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 9 and 12,
51:3215 and 3217.
44Gary Long and Peter Feuille, "Final-Offer Arbitration:
'Sudden-Death' in Eugene," Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, XXXVII (January, 19 74), pp. 186-203. (Hereafter re­
ferred to as Long and Feuille, "Final-Offer Arbitration.")
^^Fred Witney, "Final-Offer Arbitration: The Indianapolis
Experience," Monthly Labor Review, XCVI (May, 1973), pp. 20-25.
46Joseph R. Grodin, "Either-Or Arbitration for Public 
Employee Disputes," Industrial Relations, XI (May, 19 72), 
pp. 260-266. (Hereafter referred to as Grodin, "Either-Or 
Arbitration.")
47
Long and Feuille, "Final-Offer Arbitration," p. 291.
48
Grodin, "Either-Or Arbitration," p. 264.
20 3
Aq
Long and Feuille, "Final-Offer Arbitration," p. 201.
S^Florida (F), RF-BNA-GERR, Sections 11 (4), 51:1814, 
Oklahoma (P-F-ME), Section 548.10 (5), 51:4514, Rhode Island 
(SE), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 36-11-10 (c), 51:4812, and Georgia 
(F), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 10 (c), 51:1912.
S^Nevada (LE-T), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 14.9 (b), 51:3713.
S^Michigan (P-F), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 9 (e) (f), 51:3115,
53
Oklahoma (P-F-ME), RF-BNA-GERR, Section 548.10 (1) (2)
(3), 51:4514.
54Thomas M. Love, "Joint Committees: Their Role in the
Development of Teacher Bargaining," Labor Law Journal, XX 
(March, 1969) , pp. 174-181.
55For another article on joint committees see Richard P. 
McLaughlin, "Collective Bargaining Suggestions for the Public 
Service," Labor Law Journal, XX (March, 1969), pp. 131-137.
CHAPTER VI 
STRIKES
Background Material
The diversification found in the other chapters of this
research on bilateralism is missing when it comes to the
strike. Why? Thirty-one of the thirty-six jurisdictions
examined prohibit the strike. The other five jurisdictions
permit the strike in varying circumstances. A strike means:
. . .  by concerted action, the failure to report 
for duty, the willful absence from one's position, 
the whole or in part from the full, faithful and 
proper performance of the duties of employment 
for the purpose of inducing, influencing, coercing, 
or preventing a change in compensation or rights, 
privileges, obligations or other terms and con­
ditions of employment. . . .1
Just how extensive have public employee strikes been? 
Sheila C. White in her article in Monthly Labor Review reports 
that strikes have increased from 15 in 1958 to 181 in 1967.
The number of workers involved in the 1967 strikes was only 
132,000 out of a public labor force of many millions. Table 
6-1, which indicates the number of stoppages from 1958-1967, 
is taken from her article.
Although there are many cases of public employee strikes 
to date, just a few of them will get the legal point across.
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The often referred to 1951 Connecticut Supreme Court decision
in Norwalk Teachers Association v. Board of Education stated
well the case upholding the strike prohibition;
In the American system, sovereignty is inherent 
in the people. They can delegate to a govern­
ment which they create and operate by law. They 
can give to the government the power and authority 
to perform certain duties and furnish certain ser­
vices. The government so created and empowered 
must employ people to carry on its tasks. Those 
people are agents of the government. They exer­
cise some part of a sovereignty entrusted to it.
They occupy a status entirely different from 
those who carry on a private enterprise. They 
serve the public welfare and not a private purpose.
To say that they can strike is the equivalent of 
saying that they can deny the authority of gov­
ernment and contravene the public welfare.^
(Emphasis mine.)
Table 6-1.— Work stoppages in government, 1958-1967
Year Stoppages
Workers
Involved
Man
Days
Idle
1958 15 1,720 7,510
1959 26 2,240 11,500
1960 38 28,600 58,400
1961 28 6,610 15,300
1962 28 31,100 79,100
1963 29 4,840 15,400
1964 41 22,700 70,800
1965 42 11,900 146,000
1966 142 105,000 455,000
1967 181 132,000 1,250,000
1968 254 202,000 2,550,000
1969 411 160,000 745,700
1970 412 333,500 2,023,300
1971 329 152,600 901,400
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In the New York City school teachers strike of 1968, 
the New York Court of Appeals concluded in Rankin v. Shanker 
"that a legislative classification which differentiates be­
tween strikes by public employees and employees in private 
industry is reasonable and does not offend against the con­
stitutional guarantee of equal protection of the l a w . T h e  
New York Court of Appeals in City of New York v. DeLury (1968) 
stated there was "no provision of either the Federal or State 
Constitution [that] prevented the state from outlawing strikes 
by public employees." The Court concluded that the "statutory 
prohibition against strikes by public employees is reasonably 
designed to effectuate a valid state policy."^
- Thus, the courts are supportive of the prohibition of 
the strike. This is much different from the two legal posi­
tions presented in Chapter I concerning whether bilateralism 
needed a statutory basis or whether the position of the public 
employer, by implication, permitted bilateralism. In this 
chapter the courts are in unanimous support. Again the 
Florida Supreme Court in Dade County Classroom Teachers' 
Association Inc. v. Ryan (1969) held "that with the exception 
of the right to strike, public employees have the same rights 
of collective bargaining as are granted private employees" in 
interpreting the state constitutional provisions allowing 
public employees to organize and bargain collectively.^
But reference must be made to the cases discussed in 
Chapter IV concerning the wording used in some statutes.
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Remember that California, by mistaken use of the phraseology 
"engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection," 
allowed their Supreme Court to interpret this as permitting 
the strike. (Such wording had been so interpreted in private 
bilateralism.) So again, it must be stressed that the word-
O
ing used in public bilateralism is very important.
Although the prohibition of strikes is upheld by the 
courts, they still occur. The strike entailing the disrup­
tion of public services receives much attention, but this 
detracts from the millions of workers that do not strike.
One reason for the prohibition is the essential nature of 
public services. Sewer plant operators strike and tons of 
untreated sewage flow into San Francisco Bay. Teachers strike 
and the schools close. These events do generate fear about 
the development of bilateralism. For anyone to contend that 
these services are non-essential and that their disruption can 
be tolerated, in my opinion, is indeed on very shaky ground.
The position can be taken that if the service is non-essential 
government should not be performing it and should focus its 
energies on other functions. The Committee on Public Employee 
Relations created by Governor Rockefeller in January, 1966, 
analyzed this problem area of essentiality. They concluded 
that "a differentiation between essential and non-essential 
governmental services would be the subject of such intense and
9
never-ending controversy as to be administratively impossible."
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Alaska is the only jurisdiction attempting to deal with the 
essentiality problem. The Alaska (PE) statute establishes 
three classes of employees with the first class not allowed 
to strike, the second class allowed to strike so long as the 
public's health or safety is not endangered, and the third 
class permitted to strike for extended periods without serious 
effect on the public. (These provisions are examined in 
greater length in the third section of this chapter.)
What is the answer to the strike problem? The preceding 
chapter analyzed the impasse resolution provisions which are 
held to be the answer, i.e., mainly arbitration. But after 
an examination of the provisions both allowing and prohibiting 
strikes, I will present my own conclusions.
Prohibition of the Strike 
The prohibition of the strike by public employees is 
all but universal. As stated several times and examined in 
greater detail in the next section, only five jurisdictions 
are allowing or permitting a limited right to strike. In con­
trast, thirty-one jurisdictions representing forty-nine sta­
tutes prohibit the strike. In twelve statutes the strike is 
an unfair labor p r a c t i c e . T h e  provisions prohibiting the 
strike range from the concise to the complex. The concise 
nature of many statutes can be well illustrated by the Georgia 
(F) provision which states;
The protection of the public health, safety and 
welfare demands that the permanent members of
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any paid fire department of a municipality should 
not be accorded the right to strike or engage in 
any work stoppage or slowdown.11
The Florida (T) statute, covering Hillsborough County, also 
prohibits the strike with the "consideration for such pro­
visions being the right to a resolution of disputed ques­
tions.
For an in-depth analysis of the procedures established 
to handle a strike situation, Michigan (PE) (P-F), Minnesota 
(PE-T), New Mexico (SE), New York (PE-T), Oklahoma (P-F-ME), 
South Dakota (PE-T), and Federal E.G. 11491 and E.G. 11636 
are used. The Michigan (PE) statute provides that an employee 
can request a hearing by filing a written petition with the 
officer in charge of the employee within ten days after com­
pensation is suspended or other disciplinary action is imposed 
for striking. The hearing will be conducted within ten days 
of the request and in accordance with the laws and regulations 
appropriate to the removal of the employee. The decision of 
the hearing will be made within ten days, and if against the 
employee, an appeal can be taken to the circuit court having 
jurisdiction within thirty days of the decision. No penalties 
are provided for other than the loss of salary and dismissal.
The Michigan (P-F) statute, which provides for final 
offer arbitration, stipulates that the aribtration award can 
be enforced by the circuit court having jurisdiction. If the 
employee organization willfully disobeys the court’s order by 
striking or otherwise, punishment shall be a fine not to exceed
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$250 per day that such violation continues.
The New Mexico (SE) regulations define a strike as an
unfair practice, with the State Personnel Board handling
complaints and assessing penalties. The following provision
must be included in all agreements.
No strike, work stoppage, slowdown, sick out or 
picketing in a labor management dispute, or 
similar action will be engaged in or encouraged 
by the employee organization; the leadership of 
the employee organization has the obligation to 
make every effort to discourage such action and 
to direct employees to cease any such activities. 
Participation by any incumbent in any of these 
activities, in any way, will be cause for immedi­
ate disciplinary action including dismissal under 
Board Rules.15
By the Minnesota (PE-T) statute any employee knowingly 
violating the no-strike provision or being absent or abstain­
ing from work on the date or dates of a strike without permis­
sion (absent or abstaining on date or dates of a strike is 
prima facie evidence of striking) can be terminated. An 
employee charged with striking can petition, in writing within 
ten days of notice of removal, to the individual having power 
to so remove. A hearing shall be conducted within ten days 
(all analogous cases can be combined), with court review 
available of any adverse decision against the employee.
An employee finally charged with striking can regain 
employment, but will be on probation for a two year period 
and is not entitled to any pay, wage, or per diem for the days 
on strike. An employee organization found to have violated 
the no-strike provisions shall lose its exclusive representative
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status/ may not be certified for a period of two years, and 
may lose its check-off rights for two years. An employer 
unfair labor violation is no defense to a strike, but can be 
used as a mitigating circumstance in determining the penal­
ties.^^
The New York (PE-T) no-strike provisions state that an 
employee knowingly striking or being absent or abstaining 
from work (absent or abstaining is a presumption of striking) 
without permission is subject to removal, disciplinary action, 
probation for one year's service without tenure, and loss of 
pay during the strike period. If a strike occurs, the chief 
executive officer of the government involved shall determine 
the names of the strikers and shall immediately notify each 
employee. He shall also notify the chief fiscal officer and 
chief legal officer.
The affected employees can petition the chief executive 
officer within twenty days of notice of striking and the of­
ficer shall take the petition into consideration. If the 
chief executive officer decides a question exists, he shall 
appoint a hearing officer to conduct the proper proceedings.
If the hearing officer rules in favor of the employee, all 
rights shall be restored and monetary deductions returned, but 
if the chief executive officer is sustained, the employee's 
only recourse is a court review.
The chief legal officer shall, before the Public Employ­
ment Relations Board, institute proceedings against the
212
employee organization concerned. If the Board decides in 
favor of the chief legal officer, the employee organization 
loses the rights of check-off and is subject to fine. The 
Board shall take into consideration, before fixing the fine, 
the extent of willful defiance of the no-strike provision, 
the impact upon the health, safety, and welfare of the public, 
the financial resources of the employee organization, the re­
fusal of either party to engage in impasse procedures, and 
the improper acts of the employer. The rights of the organi­
zation can be restored upon affirmation that the organization
17does not assert, assist, or participate in a strike.
The Oklahoma (P-F-ME) provisions are similar to those 
discussed earlier for Minnesota (PE-T). An employee covered 
by the statute shall be deemed to be on strike if he willfully 
absents himself or abstains in whole or part from his work 
without permission. Penalties for striking can be either 
suspension of regular compensation or other disciplinary ac­
tion. A hearing shall be conducted to determine if such action 
is justified upon written request by the employee to the 
officer or body having the power to revoke or discipline. The 
hearing is to be held within ten days of the request, and the 
decision made within ten days after the conclusion of the 
hearing. If the employer is upheld, the discipline or termina­
tion is implemented, but an appeal can be taken within thirty
18days to the district court having jurisdiction.
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The South Dakota (PE-T) statute provides for a review 
of action taken against an employee by allowing the filing 
of a petition within ten days after such action is taken.
The hearing is to be conducted within ten days of the re­
quest, and the decision rendered within ten days after conclu­
sion of the hearing. An appeal can be taken by the employee 
to the circuit court having jurisdiction within twenty days 
of the decision. If the employee is found in violation, a 
fine not exceeding $1000 or imprisonment not to exceed one 
year or both shall be assessed, while an employee organization 
shall be assessed a fine not to exceed $50,000. Both employee 
and employee organization would be guilty of a misdemeanor.^^ 
Federal E.O. 11491 and E.O. 11636 have a no-strike pro­
vision in their unfair practices section, but the federal law 
prohibiting the strike is found in the U.S. Code. Section 
7311 of Title 5 U.S. Code provides:
An individual may not accept or hold a position in 
the Government of the United States or the govern­
ment of the District of Columbia if he . . . (3) 
participates in a strike, or asserts the right to 
strike, against the Government of the United 
States or the government of the District of 
Columbia; or (4) is a member of an organization 
of employees of the Government of the United 
States or of individuals employed by the government 
of the District of Columbia that he knows asserts 
the right to strike against the Government of the 
United States or the government of the District 
of Columbia.20
The penalty for violation of Section 7311 is found in Section
1918 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code which calls for a fine of
not more than $1000 or imprisonment of not more than one year
21and one day or both.
214
Three other states provide punishment for striking, but 
do not specify any procedures as presented in the preceding 
material. For both Maryland (T) and (BLT), the employee or­
ganization loses its exclusive status, is ineligible for two 
years to be certified as an exclusive representative or par­
ticipate in an election, and is denied the check-off for one 
22year. The Nevada (LE-T) statute provides that court punish­
ment for the employee organization is a fine of not more than 
$50,000 each day of the strike per organization involved; the 
officers of the organization can be fined not more than $1000 
for each day of the strike or can be imprisoned; and, any 
participating employee can be dismissed or suspended. The 
employing agency may, in the face of continued strike activity, 
dismiss, suspend, or demote any employee, cancel the contracts 
of employment for any employee, or withhold all or part of the 
salaries or wages due the employee. The punishments by either
court or employing agency can be applied either alternatively
23or cumulatively.
The Wisconsin (SE) penalties allow for the imposition of 
discipline, which includes discharge or suspension without pay 
and the cancelling of reinstatement eligibility. The employer 
can also request monetary fines against the labor organization 
or the employee or can sue for damages occasioned by the strike.
Limited Right to Strike; Alaska, Hawaii,
Montana, Pennsylvania, Vermont
These five jurisdictions are an elite vanguard among the
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jurisdictions entering bilateralism since they allow their 
employees (depending upon the coverage of the statute) a 
limited right to strike. Striking is limited in bilateralism 
because in all five cases there are qualifying factors.
The Alaska (PE) statute divides its employees into 
three classes. The first class of employees covers occupa­
tions composed of "police and fire protection employees, jail, 
prison and other correctional institution employees, and hos­
pital employees." These services are considered so essential 
that they may not be disrupted for even the shortest period 
of time. Upon the threat of a strike or the occurrence of a 
strike, the authorities shall approach a court of competence 
and jurisdiction to gain an injunction, restraining order, or 
other order that may be appropriate. If the dispute centers 
around an impasse which has not been resolved by mediation, 
"the parties shall submit to arbitration to be carried out 
under AS 09.43.030.
The occupations in the second class are those in public 
utility, snow removal, sanitation, public school, and other 
educational institution employees. These services may be 
disrupted for a limited period, but not for an indefinite 
period. They may strike after failure of impasse mediation 
and a strike vote taken by secret ballot. If a strike occurs, 
the public employer or labor relations board shall petition 
the superior court for the judicial district in which the 
strike is occurring for an injunction. An injunction can be
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gained upon the proper showing that the strike "has begun to 
threaten the health, safety or welfare of the public." The 
court shall also consider in making its judgment the total 
equities in the particular situation, not only "the impact of 
a strike on the public, but also the extent to which employee 
organization and public employers have met their statutory 
obligations." If, after the injunction is issued, an impasse 
or deadlock exists, the parties to the conflict shall submit 
the controversy to arbitration.^®
The third class of employees is undefined since they are
all others not included in the first and second classes. The
services performed by these employees can be interrupted for
"extended periods without serious effects on the public."
If the employees so desire, they can strike upon approval of
27a secret ballot vote in the bargaining unit.
The Hawaii (PE-T) statute stipulates the strike as un­
lawful for employees not included in an appropriate bargaining 
unit having a certified exclusive representative or included 
in an appropriate bargaining unit having final and binding 
arbitration for resolution of disputes. Therefore, for 
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit having an exclu­
sive representative and not having final and binding arbitra­
tion for the resolution of disputes, they shall have the right 
to strike, after complying with the following steps. First, 
the requirement for the resolution of disputes set forth in 
Section 11 must be complied with in good faith. Section 11
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provided for the resolution of impasses using either 
mediation, fact-finding, or arbitration. Second, the pro­
cedures for prohibiting unfair practices must be exhausted. 
Third, a sixty day period must have elapsed since the public 
disclosure of a fact-finding board's report and recommenda­
tions. Fourth, the exclusive representative must have given
a ten-day notice to the Public Employment Relations Board and 
28the employer.
Even with compliance of the above four steps, if the 
employer is concerned about the potential danger to the pub­
lic's health and safety due to a possible strike or an occur­
ring strike, the employer may petition the Public Employment 
Relations Board to conduct an investigation. If the Board 
determines there is a present or imminent danger to the 
public's health or safety, it shall establish requirements 
which must be met to remove the imminent or present danger.
The employer can also petition the Board for a decision on 
whether a strike is in violation of the appropriate rules and 
regulations. The employee organization will also be given 
opportunity to present its viewpoint before the Board. If 
the employer's petition is sustained, the Board shall approach 
a court of competency and jurisdiction for enforcement of its 
decision.
The Montana (N) statute allows registered professional
f
nurses or licensed practical nurses to strike providing there 
is no other strike in effect at another health care facility 
within a radius of 150 miles. Health care facilities means
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"a hospital or nursing home, or other agency or 
establishment . . . whether operated publicly or privately, 
having as one of its principal purposes the preservation of 
health or the care of sick or infirm individuals or both."
The employees or their representative must give the health 
care facility a thirty day written notice of any strike 
specifying the day the strike is to begin.
The guards at prisons or mental hospitals, or employees 
necessary for the functioning of the courts of the Common­
wealth, shall not strike at any time, but other employees 
covered by the Pennsylvania (PE-T) statute can strike if in 
compliance with the following statutory requirements. Employ­
ees are also prohibited from striking during impasse procedures 
set forth in Sections 801 and 802. When the impasse procedures 
are exhausted, the employees shall not be prohibited from 
striking unless the strike presents a clear and present danger 
to the health, safety or welfare of the public. Before the 
strike can be terminated on such grounds, an appropriate court 
hearing must be held.^^
if the decision of the hearing upholds the employer's 
contention of the strike being dangerous to the public and 
the employees do not comply, the employer is then able to 
suspend, demote or discharge at his discretion those employees 
striking. Furthermore, the employee shall not receive any 
compensation for the period during which he was engaged in any 
strike. The employee organization willfully disobeying a court
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order injoining a strike can be punished by a fine fixed at
the discretion of the court. The court shall consider as
mitigating circumstances; "any unfair practices committed
by the public employer during the collective bargaining
processes; the extent of the willful defiance or resistance
to the court's order; the impact of the strike on the health,
safety or welfare of the public; and, the ability of the
employee organization or the employee to pay the fine im- 
32posed." In line with the first mentioned mitigating cir­
cumstance, an employer unfair practice is not a defense to 
a prohibited strike. The parties to a strike can approach 
the court and request a diminution or suspension of any fines 
or penalties imposed. Lastly, any employee refusing to cross 
a picket line of an illegal strike is also considered to be
on strike and subject to the appropriate measures presented
, 33above.
The Vermont (ME-F) statute simply provides that no pub­
lic employee may strike or recognize a picket line if doing 
so will endanger the health, welfare or safety of the public. 
Should this happen, the public employer is to approach the
Court of Chancery within the county wherein the strike is
34occurring for an injunction.
In summary, five jurisdictions are now experimenting 
with a limited right to strike. The Montana (N) and Vermont 
(ME-F) are considerably shorter than the Alaska (PE), Hawaii 
(PE-T), and Pennsylvania (PE-T) provisions, but the intent
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is still there. The right to strike is limited mainly by 
stipulations protecting the health, welfare, and safety of 
the citizens affected. Additionally, the provisions specify 
certain steps that must be complied with before the employees 
can strike, e.g., the exhaustion of impasse procedures. At 
this time, research data on the impact and administration of 
these provisions are not available. This is one of many areas 
of bilateralism requiring further study.
Summary and Conclusion 
In summary, an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions 
prohibit the strike, with the five states now permitting a 
limited right to strike being a distinct minority. But one 
definite generalization can be made, i.e., despite the gen­
eral prohibition strikes still occur. Whenever the employees 
feel that their demands are justified, they will strike regard­
less of the possible consequences. Therefore, is there an 
answer to the strike problem? I do not believe there is.
The strike is something in bilateralism which must be kept to 
a minimum because of possible health and safety factors, but 
which will probably be tolerated in isolated instances. The 
best possible way to prevent strikes is to provide the parties 
with the proper instruments to permit compromise. But at 
times, the conflict in negotiations is just too great to allow 
compromise and then a strike occurs. It is somewhat of a 
utopian hope of the author that the parties involved will
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respect their responsibilities to the public and not force 
bilateralism to the brink. Besides, even without bilater­
alism, the employees can still strike.
When the public employees strike and termination of 
employment is available, does the administrator fire all the 
sanitation workers in a city, all the teachers in a school 
district, or all the postal workers? The results of such 
termination could be worse than the effects of the strike. 
Strikes are the manifestation of conflict, so a partial an­
swer would be to provide the machinery to promote compromise 
and hope like hell the parties act responsibly.
The next chapter examines the unfair labor practices 
designed to inform the parties in bilateral activities of 
actions which, if engaged in, can result in the placement of 
sanctions.
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CHAPTER VII
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
General Background 
This chapter covers the unfair labor practice provisions 
and the procedures for handling complaints as found in the 
statutes under examination. Unfair labor practice provisions 
are provided to aid bilateralism by informing the participants 
of activities which carry the threat of exposure and sanction 
if they are engaged in. It is a sad reflection upon bilater­
alism, both public and private, that such provisions are 
needed to help maintain a degree of decorum. The ACIR report 
recommends that when states, and this is extended to all juris­
dictions, do enact labor relations legislation that it contain 
unfair labor provisions which, among other things, obligates 
the parties to negotiate in good faith.^
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first and 
second sections are an examination of employer and employee 
unfair labor practices respectively. This analysis of twenty- 
two jurisdictions' data is made by comparing the respective
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provisions and constructing commonality tables. Table 7-1 is 
a summary of employer unfair labor practices, while Table 7-2 
is a summary of employee unfair labor practices.  ^ (See Tables 
below.) There are fifteen common and unique items listed as 
employer unfair practices, and twenty-two listed as employee 
unfair practices. The employee table is made longer by the 
provisions of the Minnesota (PE-T) statute on picketing and 
related matters. These provisions (Items thirteen through 
twenty) are not found in any other statutes but with the three 
exceptions noted on items thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen.
The only comparable provision in Taft-Hartley is Section 158 
(b) (7). The third section is a discussion of the procedures 
established to handle complaints. Here again, the differentia­
tion and diversification of the data allows for some common­
ality, but the uniqueness is very much present.
Special mention must be made of six jurisdictions that 
do not contain a full unfair labor practices section (employer 
and employee practices plus the procedures) but still make ref­
erence to such practices. The Alabama (F), California (ME) 
and (SE), Delaware (PE), Maryland (T), Missouri (PE), and 
New Hampshire (SE) statutes contain the following similar 
statement :
No such employee shall be discharged or discrim­
inated against becuase of his exercise of such
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1. Interfere, restrain or coerce 
an employee in the exercise 
of his guaranteed rights.
2. Refuse to bargain collectively 
in good faith with an organ­
ization which is the exclusive 
representative of employees
in an appropriate unit, in­
cluding but not limited to 
the discussing of grievances 
with the exclusive represen­
tative.
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Table 7-1.— Continued
Dominate or interfere with 
the formation, existence or 
administration of an 
organization.
Discriminate in regard to 
hire or tenure of employ­
ment or a term or condition 
of employment to encourage 
or discourage membership in 
an organization.
Discharge or discriminate 
against an employee because 
he has signed or filed an 
affidavit, petition or com­
plaint or given testimony 
under this act.
To fail or refuse to cooper­
ate in impasse procedures 
involved under the provisions 
of this chapter.
Violating any of the rules 
and regulations established 
by the director regulating 
the conduct of representation 
elections or other orders re­
lating to certification of an 
exclusive representative.
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8. Violating the terms of a
collective bargaining agree­
ment. n o w  X
9, Refusing to discuss grievances 
with the representative of an 
employee organization desig­
nated as the exclusive repre­
sentative in an appropriate 
unit in accordance with the 
provisions of this act.
10. Unilaterally exclude from work 
or prevent from working, or 
discharge any one or more em­
ployees, when the purpose of 
such action is in whole or in 
part, to interfere with or 
coerce or intimidate an em 
ployee in the exercise of 
rights assured in this law.
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11. Refuse or fail to comply with 
any provision of this chapter. d e
12. Blacklisting of any employee or­
ganization or its members for 
purpose of denying them employ­
ment.
Table 7-1.— Continued
13. To deduct labor organization 
dues from an employee's earn­
ings unless authorized.
14. Violating or refusing to com­
ply with any lawful order or 
decision issued by the 
director of the board.
15. Refusing to reduce a collec­
tive bargaining agreement to 
writing and sign such agree­
ment.
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1. Restrain or coerce:
a. an employee in the exer­
cise of rights guaranteed
b. a public employer in the 
selection of his represen­
tative for purposes of col­
lective bargaining or the 
adjustment of grievances
2, Refuse to bargain collectively 
in good faith with a public
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employer, if it has been des­
ignated in accordance with the 
provisions (of this act) as 
the exclusive representative 
of employees in an appropriate 
unit a b c d e f g h i j  1 n o p q r s t u  w x y
3. Engage in a strike, slowdown, 
or work stoppage.
4. Fail to cooperate in impasse 
procedures
5. To discriminate against any 
employee because of race, re­
ligious creed, color, sex, 
national origin, or ancestry 
or any person with regard to 
the terms and conditions of 
membership in an employee or­
ganization
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6. Violate the terms of a 
collective bargaining agree­
ment
7. Violating any of the rules and 
regulations established by the 
director regulating the conduct 
of representative elections
w X
1 n
Table 7-2.— Continued
8. Coerce or restrain any
person to:
a. force or require employer 
to cease dealing with 
another person
b. force or require a public 
employer to recognize for 
representation purposes an 
employee organization not 
certified by the director
c. refuse to handle goods or 
perform services
d. preventing an employee from 
providing services to the 
employer
9. Refuse or fail to comply with 
any provision of this chapter
10. Inducing the employer or its 
representatives to commit any 
unfair labor practice
1 n t u
to
w
to
V
Table 7-2.— Continued
11. Seek modification of the
status of supervisory employees 
as set forth in this chapter 
except as part of good faith 
meet and confer proceedings P W X
12. Attempt to induce agency man­
agement to coerce an employee 
in the exercise of his rights 
under this Order w x y
13. Forcing or requiring any em­
ployer to assign particular 
work to employees in a parti­
cular employee organization or 
a particular trade, craft, or 
class rather than to employees 
in another employee organiza­
tion or in another trade, 
craft or class 1 u
14, Causing or attempting to cause 
a public employer to pay or 
deliver or agree to pay or 
deliver any money or other 
thing of value, in the nature 
of exaction for services which 
are not performed or not to be 
performed 1 u
N>u>
w
Table 7-2.— Continued
15. Any picketing which results in 
a refusal by any person to de­
liver goods or perform services
16. Committing any act designed to 
damage or actually damaging 
physical property or endanger­
ing the safety of persons 
while engaging in a strike
17. Picketing which has an unlaw­
ful purpose such as, but not 
limited to, the furthering of 
a strike
18. Picketing which unreasonably 
interferes with the ingress 
and egress to facilities of 
the public employer
19. Seizing or occupying or des­
troying property of the 
employer
20. Violating or refusing to comply 
with any lawful order or de­
cision issued by the director 
of the board as authorized by 
this act
1 n
to
w
Table 7-2.— Continued
21. Sole representative shall not 
refuse membership except for
cause
22. Refusing to reduce a collec­
tive bargaining agreement to 
writing and sign such agree­
ment
NJ
W
in
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right, nor shall any person or group of persons, 
directly or indirectly by intimidation or co­
ercion, compel or attempt to compel any such 
employee to join or refrain from joining a labor 
organization.4
This may seem inadequate, but the silence of many statutes 
seems worse. ■
Referring to Tables 7-1 and 7-2, the horizontal axis 
shows the jurisdictions providing for unfair labor practices. 
They are placed in alphabetical order by state (the City of 
Los Angeles occupies the position of California and the City 
of Baltimore occupies the place of Maryland) with the two fed­
eral executive orders listed last. The Alaska (PE) statute 
was used as a base, i.e., the unfair employer and employee 
practices contained therein were listed first and each other 
statute compared for commonality or unique provisions. A 
word of caution is required in that the wording used in the 
tables comes from the first statute having such a provision 
and such wording is at times added to or revised by necessity 
when the subsequent provisions vary. But it is assured that 
such wording does accurately reflect the common meaning from 
the data used.
Each jurisdiction was given a letter placed on the 
horizontal axis below a jurisdictional listing. Both tables 
have the same letter for respective jurisdictions. In order
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to accommodate the jurisdictions to the limits of the alphabet 
some limitations were imposed. The listing for New York (PE-T) 
also contains the New York (NYC) unfair practices since both 
are similar enough for combining the two. Likewise the two 
federal executive orders are listed together for the same 
reason.
Unfair Labor Practices— Employer
Table 7-1 then is a summary of the fifteen common and 
unique employer unfair labor practices. Of the fifteen items, 
only items one through five can be found in a majority of the 
jurisdictions, while the remaining ten items can be found in 
eight or less jurisdictions.
Items one and two have unanimous support among the prac­
tices listed. Employers cannot interfere, restrain or coerce 
an employee in the exercise of rights guaranteed under the 
labor relations regulations (item one). Item two stipulates 
that the employer cannot refuse to negotiate in good faith 
with an exclusively recognized employee organization in an 
appropriate unit. This requirement is not limited to discus­
sing grievances. Employees are assured by item three that the 
employer is not to dominate or interfere with the formation, 
existence, or administration of their organization. Items 
four and five assure the employee that there is to be no
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discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or a 
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage 
organization membership, and that signing or filing an affi­
davit, petition or complaint under the provisions of the regu­
lations will not be grounds for discharge or discrimination. 
These five items would then form the heart of employee protec­
tion. In summary, all rights are guaranteed, the employee's 
organization is protected, and the employer is required to 
negotiate in good faith.^
The employer, under item six, is not to fail or refuse 
to cooperate in impasse procedures provided by the regulations 
found in eight jurisdictions. Item seven requires that the 
rules and regulations established for regulating the conduct 
of representation elections or other words relating to certi­
fication of an exclusive representative shall not be violated. 
Five jurisdictions list the violating of the terms of a col­
lective bargaining agreement as an unfair practice.®
Item nine is very similar in wording to item two in pro­
viding that the employer is not to refuse to discuss grievances 
with the exclusive representative in an appropriate unit in 
accordance with the regulations. Four jurisdictions, Kansas 
(PE), Montana (N), New Hampshire (P), and Oklahoma (P-F-ME), 
are prohibited from unilaterally excluding from work or
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preventing from working, or discharging one or more employees 
when the purpose of such action in any way is aimed at inter­
fering with or coercing or intimidating an employee in the 
exercise of rights assured by the regulations (item ten).
This regulation in these five jurisdictions was used in Chap­
ter I in support of the contention that the lock-out is not 
available to the public employer to counter the employee 
strike.7
The employer is not to refuse, or fail to comply, with 
any provision of their labor relations regulations, nor black­
list any employee organization or its members for purposes of 
denying them employment (items eleven and twelve). The 
Wisconsin (SE) and (ME-T) statutes state that deduction of 
labor organization dues from the employee's earnings without 
proper authorization is an unfair practice.® The Minnesota 
(PE-T) statute declares that violating or refusing to comply 
with any lawful order or decision issued by the Director of 
their Bureau of Mediation Services is an unfair practice.®
The Pennsylvania (PE-T) statute extends the provisions of 
item two by providing that the employer is not to refuse to 
reduce a collective bargaining agreement to writing and sign 
such agreement.
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It is noteworthy that the first five practices listed 
are almost identical to the wording used in the Taft-Hartley 
unfair labor practices section. It is interesting that the 
public statutes total fifteen separate listings while Taft- 
Hartley lists only five. Upon comparison, item one is Section 
158 (a) (1), item two is Section 158 (a) (5), item three is
Section 158 (a) (2), item four is Section 158 (a) (3), and 
item five is Section 158 (a) (4).^^ The other ten listed
practices have probably developed throughout bilateralism, both 
public and private, with their origin shrouded.
Unfair Labor Practices— Employees 
Table 7-2 is a summary of employee (employee organization) 
unfair practices which is identical in form to the employer un­
fair practices table. Special note should be taken of the ab­
sence of Michigan (PE) and Montana (N) from the jurisdictional 
listing since their statutes listed only employer unfair prac­
tices. This harkens back to the Wagner Act which also listed 
only employer unfair practices, but is somewhat strange since 
the intervening Taft-Hartley Act lists both employer and em­
ployee unfair practices.12 It is also interesting to note that 
the high degree of similarity between the Taft-Hartley employer 
unfair practices and those having majority commonality in 
public employment shown above does not hold true for the
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employee unfair practices. Items one (a) and two are the 
items having unanimous support, while item three is listed in 
twelve of the twenty-one jurisdictions. These three items 
correspond to similar employee unfair practices in Taft-Hartley, 
specifically Section 158 (b) (1) (2) (3).^^ There are seven
items in the employee organization unfair practices section of 
Taft-Hartley, while the bilateral statutes produce twenty-two 
separate items.
Item one of employee unfair practices restricts employee 
organizations from restraining or coercing an employee in the 
exercise of rights guaranteed by the regulations, and of re­
straining the employer in the selection of his representative 
for the purposes of negotiation or settlement of grievances.
Item two prohibits the employee from refusing to bargain col­
lectively in good faith with the employer if the organization 
has been designated as the exclusive representative of the 
employees in an appropriate unit. Items one and two of both 
employer and employee unfair practices are very similar in 
meaning. Item three is a prohibition against striking or con­
ducting a slowdown or work stoppage. In all jurisdictions ex­
cept five, Alaska (PE), Hawaii (PE-T), Montana (N),
Pennsylvania (PE-T), and Vermont (ME-F), the strike is pro­
hibited in separate sections of the regulations, although
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within the five mentioned jurisdictions the right to strike 
is not a b s o l u t e . 14 item four corresponds to item six of the 
employer table in requiring the employee organization not to 
fail to cooperate in impasse p r o c e d u r e s . 1^
Items five through twenty-two have from five listings or 
less among the twenty-one jurisdictions. In fact, seven have 
only a single jurisdictional listing. Since there is such nar­
row coverage of these items among the jurisdictions the reader 
is encouraged to turn to Table 7-2 and study these items in­
stead of having them presented in narrative form here. It 
should be noted that eight of these items are found in the 
Minnesota (PE-T) statute with item fifteen the only exception.1^  
It is somewhat strange that the employee unfair practices 
would show so little unanimity among so few items, only two, 
while the employer unfair practices have five such unanimous 
items. Likewise, Taft-Hartley has listed only five employer 
unfair practices while public bilateralism examined here pro­
duces fifteen listings. Continuing in this line of thought, 
Taft-Hartley lists seven employee unfair practices while public 
bilateralism examined here produces twenty-two. This lack of 
unanimity is strange since the development of bilateralism is 
seen by the public administrator and official as a threat of 
employee intrusion into their area of discretion. Doesn't it
243
seem likely that the employee unfair practices would be much 
more restrictive with more jurisdictions having common listings 
instead of indicating this in the employer unfair practices? 
Besides, the Michigan (PE) and Montana (N) statutes cover only 
employer unfair practices and not employee unfair practices.
This is an intriguing difference on which, at this time, avail­
able research material sheds little light. But it is tenta­
tively hypothesized that the political pulling and hauling 
within each jurisdiction as it developed its bilateral legis­
lation precipitated such diversity.
Procedures for Handling Complaints 
The data for this section are taken from the jurisdictions 
having listings under either (or both) employer and employee 
unfair practices. To begin with, of the twenty-seven statutes, 
eleven have provisions for handling complaints which simply 
state that the board established to regulate bilateral activi­
ties should be approached and will handle any complaint under 
rules and regulations so established by the board or that a 
court of competence and jurisdiction should be approached.
Of the remaining sixteen statutes, fifteen stipulate that the 
complaint should be filed with the board so established to 
handle complaints. The Maryland (BLT) statute provides for the
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filing of a complaint with a third party agency designated by 
the Office of Labor Commissioner.^®
After the complaint is filed, the Connecticut (ME) pro­
cedure calls for its agent (an undesignated person or persons 
acting on behalf of the Board) to investigate and report so 
that the State Board of Labor Relations can either dismiss the 
complaint or call a hearing.19 The procedures in Kentucky (F), 
Maine (ME-T), Vermont (SE), and Michigan (PE) will not accept 
a complaint covering an alleged violation occurring over six
months prior to its filing (except for cause such as military 
•  ^oservice). Upon receipt of the complaints all procedures call 
for the notification of the accused of the charges. Upon 
notification the accused has generally five to seven days to 
respond to the charges.
Generally the hearing is to be conducted within five to 
seven days after the issuance of the complaint. Any hearing 
ordered or held in response to a complaint is informal with 
judicial rules of evidence inapplicable. Informal procedures 
and the inapplicability of judicial rules of evidence are also 
main features of the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, 
cited in Section 156 of Taft-Hartley. This section allows the 
NLRB to make, amend, and rescind rules and regulations neces­
sary to carry out its responsibilities.21 The Pennsylvania
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(PE-T) statute allows either the Pennsylvania Labor Relations 
Board, a member of the Board, or an agent of the Board to con­
duct the h e a r i n g . 22 m  Wisconsin (SE) a tribunal of three can 
be established by the Employment Relations Commission or the 
Commission can let the parties each strike (mark-out) two names 
from a list of seven to establish a tribunal to conduct the 
h e a r i n g . 23 The Michigan (PE) hearing can be conducted by an 
agent required to report within twenty d a y s . 24 Under Federal 
E.O. 11491 the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management 
Relations and the Employee-Management Relations Commission 
under Federal E.O. 11636 shall decide complaints of alleged
violations.25
Upon the evidence taken during the hearing, in which a 
transcript is usually taken, the complaint will be either dis­
missed or a cease and desist order issued with affirmative 
action to correct the unjustice. Affirmative action can be 
either withdrawal of certification, reinstatement of an employee 
with or without back pay, or the ordering of fact-finding upon 
refusal to bargain with the charged party paying full costs, 
is provided for in both Connecticut (ME) and Massachusetts 
( M E - T ) . 26 Court review is available in all jurisdictions hav­
ing administrative proceedings with the Michigan (PE) and 
Pennsylvania (PE-T) statutes providing length specifications 
for review.27
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Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has been an analysis of the employer and 
employee unfair labor practices and the procedures for hand­
ling complaints. These unfair practices are provided to in­
form all concerned parties of what action, if engaged in, 
carries the threat of exposure and sanction. Why are unfair 
practices needed? Unfortunately they are needed to maintain 
a degree of order and decorum within the environment of bi­
lateralism. Bilateral relations produce conflict situations, 
but without these restrictions the conflict could become un­
manageable. Unfair practices provisions are analogous to a 
line drawn in the dirt separating legal from illegal labor- 
management activities.
In the analysis and comparison of the data, more items 
are listed under employee unfair practices than employer un­
fair practices (twenty-two as compared to fifteen). But there 
is more commonality in employer unfair practices than employee 
unfair practices, with commonality here meaning that an indi­
vidual item is found in at least a majority of the jurisdictions.
The employer unfair practices with some commonality pro­
hibit any interference in the employee's exercise of the rights 
granted and state that the employer is not to tamper in any way 
with the existence or organization of an employee organization.
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The employer is not to discriminate against an employee in any 
way to encourage or discourage membership in an employee or­
ganization, nor discharge or discriminate against an employee 
filing an affidavit, petition or complaint or giving testimony 
under the authority of the legislation. Lastly, the employer 
is not to refuse to negotiate collectively with an exclusively 
recognized employee organization.
The employee unfair practices having some degree of com­
monality restrict an employee organization from restraining 
or coercing an employee in the exercise of rights granted, and 
from restraining or coercing an employer in the selection of 
his representative in collective negotiations or grievance 
proceedings. The employee organization is not to refuse to 
negotiate collectively with the organization designated as the 
exclusive representative of the employees in an appropriate 
unit. Lastly, the employees are not to engage in a strike, 
slowdown, or other work stoppage.
Now comes the intriguing point of analysis that ten of 
fifteen employer unfair practices do not have commonality, 
while nineteen of twenty-two employee unfair practices do not 
have commonality. Originally I thought that the employee un­
fair provisions would be both extensive and high in commonality. 
While the employee unfair practices provisions are extensive.
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they are not high in commonality. Why? No research material 
sheds any light upon the difference, but now that the differ­
ence is uncovered future research should be conducted to fill 
this data gap.
Chapter VIII concludes this examination of bilateralism 
by a recapitulation of the data covered and resulting conclu­
sions and an analysis of the influence of bilateralism upon 
the merit system. Along with the strike, the intrusion into 
the merit system of bilateralism is most feared. The main 
question for this section of the chapter is to define the 
"merit system," since a merit system must be delineated before 
bilateral influences can be gauged. This author is of the 
opinion, now, that the merit system and bilateralism can exist 
in the same environment without irreparable harm to either.
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CHAPTER VIII 
QUOD ERAT DEMONSTRANDUM
Bilateralism and the Merit System 
One of the pervasive fears of public bilateralism as 
it appeared on the public personnel horizon and throughout 
its development has been the destruction of the classical merit 
principle and its replacement by an industrial type of senior­
ity system. Tentatively it can be reported that the merit 
principle has survived the first ten years of bilateralism and 
shows few signs of atrophy.
Initially one great distinction must be made, i.e., the 
distinction between the merit principle and a merit system.
The former refers to the basic concepts, while the latter refers 
to the method of application. Robert E. Hampton, Chairman of 
the U.S. Civil Service Commission, supported this distinction 
when he stated; "Compounding the problem and confusing the 
picture are some misguided defenders of merit systems, and I 
emphasize here systems rather than principles because some sys­
tems in their administration have lost sight of the principles
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we advocate.Therefore, if the merit principle is to 
survive in an environment of public bilateralism, which I con­
tend it will, the principles or heart of the merit concept 
must be defined and defended. If this is not accomplished, 
then perhaps the merit principle will be lost when bilateralism 
overwhelms the merit system, which I believe it could. The 
main question is: What are the principles upon which the merit
system is established?
David T. Stanley differentiates between a merit system 
and merit principles by distinguishing the principles as polit­
ical neutrality, equal opportunity, and competition based upon 
merit and competency for recruitment, selection, and advance­
ment.2 The political neutrality of the civil service can be 
illustrated by the Hatch Act; the equal opportunity of the 
civil service can be illustrated by the efforts of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission; and the competition of the 
civil service can be seen in the Federal Service Entrance 
Examination. O. Glenn Stahl defines the merit principle in its 
broadest terms as a "system in which comparative merit or 
achievement governs each individual's selection and progress 
in the service and in which the conditions and rewards of 
performance contribute to the competency and continuity of the 
service."3 Also, he contends that a merit system is based upon 
"what a person knows rather than who a person knows.
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The Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 sets forth 
six merit principles which should form the foundation for an 
improved quality in personnel systems in all units of govern­
ment. These six merit principles are:
1. Recruiting, selecting, and advancing employees 
on the basis of their relative ability, know­
ledge, and skills, including open consideration 
of qualified applicants for initial appointment.
2. Providing equitable and adequate compensation.
3. Training employees, as needed, to assure high 
quality performance.
4. Retaining employees on the basis of the ade­
quacy of their performance, correcting inade­
quate performance, and separating employees 
whose inadequate performance.cannot be 
corrected.
•5. Assuring fair treatment of applicants and
employees in all aspects of personnel adminis­
tration without regard to political affilia­
tion, race, color, national origin, sex, or 
religious creed and with proper regard for 
their privacy and constitutional rights as 
citizens.
6. Assuring that employees are protected against 
coercion for partisan political purposes and 
are prohibited from using official authority 
for the purpose of interfering with or affect­
ing the result of an election or a nomination 
for office.5
In capsulated form, the merit principle, regardless of 
the area of application (training, staffing, compensation, 
etc.) is a "balanced and fair way," "true competition," and 
"equality of opportunity." But what of its alleged counterpart
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or replacement— seniority. What is seniority? Seniority is 
defined "as the measure of an employee's right to a particu­
lar job or to employment, in relation to other employees."®
The measure used is usually longevity.
Yet Stahl contends that if the clumsy application of 
the merit system deserves approbation, condemnation should be 
placed upon seniority regardless of its application. The ques­
tion for Stahl is:
. . . which produces the more serious and longer 
range ill effects? The employee's wounds of 
being passed over (even unjustifiably) in favor 
of a younger or newer candidate may be severe, but 
they usually heal in time, and, what's more, he 
usually has another chance; in contrast, the dead 
hand of disincentive, the downright stagnation so 
often observed in seniority-ridden organizations 
•leave shortcomings in the performance and spirit 
of an enterprise that are almost impossible to 
eradicate.?
Felix A. Nigro believes, along similar lines, that a 
distinction should be made between resentments and disappoint­
ments. Resentments refer to the frame of mind an employee 
generates under unfair treatment, i.e., in the absence of merit 
principles, while disappointments refer to an employee's or 
prospective employee's frame of mind when unsuccessful.® Re­
sentment should be eliminated, but Rosaline Levenson asserts 
that if seniority is the criterion, will the young, ambitious 
employee in public employment wait for promotion until the
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senior person retires or dies, thus creating a vacancy?^
Quoting from Stahl again:
If the manpower assessment and recruitment program 
does not reach out and attract the best minds and 
skill to apply for employment, then the rest of 
the staffing process consists merely of a sorting 
out among the mediocre and the ill-qualified.10
It may come as quite a surprise (it did to the author)
that only eleven jurisdictions mentioned the merit system in
thirteen statutes. (Remember the data came from thirty-six
jurisdictions having seventy-four statutes.) Of the thirteen
statutes, ten contain simply a short section or subsection of
only, at times, a few sentences. California (SE) Section 3525,
used as illustrative of these ten provisions, states:
Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to super­
sede the provisions of existing state law which 
establish and regulate a merit or civil service 
system or which provide for other methods of admin­
istering employer-employee relations. This chapter 
is intended, instead, to strengthen merit, civil 
service and other methods of administering 
employer-employee relations through the establish­
ment of uniform and orderly methods of communica­
tion between employees and the state.H
Although this section does not mention merit principles spe­
cifically, which should perhaps be corrected, this flaw is not 
fatal. Remember that many people use system and principle 
synonymously and more than likely this is the case with the 
above. Research needs to be conducted into the applicable 
state laws before condemning this absence of a statement
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directed toward the principles of the merit system. To perhaps 
ease this poor showing for the merit system, the management's 
rights provisions add eight jurisdictions arid nine statutes, 
since these rights generally cover applicable laws and regula­
tions dealing with hiring, promotion, and transfer, among other 
items.
The Connecticut (ME) statute, although supportive of the 
merit principle, does provide that negotiated hours of work 
for policemen and firemen and methods of covering or removing 
employees from coverage under the Connecticut municipal em­
ployees retirement system shall be superior to governing 
statutes.12 The Maine (ME-T) statute is also supportive of 
the merit principle for entrance, but negotiated provisions 
for binding arbitration for demotion, lay-off, reinstatement, 
suspension, removal, discharge or discipline shall be control­
ling in case of conflict with any authority or power.13 The 
Wisconsin (SE) provisions prohibit bargaining over policies, 
practices and procedures relating to original appointment and 
promotions and the job evaluation system. (Each general class 
is defined by a listing of specific items.) But the employer 
may bargain and reach agreement providing for an impartial 
hearing officer to review decisions of the personnel board in 
these two general areas, with power to affirm, modify or
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reverse only upon showing of arbitrary and capricious
action.14
But an interesting aspect, similar to Maryland v. Wirtz, 
is the "Standards for a Merit System of Personnel Administra­
tion " issued on March 6, 1971, by the Departments of Labor, 
Defense, and Health, Education, and Welfare. These Standards 
are designed to implement statutory and regulatory provisions 
of grant-in-aid programs requiring the establishing and main­
tenance of personnel standards on a merit basis. Specifically 
Section 70.1 (d) states:
Laws, rules, regulations, and policy statements 
to effectuate a merit system in accordance with
these standards are a necessary part of the ap­
proved State plans required as a condition of 
Federal grants. .Such laws, rules, regulations, 
policy statements, and amendments thereto, will 
be reviewed for substantial conformity to these 
standards. The administration of the merit 
system will likewise be subject to review for 
compliance in operation.15
With these requirements for certain grant-in-aid pro­
grams, can the states bargain away or infringe upon the merit 
system, even if permitted to do so in their legislation? It
would seem the federal requirement is superior to state law.
Thus the merit system (principle) is reinforced from another 
vantage point.
In conclusion, Stanley studied the relationship between 
the merit system and bilateralism in fifteen cities and four
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urban counties. Analyzing this relationship on such points 
as hiring, promotions, transfers, training, grievances and 
disciplinary appeals, classification, pay, and fringe benefits, 
he concludes that "the relationship is dynamic and immature."16 
He did find, for example, the expected effort toward using 
seniority in promotions, toward upgrading some positions and 
creating new positions thus influencing the classification 
plan, and toward replacing aptitude tests with performance 
tests. (These same ideas are elaborated somewhat in his book 
Managincr Local Government Under Union Pressure. ) I?
Seniority simply has a hard time finding a place in pub­
lic service for one major reason. If seniority is applied in 
promotions then doesn't this destroy lateral entry into the 
civil service. If lateral entry is eliminated then hiring can 
only be at the lowest level for any particular career. I con­
tend that such a turn of events would breed more evil than good. 
The superior person wanting to take or find a government job 
might very likely be prevented since the senior person would 
get the job.
Although the merit principle is now well established in 
public personnel administration, at least in the federal gov­
ernment and some states and local units of government, the 
Stanley study documents that complacency on the part of public
260
officials could place the merit principle in trouble. The 
merit system needs to be both defended and revitalized for it 
to continue, but merit principles must not be compromised. 
Although seldom mentioned in the bilateral statutes, this over­
sight needs correction.
Summary and Conclusions 
The diversification created by the prism of bilateralism 
is the recurring theme throughout this comparative study of the 
development of bilateralism in federal, state, and local units 
of government. This conceptual idea is founded upon the work 
of Fred W. Riggs. His ideas (using a structural-functional 
framework) are grounded upon the diversification or differen­
tiation produced within societies as they develop. Riggs' 
structural-functional framework, based on Talcott Parson's 
work, is applied in his prismatic model. Development is from 
a fused society through the prism of development into a dif­
fracted society. The functions in a diffracted society are 
more specific as compared to the diffuse functions in a fused 
society. In like terms, the units of government not yet in­
volved in bilateralism are analogous to Riggs' fused society 
because they use unilateralism based on sovereignty, but the 
prism of bilateralism (joint decision-making) produces 
diversification or differentiation in public labor-management
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relations in those governmental units involved in public 
bilateralism.
This diversification was seen throughout Chapters II 
through VII. The amount of diversification varied, with the 
least amount produced in Chapter VI with most jurisdictions 
prohibiting the strike and the greatest amount being spread 
equally among the other chapters. One disturbing element of 
this examination is that bilateralism is immature with its 
full impact yet to be determined. Conclusions drawn today 
will very likely be outdated tomorrow. Bilateralism is still 
developing so that any arrangement or procedure examined in 
this research is unfortunately quite susceptible to change.
The lack of conclusions in the following material is by 
no means an attempt on the author's part to resist any efforts 
to draw specific conclusions. The low level of generalization 
would render such efforts suspect. Public bilateralism is 
still so young and evolving that trying to grab hold of it is 
like grabbing mercury— now you have it but now you don't. 
Public bilateralism today is very dynamic, diversified, com­
plex, and confused. Thus, based on these elements and the 
political milieu of each unit of government entering bilater­
alism it will be some time before meaningful generalizations 
and conclusions can be developed.
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With this background of diversification and evolution. 
Chapter II examined the administrative machinery for imple­
menting bilateralism. The congeries of such arrangements can 
well be seen by examining Table 2-1. There are twenty-nine 
jurisdictions listed and forty-six separate administrative 
boards or agencies having a variety of duties and powers.
These boards or agencies were either already in existence 
handling industrial labor-management relations or have been 
created to handle public bilateralism. The reason for the 
variety of usages are yet to be fully explored, but tentatively, 
as Jean T. McKelvey sets forth, the diversification probably 
depends upon the employees covered, i.e., if the employees are 
associated with the general labor movement or are exclusively 
public in nature and not wanting to associate with the general 
labor movement. Those employee organizations associated with 
the general labor movement will generally use existing labor 
machinery, while those employee organizations not in associa­
tion with the general labor movement will use newly created 
machinery. These latter employees want little to do with 
"labor unions" or existing labor agencies.
Chapter III analyzes the many faceted topic of recogni­
tion. Recognition refers basically to three different pro­
cesses, i.e., the determination of the appropriate unit, the
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determination of the representative for the appropriate unit, 
and the determination of the extent of union security. An 
appropriate unit is that group of employees or part of an or­
ganization that is organized or grouped together to engage in 
bilateral activities. Representation elections are conducted 
to certify, decertify, or change representatives of the em­
ployees. Certification refers to the process of being elected 
to represent the employees, while decertification means the 
opposite. Decertification is bifurcated in that another rep­
resentative can be selected or the employees can choose not 
to be represented by any organization. Union security refers 
to the application of the union or agency shops, exclusive 
status, and the check-off. The union shop requires all em­
ployees, after a specified period, to join the union, while an 
agency shop requires the payment of a fee by the employee to 
the organization regardless of membership in order to defray 
the cost of representation. Only Kentucky (F) and Alaska (PE) 
provide for the union shop, while six jurisdictions allow the 
agency shop. Exclusive status means that the employee organi­
zation is the recognized representative, and this position 
cannot be challenged for a specified time, usually one year. 
Check-off refers to the deduction of employee organization 
fees from the employee's paycheck upon written authorization.
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Really the only solid conclusion that can be drawn from all 
this material is that each governmental unit is handling the 
problem differently. The diversification is so great and the 
area is evolving so rapidly that any conclusions are nothing 
more than mere speculation.
Nevertheless, it is probable at this time that super­
visors are generally excluded from such activity, but there 
are a few exceptions to this. Public management is still hav­
ing some trouble in drawing the line between supervisory and 
non-supervisory employees. The union shop will find little 
support within bilateralism, but the agency shop will expand 
slowly. The check-off of dues and other assessments is not a 
threat to management'exposition and should be granted where 
requested.
The diversification found in Chapter IV, the longest 
chapter, is indicative of the prismatic effect of bilateralism. 
The chapter is build upon an examination of scope of negotia­
tions, management's rights, publicity, official time, contract 
interpretation, and the beginning background material and gen­
eral provisions. The scope of negotiations refers to areas of 
labor-management relations that can be negotiated. Manage­
ment's rights refer to those rights retained and are therefore 
outside the scope of negotiation. Publicity refers to the
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aspect of public exposure in the negotiation of an agreement. 
Official time refers to the ability to negotiate during duty 
hours. Contract interpretation refers to the process of set­
tling disagreements over items in the agreement.
Although speculative at this time, it appears that the 
scope of negotiations outside of "wages and hours" will con­
tinue to expand. The "working conditions" are more open to 
negotiation since wages and hours are generally set by law, 
not contract. With the expanding scope of negotiation the 
right of management could shrink some, but it is contended 
that after further development a core of rights will emerge 
which will not be negotiated. Publicity is a knotty problem 
but it is my contention that executive sessions will be al­
lowed for preparation and negotiation sessions but that the 
resulting contract will need public exposure sometime. More 
and more official time (duty hours) will be used to conduct 
bilateral business since the work area is the normal meeting 
place for employer and employee.
The diversity in impasse resolution methods is well de­
picted in the fourteen classes presented in Table 5-1. If the 
negotiations become deadlocked, then the issue or issues are 
processed through either mediation, fact-finding, or arbitra­
tion. Mediation is simply the process of maintaining
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communication between the parties and trying to settle the 
dispute through gentle persuasion. Fact-finding is the pro­
cess of trying to settle an impasse through studying the con­
flict and issuing a statement of facts and perhaps recommen­
dations that the parties may have overlooked— usually caused 
by the blindness generated by the conflict. Arbitration is 
the settlement of the conflict by a third party. But again 
the way the three approaches are used in public bilateralism 
is extremely diverse. At times mediation is used like fact­
finding, and at times fact-finding resembles advisory arbitra­
tion. At least final-offer arbitration is distinctive enough 
to stand out as something new and different. Except that 
police and firemen are_the only public employees’covered by 
binding arbitration, conclusions are at best speculative. The 
essential nature of these employees probably accounts for the 
use of binding arbitration. Final impasse procedures will gain 
greater support in light of the need to find a replacement for 
the strike. The essentiality of public services necessitates 
final procedures.
Chapter VI examines the strike in bilateralism. This 
material allows the conclusion that with very few exceptions 
the strike by public employees is still prohibited. But 
Hawaii, Alaska, Montana, Vermont, and Pennsylvania are
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experimenting with a limited right to strike with the results 
yet to be determined. Although there are only these five jur­
isdictions permitting a limited right to strike, the expanded 
use of the strike is doubtful. With the advent of final-offer 
arbitration the likelihood of expansion has contracted.
Unfair labor practices (Chapter VII) are analogous to a 
line drawn in the dirt separating legal from illegal labor- 
management activities. Although there are more unfair employee 
practices listed than employer unfair practices, the employer 
practices have more commonality, i.e., they are found in more 
jurisdictions than are employee unfair practices. (See Tables 
7-1 and 7-2.) This difference is puzzling. Probably when the 
bilateral statutes were written there was more overall under­
standing of what management should not do than what the em­
ployee organization should not do. This difference will 
probably decrease with further development and with more ex­
perience in the area.
It is quite easy to examine this bilateral diversifica­
tion and rush to Washington for passage of some standardization 
so that everyone will be doing the same thing. In my estima­
tion nothing could be more foolhardy. I contend that eventu­
ally, and hopefully not in the distant future, this 
diversification or experimentation will begin to yield some
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methods of implementing bilateralism which seem "better" than 
other methods. This is illustrated by the as yet miniscule 
use of final-offer arbitration. Perhaps when more data is 
compiled and analyzed, the limited right to strike could spread 
beyond the five states now permitting it, but final-offer ar­
bitration could retard such expansion. Unless the federal 
legislation is drawn in very loose terms, thus permitting 
experimentation (which if done this way it would perhaps be 
better to have none at all), the federal conformity might 
impede experimentation. Let's not bind the feet of bilateral­
ism within the restrictions of federal legislation, but allow 
full growth and development of this diversification. In terms 
similar to John S. Mill's marketplace of ideas, let there be 
a full expression of ideas, for who knows in which area will 
lie a meaningful development for bilateralism.
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GLOSSARY
1. AFSCME; American Federal of County, Municipal, andj. 
State Employees (AFL-CIO) one of the largest unions.
2. Agency shop; An element of union security in which 
the employee is not required to jion the employee organiza­
tion but is required to pay some amount to defray the cost 
of negotiating and administering the agreement.
3. Arbitration t A third party process of resolving 
an impasse in which the arbitrator examines the issues in 
conflict and determines the solution. The process can be 
either voluntary, compulsory, binding, or advisory, but 
advisory arbitration closely resembles fact-finding with 
recommendations.
4. Bilateralism ; The emerging labor-management rela­
tionship in the public sector based on joint-decision making. 
This relationship closely resembles industrial labor relations,
5. Certification ; Refers to that aspect of represen­
tation elections in which an amployee organization is desig­
nated as the representative for a unit.
6. Check-off: Refers to the process of taking employee
organization dues and other assessments out of the employee's 
pay check upon written authorization by the employee.
7. Decertification: Refers to that aspect of repre­
sentation elections in which one employee organization is 
replaced by another organization or where the employees reject 
the present representative and do not desire another.
8. Exclusive representation: An element of union secur­
ity meaning that the employee organization representing an 
appropriate unit is the only organization entitled to do so 
for some unchallengeable period.
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9. Fact-finding: Refers to the third party process of
resolving an impasse whereby issues in conflict are analyzed 
to provide the parties with data; fact-finding with recommen­
dations closely resembles advisory arbitration.
10. Final-offer arbirtation: A third party process of 
resolving an impasse in which the arbitrator is limited to 
the offers submitted by the parties in determining the resolu­
tion.
11. Impasse : Refers to a negotiation deadlock; see 
mediation, fact-finding, arbitration, final-offer arbitration.
12. Mediation: A third party process of resolving an 
impasse through advising or assisting the parties.
13. Representation election: Refers to the process of 
determining whether the employees desire representation; see 
certification, decertification.
14. Sovereignty: Ultimate political power in a unit of 
government; used as a support for unilateralism but now being 
waived to permit bilateralism.
15. Unilateralism: A decision-making process used prior
to bilateralism in which the public employer made all policy 
decisions based on its sovereign position.
16. Union security; Refers to various items which 
provide a measure of security to the employee organization 
in bilateralism; see exclusive representation, union shop, 
agency shop, check-off.
17. Union shop: An element of union security in which 
employees are required to join the employee organization within 
a specified period to retain employment.
18. Unit or Appropriate bargaining unit: Means a group 
of employees, however determined, that is the negotiating 
counterpart of public management.
APPENDIX A
ABBREVIATIONS
The employee coverage of the data is repeatedly referred 
to, e.g., Alaska (PE). This is necessary to indicate the sta­
tute used since several jurisdictions have more than one sta­
tute each with different employee coverage. For illustration, 
Executive Orders 11491 and 11635 have different employee cover­
age, i.e., 11491 covers the general civil service with some 
qualifications while 11636 covers the Department of State. 
Therefore, to facilitate handling the data in the narrative, 
tables, and footnotes, the jurisdictions' name (state or fed­
eral) is presented and then the coverage, e.g., Nebraska (T) 
or Federal E.O. 11636. Appendix C can be referred to for a 
more detailed presentation on coverage. The following abbrevi­
ations are used throughout this study.
PE— public employees 
SE— state employees 
LE— local employees 
T— teachers 
P— policemen 
F— firemen 
N— nurse
273
274
SP— school personnel, Oregon 
AE— academic employees, Washington 
SU— state university, Washington 
PDE— port district employees, Washington 
LA— Los Angeles 
NYC— New York City 
BLT— Baltimore 
PLT— Portland
APPENDIX B
STATUTES AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS USED IN THE STUDY 
AND THE DATE OF THEIR EFFECTIVENESS
Jurisdiction Date of Effectiveness
Alabama
Firefighters
Alaska
8—16—1967
Public Employees Relations Act 
Teachers
5-5-1972
8-16-1972
California
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act 
State Employees 
Winton Act (teachers) 
Firefighters 
Los Angeles
Connecticut
12-1-1971
12-1-1971
2-1971
Municipal Employee Relations Act 
Teachers
6-16-1967
1964
Delaware
Right of Public Employees to Organize 
Teachers
6-15-1965
10-31-1969
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Florida
Fire Fighters Bargaining Act 1-1-1973
Teachers Professional Negotiations Law
(Hillsborough County) 7-3-1971
Georaia
Firefighters Mediation Act 4-5-1971
Hawaii
Public Employees 
Idaho
7-1-1970
Firefighters
Teachers
1970
7-1-1971
Kansas
Public Employees 
Teachers
3-1-1972
3-23-1970
Kentucky
Fire Fighters Collective Bargaining 
Act 
Policemen
7-1-1972
6-16-1972
Maine
Municipal Public Employees Labor 
Relations Act 6-9-1972
Maryland
Teachers
Baltimore
7-1-1969
9-30-1969
Massachusetts
State Employees 
Local Employees
6-6-1972
6-6-1972
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Michigan
Public Employment Relations Act 
Policemen's and Firemen's Arbitration
7-23-1965
5-4-1972
Minnesota
Public Employment Labor Relations Act
Missouri
7-1-1972
Public Employees 10-13-1969
Montana
Nurses in Health-Care Facilities 
Professional Negotiations Act for 
Teachers
7-1-1969
7-1-1971
Nebraska
Public Employees 
Nebraska Teachers' Professional 
Negotiations Act
Nevada
7-6-1972
10-23-1967
Local Government Employee-Management 
Relations Act 4-28-1969
New Hampshire
Public Employees 
Policemen
8—26—1969
5-27-1972
New Jersey
New Jersey Employer-Employee 
Relations Act 4-1-1969
New Mexico
Public Employee-Management Relations 
Regulations issued by State 
Personnel Board 7-1-1971
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New York
Taylor Act 
New York City
North Dakota
Public Employee Mediation 
Teachers
Oklahoma
9-29-1972
9-29-1972
7-1-1969
Firefighter's and Policemen's 
Arbitration Law 
Teachers
4-6-1972
1971
Oregon
Public Employees 
Teachers
School Personnel
Nurses
Portland
Pennsylvania
7-1-1969
9-9-1971
1971
7-1-1969
11-14-1968
Public Employee Relations Act 
Policemen and Firemen
10-21-1970
6—24—1968
Rhode Island
State Employees Labor Relations Act 
Municipal Employees' Arbitration Act 
School Teachers' Arbitration Act 
Firemen 
Policemen
5-8-1972
5-8-1972
5-11-1966
4-20-1970
4-20-1970
South Dakota
Public Employees 
Firemen and Policemen
7-1-1970
3-19-1971
Texas
Teachers 1967
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Vermont
State Employees Labor Relations Act 
Public Employees and Firefighters 
Teachers
Washington
Public Employees Collective Bargaining 
Act 
Teachers
Community College Academic Employees 
State University System Educators 
Port District Employees
Wisconsin
4-24-1969
7-1-1970
9—1—1969
7-1-1967
8-9-1971 
7-1-1969 
3-21-1967
State Employment Labor Relations Act 
Municipal Employment Relations Act
Wyoming
Firefighters
Federal Government
5-1-1972
11-11-1971
1968
Executive Order 10988 
Executive Order 11491 
Executive Order 11636
1-17-1962
10-29-1969
12-17-1971
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Connecticut
ME c
T d
Delaware
PE c
T d
Florida
F e
T d
Georgia
F e
Hawaii
PE-T a b d g h
Idaho
F e
T d
Kansas
PE a c
T d
Kentucky
F e
P f
Maine
ME-T
Maryland
BLT c
T d
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Massachusetts
SE a
ME-T b
Michigan
PE a b
P-F
Minnesota
PE-T a b
Missouri
PE a
Montana
N
T
Nebraska
PE a b
T
Nevada
LE-T b
New Hampshire
SE a
P
New Jersey
PE-T a b
New Mexico
SE a
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New York
PE-T a b d
NYC c
North Dakota 
T
Oklahoma
F—P—ME c
T d
Oregon
PE a c
T d
SP d
N
PTL
Pennsylvania
PE-T a b d
F-P e f
Rhode Island
SE a
ME c
T d
F e
P f
South Dakota
PE-T a b d
F-P e f
Texas
Vermont
Washington
PDE
Wisconsin
Wyoming
F
Federal
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SE a
ME—F c e
T d
LE c
T d
AE h
SU h
SE a
ME-T b d
10988 i
11491 i
11636 i
APPENDIX D
WORKING CONDITIONS PROVISIONS OF THE 1957 
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE SOCIAL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES UNION AND THE NEW YORK 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
1. The City agrees to provide adequate, clean, 
well-ventilated, safe and sanitary office space, in full com­
pliance with all applicable law and the rules and regulations 
of the Departments of Health, Buildings, Fire, Labor, and 
Water Supply, Gas and Electricity, for each employee covered 
by this contract.
2. The City shall provide each employee covered by this 
contract with supplies, equipment and telephone services, ade­
quate to perform his duties and responsibilities.
3. All new Social Service Centers shall be air-condi­
tioned. All old Social Service Centers, not yet air-conditioned, 
shall be converted to air-conditioned status as soon as possible.
4. The City shall permit operation of a vending machine 
by a concessionaire to make available lunch, coffee and soft 
drinks on the premises, subject to approval of the Board of 
Extimate, and to rules and regulations governing use of such 
machines.
5. New Locations— The City agrees to acquire space and 
open new work locations necessary to comply with all provisions 
of this contract. The City further agrees to continue to expand 
the staff of the Bureau of Plant Management on an as-needed 
basis during the term of this contract. If sufficient qualified 
staff cannot be recruited, the City agrees to contract out 
necessary work functions to reduce delays in the establishment 
of new work locations and additional work space.
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6. Painting— The City agrees to paint each work loca­
tion at least once every five (5) years.
7. Lounges— A lounge area which is usable as a lounge 
shall be made available in each work location, unless by 
agreement of the parties such space is temporarily utilized 
for caseload contract compliance.
8. Desks and Chairs— Each Caseworker and Home Econo­
mist shall be provided with a desk and chair.
9. Dictating Machines— The Department will provide 
two dictating machines to each three case units plus a 10% 
reserve of dictating machines in each Social Service Center 
and Bureau of Child Welfare. These machines shall be kept 
in good working order. Each dictating machine shall be 
placed in a sound proof booth. The Division of Day Care 
shall be provided with a minimum of fifteen (15) new machines. 
Field Caseworkers in the Division of Day Care shall be per­
mitted to use dictating machines in Social Service Centers, 
provided the transcription is done at the Division of Day Care.
10. Adding Machines— Each Home Economist shall be 
provided with an adding machine.
11. Duplicating Machine— A duplicating machine shall 
be made available in each Social Service Center, Bureau of 
Child Welfare location, and the Homemaking Center.
12. Manuals and Handbooks— Upon appointment to staff, 
each employee shall be supplied with a current copy of the 
appropriate Department of Social Service manual, handbook, 
and if assigned to field work, a field book.
13. Coat Racks— Coat and hat racks for hanging such 
garments shall be provided on each floor in each work location.
14. Thermometers— A thermometer shall be installed 
on each floor in each work location.
15. Water Fountains— Adequate water fountains shall
be provided on each floor in each work location, provided that 
no fountain need be placed on a floor where less than twenty 
(20) employees are assigned.
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16. Homemaker's Equipment— Homemakers shall be supplied 
with the equipment necessary to the performance of their 
duties including rubber gloves, a sewing kit and a utility bag.
17. Conference Rooms— A conference room shall be provid­
ed in each Social Service Center, Bureau of Child Welfare loca­
tion and Homemaking Center; unless by agreement of the parties, 
such space is temporarily utilized for caseload contract com­
pliance.
18. Children's Counselors Office Space— Sufficient 
office space with desks and chairs shall be provided for 
Children's Counselors to do required office work.
19. Centrex— All new Social Service Centers shall be 
equipped with a centrex telephone system, and all old Social 
Service Centers, not yet equipped with centrex shall be 
converted, in accordance with schedules, to be worked out 
with the New York Telephone Company. Where centrex cannot 
be installed in 1967, additional telephones as needed will 
be provided.
20. Lockers— In the planning of new or renovated 
Children's Centers, lockable clothing lockers shall be provid­
ed for Children's Counselors on the basis of one locker per 
Children's Counselor.
Pending the provision of clothing lockers, the Depart­
ment agrees to provide a small "valuables" locker for each 
Children's Counselor.
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